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Abstract 
We know little about the formation and maintenance of delusional beliefs. Two 
main approaches have dominated the scant literature. These seek to account for delusions 
as primarily disturbances of perception (Maher, 1988) or as differences in reasoning 
(Garety, 1991). The concern here is with reasoning biases. Garety and Hemsley (1994) 
have proposed a model in which delusions'are caused by a "failure to utilise previously 
acquired information". This leads to people with delusions exhibiting characteristic 
information processing biases in reasoning (i.e. hastiness and overconfidence). The aim 
of the present research was to compare the performance on reasoning tasks of people with 
delusions with that of psychiatric and normal control subjects in order to examine whether 
these subjects exhibited the proposed characteristics of delusional thought. The reasoning 
tasks were manipulated in both the form of reasoning (deductive, probabilistic etc.) and in 
content to examine the effect of reasoning with different types of material (neutral or 
emotional). 
The results of the six studies demonstrated both abnormal and normal reasoning by 
people with delusions. These people were no more confident than control subjects in the 
certainty of the correctness of their answers (Experiment 2). Nor were people with 
delusions excessively swayed by information currently present in the environment 
(Experiments 1 and 5) which is a supposed consequence of the inability to use past 
experience. However, people with delusions were shown to be hasty in their decisions 
relative to comparison subjects (Experiment 5). This hastiness was further exaggerated 
when the material reasoned with was self referent in content (Experiment 6). In addition, 
people with delusions were significandy poorer at reasoning on one of the most researched 
paradigms the Wason Selection Task (Experiments 3 and 4). The relevance of these 
findings for theories of delusions was examined. 
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Chapter One 
1 
M Diagnosis and definition of Delusions 
1.1 A brief introduction to the thesis 
Delusions are the hallmark of madness. A person expressing bizarre ideas of 
persecution or grandiosity would likely be called insane or schizophrenic. Jaspers 
(1963) stated that "delusion has been taken as the basic characteristic of insanity. To be 
mad was to be deluded." (p.93). Delusions are usually defined as false beliefs. Unlike 
other beliefs, surprisingly little is known about how and why delusions are formed. 
Early clinicians had a great deal to say about the causes of delusions (i.e. Serieux and 
Capgras, 1909, Freud, 1915). However, the Behaviourist approach considered mental 
symptoms, like delusions and the study of consciousness, inappropriate to investigate. 
Recently, cognitive psychologists have regained the confidence to research these 
previously neglected areas. Now the attempt to understand the nature and function of 
delusions is one of the most exciting challenges to current psychology. 
This thesis reports a number of studies that examined one of the proposed 
mechanisms for the formation and maintenance of delusional beliefs. Specifically, it has 
been suggested that people with delusions exhibit biases in reasoning that contribute to 
the forming and holding of the abnormal belief (Bentall, 1994, Garety and Hemsley, 
1994). This theory is more carefully considered in a review of the literature surrounding 
the nature, definition and theories of delusions. Then this theory is tested in a number of 
empirical studies. 
In this thesis it is contended that delusions are formed and maintained using 
reasoning processes similar to those used in other non delusional beliefs. Delusions are 
proposed to exist on a continuum with normal beliefs; they differ in degree rather than in 
kind. This notion is supported by the demonstration that many normal beliefs are 
formed using biases in thinking and that delusions also rely on these types of biases, 
only to a more extreme degree. The specific differences in reasoning form the body of 
research. Naturally, any discussion of factors leading to the development and 
maintenance of delusions must necessarily begin with a consideration of what a delusion 
is. 
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1.2 Definition 
Delusions are disturbances in the content of thought, and not in the thinking 
process, as in Formal Thought Disorder. To an observer, a delusion appears to be a false 
belief that is out of keeping with what other people would generally believe. To the 
person holding the delusional belief, the delusion wil l be indistinguishable from any 
other belief held. The decision to determine a belief as being delusional is not made by 
the person holding that belief. Rather, the judgement is made by an external observer. 
Typically, the belief wi l l be considered delusional i f there is an apparent lack of 
supporting evidence. For instance, someone may feel that they are being watched by the 
police because the street lamp outside the room flickers. 
The DSM-IIIR (American Psychiatric Association, 1987) is fairly standard in its 
definition of a delusion. In this case delusions are defined as false personal beliefs that 
are "based on incorrect inference about external reality and are firmly sustained in spite 
of what almost everyone else believes, and in spite of what constitutes incontrovertible 
and obvious proof to the contrary. The belief is not one ordinarily accepted by other 
members of the persons culture or subculture." Therefore, for a person to be diagnosed 
as deluded it is required that s/he views the belief as veridical, that it is based on 
incorrect inference, it is not shared by most other people in his or her culture and that the 
person maintains the belief in the face of incontrovertible evidence sufficient to 
disconfirm it. 
1.2.1 Problems of Diagnosis of Delusions 
Adequate as the DSM-IIIR definition appears to be, as Jaspers (1963) noted 
"definition wi l l not dispose of the matter". Maher (1992a) discusses the discrepancy 
between the ideal view of delusions and the reality of actually diagnosing them. In 
practice, the diagnosis of delusions is made on a different basis to that implied above. 
Beliefs are defined as delusional not when they have been demonstrated to be false but 
because they appear to be highly implausible. The assessment of plausibility is made by 
a clinician on the basis of common sense and not on the basis of evaluation of empirical 
data on an index of "plausibility". Hence, the occasional situation may arise in which an 
individual has been regarded as deluded because s/he has held a highly implausible 
belief that later turned out to be true 1 . The possibility that the belief considered as a 
delusion is actually true is rarely taken seriously. Mayerhoff, Pelta, Valentino and 
Chakos (1991) report that a woman considered to be deluded on the basis of her 
1 Maher (1988) refers to this as the Martha Mitchell Effect. This woman was the wife of the Attorney 
General of the United States. She alleged that illegal activity was taking place in the White House. She 
was regarded as suffering some form of psychosis until the Watergate affair altered everyone's opinion. 
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reporting being the victim of threats, actually was being threatened. Similarly, Lemert 
(1962) on the basis of interviews with paranoid patients concluded that most had been 
the victims of genuine conspiracy. Of course, without external objective confirmation 
this high endorsement rate may be a function of a well integrated delusional belief and 
the effects of being hospitalised and disempowered. 
In addition, it is not usually the case that counter evidence is ever presented to 
the patient. Moor and Tucker (1979) note that conviction in the belief is poorly explored 
and is usually assumed. Counter argument is rarely used, as it is considered unwise to 
confront patients with their delusions. Slater and Roth (1969) suggested that it was a 
waste of time to argue with patients over their delusions. It is true that to dispute the 
delusion probably would be fruitless, but so it would be with most people with strongly 
held ideas. A delusional belief must be seen as like any normal belief and that it will not 
be readily abandoned until it is replaced by a better belief. Therefore, the existence of 
incorrigibility cannot be considered as indicative of pathology, as this is normal (this 
wi l l be demonstrated in chapter 3). I f one considers that a delusion appeared for a 
reason and that until an alternative can be supplied that satisfies the original requirement 
for an explanation, the delusional belief will not be rejected. Thus, it can be seen that 
the clinical application of the definition is not as simple as it would appear. 
1.2.2 Problems in the Definition of Delusions 
Besides the problems in diagnosis, Maher (1992a) notes this strict definition of 
what constitutes a delusional belief holds certain implications. One implication is that 
the causal pathology most likely lies in a process of incorrect inference i.e. people with 
delusions have faulty reasoning processes. Additionally, the definition implies that any 
belief may be categorically classed as either true or false. It assumes there exist criteria 
by which to determine the falsity or truth of a belief and that there are clear criteria for 
correct and incorrect inference. Similarly, the assumption is that it is possible to assess 
the degree to which the available counter evidence is sufficient to disconfirm a belief. 
Therefore, delusions are assumed to categorically differ from normal beliefs and that this 
deviation is checked against some external criteria. However, the actual falsity of a 
belief is not stricdy necessary, as in cases of delusional jealousy the partner may actually 
be unfaithful. In the case of religious delusions based on assumptions of faith, there can 
be no judgement as to the relative truth or falsity of the belief. 
It is apparent that the formal definition of delusions (DSM-IIIR, or now DSM-
IV) assumes that the majority of beliefs are non delusional. Presumably then, the 
majority of beliefs held by the vast majority of people are based on correct inference, are 
generally held by others, are not demonstrably false, or i f so are rapidly modified in the 
face of counter evidence. This would then cause normal beliefs to be so prevalent in the 
3 
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population that the existence of an abnormal delusional belief would be immediately 
apparent and thus, easy to diagnose. Naturally, the existence of such a belief would 
imply an underlying deviant process in the individuals who hold them, as the beliefs are 
so distinct from normal. 
However, this is not the case. Normal beliefs rarely i f ever, fu l f i l all of the 
criteria outlined above. This is most obvious when one considers that the formal 
definition of delusions is inadequate when attempting to distinguish clinically abnormal 
beliefs from other non pathological, but subjectively important beliefs (i.e. political or 
religious). In addition, many beliefs are based on incorrect inference and are not formed 
using prescriptively correct procedures. For instance, Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky 
(1982) demonstrated that reasoning is often based on heuristics or rules of thumb. 
Therefore, judgement is based not on logical thought but on biases produced by calling 
to mind the most readily available information or most representative case. This issue of 
what constitutes a normal belief will be returned to in chapter 3. 
Delusions have been shown to vary in fixity and conviction over time (Garety, 
1985). This indicates that the belief is not necessarily fixed, one of the tenets of the 
definition. Also, the success of cognitive therapy with patients with delusions indicates 
that their beliefs are not always resistant to counter arguments, i f expressed in the right 
way (Chadwick and Lowe, 1990, Kingdon and Turkington, 1991b). 
Therefore, some authors have suggested that delusions can be thought of as being 
on a continuum of thought running from normal to pathological beliefs (Strauss, 1969). 
Rather than consider delusions as categorically different, they can be regarded as sharing 
many of the features of normal beliefs. These dimensional theorists have speculated that 
delusions are not all or nothing phenomena and this has allowed the recognition that 
delusion like beliefs appear to be within the realms of normality. Support for this 
position comes from a number of sources. In the measurement of delusions Garety 
(1985) and Kendler, Glazer and Morgenstern (1983) demonstrated that delusions are 
variable in fixity and are multidimensional. Garety and Hemsley (1987) reported four 
global dimensions that apparently vary in a continuous manner. 
1.2.3 Alternative Classification Systems 
Rather than view delusions as all or nothing phenomena that have little in 
common with normal beliefs, it may be best to consider delusions as on a continuum, 
with normal beliefs. With this in mind an alternative classification scheme is necessary. 
Oltmanns (1988) suggested a dimensional approach using 7 criteria. Normal beliefs wil l 
have some of the features listed below but it is more likely that delusions will have all of 
them. Naturally, ideas that occupy the middle ground wi l l still be debatable. None of 
the elements are necessary or sufficient for diagnosis. 
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A) The balance of evidence for and against the belief is such that others 
consider it completely incredible. 
B) The belief is not shared by others. 
C) The belief is held with firm conviction. Statements or behaviours are 
unresponsive to presentation of evidence contrary to the belief. 
D) The subject is preoccupied (or emotionally committed to the belief) and 
finds it difficult to avoid thinking or talking about it . 
E) The belief involves personal reference rather than unconventional religious 
or scientific or political conviction. 
F) The belief is a source of subjective distress or interferes with the person's 
occupation or social functioning. 
G) The person does not report any subjective effort to resist the belief (unlike 
a person with an obsession). 
Naturally, not all of the factors are of the same importance. Hence, the greater 
number of characteristics does not increase the chance of diagnosis. The elements are 
not restricted to delusions as non-deluded persons wil l refuse to abandon certain ideas in 
the face of contradictory evidence (Maher, 1988, Nisbett and Ross, 1980). 
Maher (1988) advocates an alternative to the descriptive content based 
classification of the DSM-IV(1995). In the field of normal beliefs content is not seen to 
be important in classification. Rather, there is an emphasis on the explanatory structures 
employed. Maher cites Southard (1916) who proposed that delusions can be classified 
according to logical structure in accordance with moods of grammar that the form 
reflected. There may well be a case for the logical structure of a delusion to have a role 
in classification. However, this possibility has not been pursued. 
1.3 Types of Delusions 
Delusions have been reported in over 70 conditions (Manschreck, 1979). These 
include psychiatric, neurological, metabolic and organic illnesses. Delusions are seen in 
Parkinson's disease, Alzheimer's disease and other dementing illnesses (Cummings, 
1985) as well as in temporal lobe epilepsy, drug and alcohol abuse and HIV infection. 
Any disease process that affects the brain may well affect cognitive processes, reasoning 
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and judgement and may ultimately affect beliefs. However, in the dementing diseases 
the delusions seen are often in a context of general mental decline and are often 
relatively simple, non elaborated beliefs, that differ from those seen in the much younger 
people with schizophrenia. Delusions are also seen in association with specific lesions 
in the brain. For instance, Anosognosia is the denial of the presence of an iilness such as 
hemipariesis and occurs in some subjects after contra lateral damage to the parietal lobe. 
Delusions are also prevalent in the functional psychoses such as Mania (bipolar 
disorder), delusional disorder and schizophrenia. In fact, delusions are in many ways the 
hallmark or defining features of the presence of schizophrenia (Benson and Stuss, 1990). 
Delusions are usually classified according to theme and content and some 
specific contents are associated with specific disorders and these are outlined below. 
The focus of this thesis is with the specific delusions associated with psychosis. 
Delusions are sometimes divided into primary and secondary. Primary delusions 
or autochthonous delusions are considered to be "native to the soul" (Sims, 1988) and 
arise directly without external cause. Such beliefs are meant to occur un-understandably 
(Jaspers, 1963) and do not occur in response to another psychopathological form such as 
mood disorder. Primary delusions were assumed to be psychologically irreducible and 
were thought to occur only in schizophrenia. Secondary delusions were meant to be 
delusion like ideas that were not true delusions as they were understandable given the 
person's life and history. 
This distinction between understandable and un-understandable is not readily 
accepted in current psychology. These terms were introduced by the early 
phenomenological psychiatrists who viewed schizophrenia as inexplicable and hence, 
any symptom of this condition should be equally inexplicable. Spitzer (1992) notes that 
Jaspers's differentiation between primary and secondary delusions was formulated when 
the pathogenic agent responsible for schizophrenia was expected to be discovered in the 
same way the cause of syphilis had been. 
As wil l be detailed later virtually all psychological theories of delusions view 
them as secondary to another process. Therefore, this distinction wil l not be used 
further. However, to an extent this notion of understandability continues in that so 
called "bizarre" delusions are given greater credence in the diagnosis of schizophrenia. 
Though what differentiates a bizarre from non bizarre delusion is a difficult issue to 
resolve and this leads to very low reliability in diagnosis (Fenton, Glashman and 
Heinssen, 1988, Flaum, Arndt and Andreasen, 1991, Goldman, Hien, Haas, Sweeney, 
and Frances, 1992). 
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1.4 Themes of Delusions 
Delusions are usually classified according to the theme that the delusion takes. 
The Present State Examination (PSE, Wing, Cooper and Sartorius, 1974) reports 13 
kinds of delusion, whilst the Schedule for Affective Disorders and Schizophrenia 
(SADS, Spitzer and Endicott, 1977) reports 11 types. Common delusional themes 
include ideas of importance (Grandiose), ideas of being persecuted, ideas of being loved 
and many more that are shown in table 1.1. 
Also shown in this table are some of the different conditions that delusions can 
be associated with. Some delusions such as those seen in the delusional 
misidentification syndromes (DMS) are specific delusional ideas that typically involve 
the belief that people have been replaced or are not who they appear to be. For instance, 
the Capgras delusion is the belief that someone like a loved relative is actually an 
impostor. Such delusions are extremely rare. When they do occur, these delusions are 
usually associated with a schizophrenia diagnosis. Berson (1983) notes that at least 55% 
of Capgras patients have a definite diagnosis of schizophrenia. However, recently there 
has been a great stress on the association of organic impairment in these subjects 
(Fleminger and Burns, 1993). For instance, the right hemisphere parietal lobe is often 
implicated in the condition of Reduplicative Paramnesia as well as the other DMS. The 
Capgras delusion and the other misidentification syndromes are the subject of a great 
deal of research and debate and this is mentioned briefly in the next chapter. However, 
this thesis is more concerned with the delusions seen specifically within the context of a 
psychotic syndrome. 
Some delusions are frequently associated with a diagnosis of schizophrenia. The 
World Health Organisation (International Pilot Study of Schizophrenia, 1973) reported 
that delusions of reference were found in 67% of schizophrenics, and delusions of 
persecution were seen in 64%. Delusions of control were present in 48% of the patients 
with schizophrenia. Only 10% of the patients showed evidence of Formal Thought 
Disorder. Delusions of Grandeur are very much more frequently associated with Bipolar 
Disorder (mania). Therefore, delusional beliefs are often associated with specific 
syndromes. However, delusions are not completely syndrome specific as a person with 
schizophrenia can have delusions of Grandeur or Guilt. This list (table 1.1) is not 
exhaustive but merely represents some of the delusional themes and the psychiatric 
classification associated with them. 
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Table 1.1: Delusional Themes. 
Theme Description Classification 
Control 
Delusional Mood 
Grandeur 
Guilt 
Infestation 
Jealousy 
Love 
Persecution 
Reference 
Somatic 
Hypochondriacal 
Sin 
Religion 
Belief of actions or thoughts 
being controlled 
Belief that things have changed 
feelings of unfamiliarily, deja vu, 
depersonalisalion, derealisation 
Belief of being famous or of having 
outstanding abilities 
Belief of being guilty of something 
that may not have done 
Belief that body is infested with small 
macroscopic organisms 
Belief that partner is unfaithful 
Belief of being loved by someone 
(especially from a higher social class) 
Belief of being persecuted by 
persons or agency 
Belief that radio and TV broadcasts 
are directed at the individual 
Belief of suffering a physical 
illness 
Belief that have committed terrible sins 
Belief in extreme religious ideas 
Misidentification Syndromes 
Impostors 
Nihilism 
Duplication of 
location 
Good Health 
Belief that others have been 
replaced by impostors 
Belief that strangers are actually 
disguised familiar people 
Belief that another person is 
physically transformed into self 
Belief that those around have changed 
place with each other 
Belief that one is dead or does 
not exist 
Belief that current location is also 
situated in a non adjacent area 
Belief that not ill when actually ill 
Denial of an illness such as 
hemipariesis 
Schizophrenia 
Schizophrenia 
Mania 
Schizophrenia 
Depression 
Schizophrenia 
Personality Disorder 
Alcohol abuse 
Erotomania 
De Clerembault's Syndrome 
Schizophrenia 
Delusional Disorder 
Schizophrenia 
Depression 
Schizophrenia 
Depression 
Schizophrenia 
Capgras Syndrome 
Fregoli Syndrome 
Subjective Doubles 
Doppleganger 
Intermetamorphosis 
Cotard Syndrome 
Reduplicative Paramnesia 
Anosognosia 
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1.5 Content of Delusions 
The actual content of the delusion is determined by the current culture of the 
experiencer. Therefore, there are differences in the content of delusions across time and 
across cultures. Persecutory delusions in the USA in the 1950's would often involve 
communist forces, KGB etc., as they were a powerful agent at the time. The 
mechanisms of controlling thoughts and actions have also changed from tape recorders 
to computers. The cross cultural differences are demonstrated by explanations for 
events given by members of West Indian communities that may involve voodoo or black 
magic. The explanation given by a European patient may involve X-rays and 
computers. 
1.6 Differentiation of Delusions from other psychiatric symptoms 
As has been noted, there are difficulties in defining delusions and distinguishing 
them from other normal beliefs (see pages 2-4 and chapter 3). In addition, there are 
considerable difficulties in distinguishing delusions from other abnormal thoughts and 
experiences. 
1.6.1 Differentiation of Delusions from Hallucinations 
A hallucination is considered to be "a sensory perception without external 
stimulation of the relevant sensory organ" (DSM-IIIR, 1987). Therefore, a hallucination 
is a perceptual experience and a delusion is belief. Thus, delusions and hallucinations 
apparently have very little in common and one might think that they should be easily 
distinguished. 
Delusions and hallucinations may co-occur in the same subject. A person may 
have a delusional interpretation of the source of the voices that are heard. For instance, 
the voices may be accounted for by telepathy or as the voice of God or the devil. 
However, it would appear that the experience of the voice and the judgement as to its 
source are different. The hypothesis that hallucinations arise in part from a failure in 
judgement skills (Slade and Bentall, 1988) has raised the possibility that the two 
phenomena are not as distinct as was thought (discussed in chapter 2). 
There are more complicated distinctions between hallucinations and delusions. 
One instance in which the distinction is blurred is the case of delusional infestation (see 
Berrios, 1985 for a review). Here the person develops the delusional conviction that s/he 
is infected with small organisms such as mites or insects (Morris, 1991). There is a 
long-standing debate as to whether the cause is a hallucinatory experience that is 
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delusionally misinterpreted (Bers and Conrad, 1954) or whether the infestation is the 
result of a primary delusion (Ekbom, 1938, Fish, 1974). 
Other classifications are equally difficult, especially when the experience is 
related to the body. Somatic hallucinations occur when the subject reports abnormal 
perceptions in the body. Frequently, these are given delusional elaborations. Then it 
becomes difficult to establish i f the hallucinatory experience is still occurring. To some 
extent it would appear that there is both a hallucinatory and delusional component to 
these experiences. For example, a person may report that parts of his body talk to him. 
He may feel movements in his body parts. This may be seen as a somatic hallucination, 
but the additional interpretation that he is receiving messages or that someone is 
controlling the body parts may be seen as delusional. The distinction between delusions 
and hallucinations wil l be returned to in Chapter 2 when discussing the aetiology of 
delusions. 
1.6.2 Differentiation of Delusions from Overvalued Ideation and Obsessions 
Delusions are assumed to differ from these other clinical symptoms essentially 
by the degree of insight that is preserved in the other conditions. An overvalued idea is 
seen to be an acceptable, comprehensible idea pursued by the holder beyond the bounds 
of reason. McKenna (1984) refers to an overvalued idea as a "solitary abnormal belief 
that is neither delusional nor obsessional in nature but which is preoccupying to the 
extent that it dominates the sufferer's l i fe" (p579). The background evidence is not 
usually unreasonable but it may become so important that all other ideas are secondary. 
Overvalued ideas are more frequently found in people with personality disorders. 
Examples of overvalued ideas include; Anorexia Nervosa, Hypochondriasis, and Gender 
Identity Disorder (Transexualism). An overvalued idea is considered to be an isolated 
notion associated with a strong affect state and abnormal personality. 
Overvalued ideas are distinguished from obsessions by not feeling subjectively 
senseless in the way obsessions are viewed. Obsessions are troubling thoughts that the 
experiencer finds repetitive and strange and that are not preventable. Obsessional 
thoughts are meant to have a feeling of subjective compulsion, a resistance to this 
compulsion and a preservation of insight. Hence, obsessions differ from delusions by 
the degree of preserved insight into the idea and resistance to it. Oltmanns's (1988) 
alternative classification of delusions refers to this difference between delusions and 
obsessions (page 5). However, it appears that not all subjects with obsessions resist their 
thoughts. Also, subjects with delusions may actually try to resist their ideas (Garety and 
Hemsley, 1994). 
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1.6.3 Differentiation of Delusions from Confabulation 
Confabulation is a condition that is characterised by the expression of false 
statements of beliefs. However, unlike delusional beliefs, confabulatory statements are 
usually very transient, inconsistent and often occur in the context of a memory deficit 
(McAllister, 1992). It appears that the person forgets that s/he does not remember and 
may construct false experiences and ideas to compensate. 
1.7 Delusions as false beliefs 
There is a debate as to whether delusions really are beliefs at all. Sass (1994) has 
recently remarked on this in relation to the famous Schreber case (1903, 1988). 
Schreber's delusions according to Sass, were not really delusions at all but attempts at 
description of what was happening. Therefore, Schreber would say that "i t felt like" his 
stomach had disappeared or it felt "as i f he was turning into a woman. These were then 
distorted into an apparent delusion by the reporting of them, when in fact they were 
descriptions (possibly of hallucinatory experiences). Sass notes that people with 
delusions show a number of characteristics that indicate the delusions are not really 
beliefs. Firstly, Sass contends that people reporting these experiences often do so with a 
wry sense of humour or irony, as i f they do not really believe it themselves. Also, the 
attitude of the person with the delusion reveals the belief as inconsequential. There is 
very little acting on the belief. In addition, there is according to Sass, no accompanying 
emotional state in keeping with the delusional belief. This is odd given the usual 
profound content of the delusion. 
This contention that delusions are not beliefs at all is perhaps typified by Berrios 
(1991, p. 12) who states: 
"Delusions are likely to be empty speech acts, whose informational content 
refers neither to the world nor self. They are not the symbolic expression of 
anything. Its 'content' is but a random fragment of information trapped in the 
very moment the delusion becomes crystallised. The commonality of certain 
themes can be explained by the fact that informational fragments with high 
frequency have a higher probability of being trapped." 
This clearly suggests that delusions are not beliefs. However, the assumption 
that delusions are empty speech acts contributes very little to the debate on aetiology. 
There is no attempt to explain a symptom that is considered the hallmark of 
schizophrenia and that causes a great deal of distress to the experiencer and the family of 
the sufferer. The recurrence of specific themes implies that delusions cannot be mere 
random events as a theme implies a structure. The characteristic resistance to counter 
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argument of a delusion seems incompatible with Berrios's view. Why would one defend 
an "empty speech act"? A meaningless speech act seems more consistent with 
confabulation than a delusion. 
In addition, as will be shown in chapter three, there is considerable evidence that 
delusions act in the same way as normal beliefs and provide order for the believer. This 
is true to such a degree that the delusion can give the believer a sense of purpose in life 
that is similar to the purpose that religion serves for Anglican ordinands (Roberts* 1991). 
The assumption that delusions are mere notions does not concur with the high incidence 
of acting on the delusional belief that has been reported. Buchanan, Reed, Wesseley, 
Garety, Taylor, Grubin and Dunn (1993) noted that over 50% of patients with delusions 
had acted in accordance with their beliefs in some way in the last month. Persecutory 
beliefs were far more likely to be acted on, but fortunately violence was very rare. 
Therefore, to assume that delusions are meaningless speech acts seems 
inappropriate unless one considers the possibility that there are varieties of delusions. 
The description given by Berrios may be true of some particular people. Such people 
may make statements that are inconsistent and vary in content from moment to moment 
and day to day. However, all of the people with delusions who participated in the 
studies that follow expressed ideas of persecution or grandeur, that were consistent in 
theme and over time. In addition, in all cases there was an appropriate emotional state 
usually of anger, fear or sadness at being persecuted (or of happiness in the grandiose 
delusions). For many of the subjects there was recent evidence of acting in accordance 
with the beliefs or of wanting to. Where no action was occurring it was usually because 
action in the past had led to a period of hospitalisation. Such subjects had learned to not 
act whilst continuing to believe. Therefore, whilst accepting that there may be people 
who f i t the criteria outlined by Berrios and Sass, this description is not appropriate for 
the people who were the subject of this thesis. Perhaps, there is a need for a more 
specific phrasing to distinguish between people with delusions and those who are 
describing experiences. 
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1.8 Conclusions 
This chapter has tried to give a flavour of what is meant when one talks about a 
delusional belief. The intention has been to demonstrate what a delusion is, how it can 
be defined and how it can be distinguished from other experiences. It has been argued 
that delusions are interesting symptoms in their own right and are worthy of separate 
study outside the mantle of schizophrenia (Bentall, Jackson and Pilgrim, 1988, 
Brockington, 1992). Whatever the outcome of the long-standing debate on the value of 
the schizophrenia diagnosis it is clear that research on the symptoms of the syndrome 
can only contribute to a greater understanding of the psychological processes in 
operation (Persons, 1986, Costello, 1992). 
In defining delusions there has been a gradual change away from the Jasperian 
concepts of primary and secondary delusions to more descriptive and atheoretical 
systems. However, even with such classification systems (e.g. DSM-IIIR or DSM-IV) 
there still remain problems of definition. For instance, the DSM-IIIR description implies 
that delusions are categorically different from other beliefs. As wil l be shown in chapter 
3, the assumption that delusions are the only beliefs that are irrational, incorrigible and 
formed using "faulty inference", is not accurate as a great many "normal" beliefs fu l f i l 
these criteria. In addition, it has been noted that there is a great difficulty in 
distinguishing delusions not only from normal beliefs but also from other psychiatric 
symptoms such as obsessions, hallucinations and overvalued ideas. 
There are alternatives to categorical definitions of delusions. Maher (1988) has 
argued that consideration of delusional content is not useful whereas classification 
according to differences in grammatical structure may be. This is an approach that has 
not been pursued. An alternative method for classifying delusions is to use a 
dimensional approach such as that suggested by Oltmanns (1988). Whilst not solving 
the problems of classification it acknowledges the difficulties and goes some way 
towards dealing with them. 
Delusions have a complex definition (or at least description). Ideally, any theory 
of delusions should be able to explain the formation and maintenance of delusions. In 
addition, there is a need to identify factors influencing a person's conviction, 
preoccupation and the way a belief can fluctuate over time. What is also needed is to 
identify the way these people collect and interpret information from the environment and 
the manner in which this evidence is used to support or disconfirm their beliefs. Chapter 
two will describe some of the main accounts of delusion formation and attempt to assess 
how successful they have been. 
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2 
Jmd Theories of Delusion formation 
2.1 Introduction 
Recently, cognitive psychologists have turned their attention to the study of 
delusions, which had previously been neglected. This has led to new experimental 
research into the formation and maintenance of these abnormal beliefs. Prior to this new 
found enthusiasm, there had been comparatively little attention paid to them. In the two 
major reviews to date (Arthur, 1964, Winters and Neale, 1983) theories tended to be of a 
speculative, often psychodynamic nature and largely lacking in empirical support. 
In comparison to investigations of the processes involved in auditory 
hallucinations, delusions have received comparatively little attention (see Bentall, 1990a 
for a review of the research into hallucinations). This paucity of research seems baffling 
when one considers the enormous amount of research conducted on the formation of 
normal beliefs and attitudes (this wil l be covered in the next chapter). 
Bentall (1994) attributes this lack of research into delusions to three possible 
reasons. Firstly, as a result of a failure in communication between psychopathologists 
and psychologists. Secondly, as a reflection of the psychopathologists' preference for 
studying broad syndromes rather than "specific manifestations of madness" such as 
delusions or hallucinations. Thirdly, the belief of the psychopathologists that delusions 
and normal beliefs have little in common. A failure in communication seems readily 
corrected. The preference for studying broad syndrome categories has been questioned 
by a number of researchers (Persons, 1986, Costello, 1992, 1993) and there is now a 
greater emphasis on studying the symptoms of the syndromes. The third possibility is 
that delusions and normal beliefs have little in common. This suggestion is considered 
in the next chapter where it is argued that delusions lie on a continuum with normal 
beliefs and are fundamentally similar. In addition, the relative difficulties of defining 
and diagnosing delusions has already been outlined indicating the possibility that 
delusions do share some similarities with normal beliefs. 
Only a selective review of recent research will be considered in the next section. 
Theories arising prior to 1983 are very comprehensibly dealt with by Winters and Neale. 
Four main types of theory have been proposed to account for delusions and these will be 
mentioned here. The theories are classed as Psychodynamic, Organic, Perceptual 
abnormalities and Reasoning abnormalities. However, they are no means the only 
classification and are not necessarily mutually exclusive. 
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2.2 Psychodynamic theories of delusions 
In contrast to the organic approach (below) the psychodynamic theorists place no 
importance on locating the cause of a delusion to a brain area. Rather these accounts are 
wholly dependent on explanations in terms of psychological processes and life events 
(see Winters and Neale, 1983 for a ful l review of theories) and place a great deal of 
importance on the content of the delusion. 
Typical of the psychodynamic formulations of delusions is the Schreber (1903, 
1988) case commented on by Freud. Freud (1915), who never actually met Schreber, 
proposed that delusions of paranoia (and grandiosity) resulted from repressed 
homosexual desires. The desire of the subject is expressed as " I , a man, love him", 
owing to the unacceptable nature of this thought, anxiety reverses this to " I , a man, hate 
him" and is projected to "He hates me, so I can hate him". This eventually becomes " I 
hate him because he persecutes me". This implies that the persecutor is always the same 
sex and is secretly loved by the sufferer. Paranoia is seen as the denial of homosexual 
love. As with most psychoanalytic theories there is little, i f any, evidence for such a 
claim. Lester (1975) reported an apparently high co-incidence of paranoia and overt 
homosexuality. However, this is actually contradictory to Freud's theory as the 
homosexual urges should be inexpressible. The reported high incidence of paranoia and 
homosexuality is most likely owing to the genuine persecution this group have 
experienced. In addition, the occurrence of persecutors of a different sex to the apparent 
victim throw Freud's account into doubt. 
In the psychoanalytic literature, the concept of projection is most commonly used 
to explain delusions. Therefore, delusions act as externalisations of personal wishes, 
conflicts or fears. Hence, a delusion may be viewed as an expression of inner 
unconscious wishes that are externally attributed. Recent attempts at an integration and 
updating of psychodynamic ideas still ultimately leave open ended hypotheses in which 
any outcome can be "explained" post hoc (Hingley, 1992). Whilst valuable in placing 
an emphasis on listening to the person with the delusion and valuing the beliefs, 
ultimately many theories do not stand up to experimental scrutiny. 
2.3 Organic causes of delusions 
Delusions occur in a wide variety of organic disorders of the central nervous 
system. As noted earlier, it is not surprising that a disorder that affects the brain may 
alter cognition, reasoning, judgement and potentially beliefs. However, the concern here 
is with delusions arising in the background of a psychotic syndrome, which by definition 
has no currently known organic cause. Despite this apparent contradiction in terms there 
are numerous theories proposed to account for delusions. Naturally, the research in 
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organic causes of delusions is intimately entangled in the search for the elusive organic 
basis of schizophrenia. For a review of such work see Chua and McKenna (1995). 
However, there have been specific attempts to link delusions to specific brain 
pathologies. 
2.3.1 Frontal Lobe accounts of delusions 
Benson and Stuss (1990) account for delusional misidentification syndromes and 
other delusions as problems arising in the frontal lobes (see also Butler and Braff, 1991). 
Disturbances in frontal lobe functioning leads to an inability to be self critical and this 
leads to a disturbance in reality testing. 
Evidence for the frontal lobe hypothesis is often derived from studies on people 
with schizophrenia using the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task (WCST). This task requires 
subjects to arrange cards according to one of three criteria: colour, number or shape. 
The person is required to ascertain the nature of the rule. After a time the experimenter 
changes the rule, and the number of trials required to learn the new rule is an index of 
perseverative responses. Patients with frontal lobe resections were found to be impaired 
on completing a set within a category and they tended to continue sorting according to 
one dimension after it had been changed, called perseverative errors (Lezak, 1976). 
Since some schizophrenic symptoms such as lack of motivation, social withdrawal, 
distractibility, and shallow affect are apparently similar to people with damage to the 
frontal lobes an analogy with frontal lobe patients was considered appropriate. Thus, 
people with schizophrenia were tested on tasks sensitive to frontal lobe damage. 
People with schizophrenia have been found to perform poorly on WCST (Fey, 
1951, Malmo, 1974). However, other psychiatric patients (Franke, Maier, Hardt, 
Friebos, Lichtermana and Hain, 1993) and those with diffuse brain damage or focal 
lesions outside the Frontal lobes (Pendleton and Heaton, 1982) have been found to 
perform poorly too. Additionally, there are examples of gross frontal pathology and 
normal response. Recently, it has been possible to link performance on WCST with 
cerebral blood flow imaging (Weinberger, 1988). It appears that subjects with 
schizophrenia fail to activate their dorsolateral prefrontal cortices as is normally seen. 
Hence, there is a circular argument that poor performance is because of a failure .to 
activate the relevant frontal regions or the failure to activate is because of poor 
performance. 
In people with chronic schizophrenia perseverative errors are negatively 
correlated with activation of the frontal cortex. They do improve i f offered money 
indicating the core deficit is a failure to accept praise as sufficient reward (Summerfelt, 
Alphis, Wagman, Funderburk, Hierholzer, and Strauss, 1991). Metz, Johnson, Pilskin, 
and Luchins (1994) demonstrated that subjects with schizophrenia were able to benefit 
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from instructions on the task which subjects with Frontal lobe lesions are unable to do 
(Nelson, 1976). These instructional benefits were maintained at six weeks indicating 
that the poor performance seen in people with schizophrenia is not caused by the same 
pathology as in people with lesions to the frontal lobes. More importantly, when using a 
number of tests sensitive to frontal lobe functioning, rather than one alone, there is no 
single frontal lobe test sensitive to the cognitive impairment in schizophrenia (Goldberg, 
Kelsoe, Weinberger, Pliskin, and Berman, 1988). Delusions are considered to be caused 
by frontal lobe abnormalities by association only as there are no reports of the 
performance of people with delusions (rather than schizophrenia) using the WCST. 
David (1992) notes that the frontal lobe is assigned a role in almost all 
psychiatric conditions including personality disorders, obsessions, depression and 
delusions. As the frontal lobes constitute about one third of the brain, localising a 
disturbance to this region is grossly inadequate. Even when reduced to three main sub 
areas of the orbital, mesial and dorsolateral there are still many psychological processes 
in each area. 
Generally, it is regarded that the frontal lobes carry out 'executive' functions. 
The lobes control and deploy other functions such as language. Hence, the systems are 
not likely to be modular but distributed and this increases the difficulty of localisation. 
In a sense the frontal lobes have a role in everything in general and nothing in particular. 
In conclusion, David (1992) states that the attempt to construct a neuropsychology of 
psychiatric disorders needs to go beyond crude localisation and instead define 
psychiatric phenomena in terms of breakdown or malfunction of psychological 
processes. 
2.3.2 Temporal lobe account of delusions 
The work of Liddle and colleagues indicates that the underlying pathology in 
delusions is more likely to be in the Temporal lobes rather than Frontal lobes. Liddle 
and Morris (1991) used a battery of neuropsychological tasks on subjects with 
schizophrenia and correlated the performance with the schizophrenic subsyndromes 
identified by Liddle (1987). The subsyndromes of Disorganisation (characterised by 
Formal Thought Disorder, and inappropriate affect) and Psychomotor Poverty (poverty 
of speech, and lack of spontaneous movement) were associated with poor performance 
on tasks sensitive to frontal lobe functioning. The subsyndrome of Reality Distortion 
(Delusions and Hallucinations) was associated with temporal lobe abnormalities. This 
result was further strengthened by the finding that increased regional Cerebral Blood 
Flow (rCBF) was correlated with the severity of the subsyndromes. The people with the 
most reality distortion symptoms had the most abnormal activity in the temporal lobe. 
The other two syndromes were associated with frontal lobe rCBF increases (Liddle, 
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Friston, Hirsch and Frackowiak, 1990, Friston, Liddle, Frith, Hirsch, and Frackowiak, 
1992). This theory is strengthened by the fact that people with lesions of the left 
temporal lobe often exhibit delusional symptoms (Davison and Bagley, 1969) and that 
temporal lobe epilepsy can be associated with a syndrome characterised by delusions 
and hallucinations in the absence of formal thought disorder or flattening of affect 
(Slater, Beard and Glitero, 1963). Therefore, it appears that delusions are more likely to 
arise from an abnormality in the Temporal lobe. 
Cummings (1985) reported that many delusions associated with organic 
conditions could be accounted for by toxic metabolic processes and disorders affecting 
the limbic system and basal ganglia. This was proposed on the basis of studying a group 
of elderly subjects (mean age 63.7) with Alzheimer's disease, Parkinson's disease and 
Huntingdon's chorea. Therefore, these delusions (often simple in nature) where seen 
against a background of dementia. Cummings (1992) further developed this idea of 
limbic system involvement in delusions. It is reported that lesions of the temporal lobes 
or caudate nuclei and bilateral brain involvement are common in disorders manifesting 
psychosis. 
Despite different delusions apparently occurring in different locations with 
different effects, a common property associated with delusions is the areas of the 
temporal lobes and caudate nuclei, which are both parts of the limbic system. The 
cortical structures of the limbic system include the subcallosal gyri, cingulate gyri, 
parahipppocampal gyri, and hippocampi. Nuclear structures of the limbic system 
include the amygdaloid complexes, septal nuclei, hypothalamus, epithalamus, and 
anterior thalamic nucleus. 
The function of the limbic system is mediation of the emotional life and 
environmental surveillance. Thus, dysfunction of this area would interfere with the 
assessment of environmental threat, produce incorrect assignment of danger and cause 
inappropriately fearful and threatened behaviour perhaps manifesting itself as paranoia. 
The possible involvement of the Temporal lobe wil l be returned to when discussing 
accounts of delusions proposed by McKenna (1991), and Gray, Feldon, Rawlins, 
Hemsley, and Smith (1991). 
A further neuropsychological approach was taken by Cutting (1985, 1991, 1992) 
who proposed that some delusions in schizophrenia are caused by either left temporal or 
right parietal dysfunction. Left sided damage in the form of left temporal lesions is 
associated with paranoid beliefs and delusions of reference (Toone, Garralda and Ron, 
1982). This may mean that affective associations are being made to previously neutral 
stimuli. Right sided parietal damage may cause delusions by its effect on perception. 
The Capgras delusion is the belief that a familiar person is no longer the same and has 
been replaced by an impostor. This delusional belief, like the other DMS and 
anosognosia are frequently associated with right sided damage (Fleminger and Burns, 
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1993). The Capgras delusion wi l l be referred to later as it illustrates the need for a 
number of different ideas to be taken into account (Young, 1994). 
2.3.3 Limitations of organic accounts 
Whilst there are many studies citing a relationship between schizophrenia or 
delusions and dysfunction in a certain area of the brain, the limitations of the organic 
accounts mean that psychological explanations are required also. Even i f it is possible to 
identify the location of the proposed defect there is still a need to explain the processes 
by which it is expressed (McKenna, 1991). 
Charlton (1990) states that there has been an over reliance on biological 
psychiatry, whilst at the same time an ignoring of the philosophical objections to 
biological research in the absence of psychological theory. Bentall (1994) expresses 
three of these objections. The first is that a reliance on the biological cause as an 
explanation of abnormal behaviour is Dualistic. The psychological phenomena become 
epiphenomena to a biological cause (Rose, 1984). Naturally, the mind-brain relationship 
is very complex and greatly debated. However, it appears reasonable to expect that 
interaction between the brain and the environment is not one way. Brain events can 
determine subjective experiences and so too environmental stimuli can help to determine 
brain functioning. 
The second objection is in the viewing of the brain as an information processor. 
Associating an area with an i l l understood process is little more than "sophisticated 
phrenology" (Bentall, 1994, p. 340). In Bentall's opinion, Marr (1982) outlined the 
proper relationship between psychology and physiology. To understand how the brain 
works it is necessary to i) define its functions (what solutions it provides to the 
ecological problems), ii) define the algorithms or rules that the brain runs by (Cognitive 
psychology) and iii) only once the algorithms are defined is it possible to ask how the 
brain as a biological and physical machine operates these algorithms. Biological 
research needs to be conducted in the light of psychological knowledge. 
A third problem is that of "intentionality" (Tallis, 1991). This is the 'aboutness' 
that links mental events to the world they represent. This carries the implication that the 
information processing of the brain is content specific and therefore to some extent how 
the brain processes information depends on what the information is. 
As Dennett (1971, cited in Bentall, 1994) notes when we are unable to explain 
behaviour in terms of benefits or goals (no intentional behaviour) we seek biological 
explanations. One can decide the behaviour is non intentional ( i.e. Jaspers 
"ununderstandable" delusions) and dismiss it as epistemologically worthless (Berrios, 
1991) or attempt to search a little deeper for non apparent meanings. Typically, 
delusions have recurring themes especially concerning the person's social position. 
19 
Chapter Two 
Thus, delusions can be seen not as being non intentional, but as a disorder of 
intentionality. Therefore, to understand the mind of a person with delusions one must 
take account of the person's brain, and individual history and perceived position socially 
and not ascribe the cause of the delusion to an organic impairment alone. 
2.4 Perceptual abnormality theory of delusions 
Delusions have been explained as rational interpretations of unusual experiences, 
and are essentially secondary to some other deficit. Frith (1979) argued that 
schizophrenia and the symptoms of delusions, hallucinations and thought disorder could 
be accounted for by a disturbance in consciousness. He proposed that a defective 
preconscious filter would allow into consciousness percepts and material that would 
normally be ignored. Therefore, the subject would have strange experiences that would 
be explained using fundamentally normal reasoning processes. Partial support for this 
theory was provided by Bullen and Hemsley (1987) who predicted that schizophrenics 
should fail to inhibit alternative meanings of words because the defective filter would 
allow multiple meanings into consciousness. Peters, Pickering and Hemsley (1994) used 
the negative priming paradigm which, in normal subjects, is used to demonstrate that 
unattended information is actively inhibited rather than being allowed to decay. High 
schizotypes and people with a diagnosis of schizophrenia were less able to actively 
inhibit this unattended material (Beech, McManus, Baylis, Tipper and Agar, 1991). 
Frith (1992) revised his theory and proposed that rather than having a defective 
preconscious filter, subjects with schizophrenia have a defect in the system that monitors 
actions and the preceding intention to act. It is suggested that the subject fails to 
recognise self generated thoughts and actions. As the thoughts are not recognised as 
internally generated then they must have come from somewhere else. Therefore, the 
thought may seem alien and the person may experience the symptom of thought 
insertion. I f an action occurs such as moving an arm that is not preceded by an 
awareness of an intention to move that arm, the person may feel that his body is 
controlled from without (delusions of control or passivity experiences). I f the subject is 
unable to monitor the intention to switch attention then the person may find that his 
attention has moved without his awareness. He may infer that his attention moved for a 
reason such as his name was mentioned. Therefore, the subject may feel that people are 
talking about him (persecutory delusions) or i f his attention is captured by the television 
or radio that they are talking about him there (Ideas of reference). 
The hypothesis that there is an inability to monitor willed intentions has been 
supported by a number of studies that have shown central monitoring is faulty. For 
instance, Frith and Done (1989) had subjects follow a target on a computer screen using 
a joystick. Normal subjects can correct errors even before receiving visual feedback 
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indicating that they are monitoring their intended responses and do not require external 
feedback. Acute schizophrenics corrected their errors like normals when visual 
feedback was available but not in the absence of visual feedback. A similar finding was 
reported by Mlakar, Jensterle, and Frith (1994) who found that schizophrenics were poor 
at drawing in the absence of feedback. Once again indicating a defect in the central 
monitoring of actions. 
Frith's (1992) theory is seemingly able to account for many positive symptoms 
including hallucinations, delusions and thought disorder. However, the delusions it 
explains are more like abnormal experiences than beliefs. Frith's account is best suited 
to passivity experiences where the person feels that his actions or thoughts are controlled 
by someone else. It is less able to encompass the many other types of delusion where a 
person's actions are not involved, such as Grandiose delusions. In fact, in the study by 
Frith and Done (1989) the inability to correct performance on the non visual feedback 
condition was most marked in people with delusions of control, thought insertion and 
thought blocking. 
Authors such as Jaspers (1963) view some delusions as understandable in the 
context of other psychopathologies such as hallucinations. Maher (1974) proposed that 
abnormal beliefs virtually always arise from rational interpretations of anomalous 
experiences (i.e. hallucinations). According to Maher (1974) the person has an unusual 
experience that results in a sense of puzzlement. This leads to the search for an 
explanation, which as the initial experience is odd is likely to be abnormal too. The 
explanation wil l bring relief and this is reinforcing. Cognitive abnormalities are not 
implicated, and it is assumed that the subject has essentially normal reasoning processes. 
In support of this there are some reports of "delusional moods" preceding delusions. 
These moods usually encompass feelings that the world has been subtly altered in some 
way so that it is sinister (Sims, 1988). This is found to be distressing and requires an 
explanation, even i f it is bizarre. Similar reports have been found for bodily sensations 
(Maher and Ross, 1984). 
Besides these anomalous experiences it is possible that perceptual deficits can 
leave the individual vulnerable to developing abnormal beliefs. For instance, Cooper 
and Curry (1976) reported that persecutory beliefs are sometimes associated with 
deafness. As the person is unable to fully discern what is being said, the person wil l 
believe that others are talking about him/her. Other supportive evidence is provided by 
the apparent induction of delusion like beliefs in subjects undergoing anomalous 
experiences (Zimbardo, Anderson and Kabat, 1981, Chapman and Chapman, 1988). 
Therefore, normal subjects with strange perceptual experiences were shown to form 
delusion like beliefs. 
There is even evidence of normal reasoning processes operating in subjects with 
delusions. Williams (1964) reported that DSM I I diagnosed schizophrenics 
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demonstrated normal syllogistic reasoning. In addition, the difficulty faced by clinicians 
in persuading the patient about the falsity of the belief led the clinicians to believe that 
more than reasoning processes were implicated. Slater and Roth (1969) considered 
reasoning with people with delusions is nothing but a "waste of time". This implied that 
intact reasoning processes were being driven by an abnormal experience. 
2.4.1 Criticisms of Maher's theory 
Useful as Mahef's theory seems, there are some limitations that need to be 
addressed. Delusions are a common psychotic symptom but not all subjects in the same 
conditions experience them, indicating an element of judgement is involved. A great 
many people gradually lose their hearing but most recognise that they are going deaf and 
that others are not talking about them. In most cases of unusual experiences 
explanations tend to the mundane rather than the fantastic. Also, delusions often 
develop in the absence of either abnormal experiences or perceptual impairments. 
Chapman and Chapman (1988) examined the relationship between beliefs and 
experience in a large group of students and found that subjects responded to similar 
experiences with beliefs that ranged from the normal to fully delusional. This study is 
cited by both Maher and his critics as evidence that people under unusual circumstances 
can develop bizarre explanations. The critics mention that most people do not reach 
bizarre magical explanations and hence, there must exist differences in reasoning style. 
Delusions are postulated to arise from hallucinations but hallucinations 
themselves may in some cases be secondary to abnormal beliefs. Hallucinations require 
an element of judgement. The experiencer has a reality discrimination task and must 
decide between internal or external origin of the information (Bentall, 1990a). Bentall, 
Baker and Havers (1991) demonstrated the importance of judgement in experiencing 
voices. They reported that subjects who heard voices externally misattributed their own 
internally generated ideas on a Reality Monitoring task (Johnson and Raye, 1981). The 
hallucinators were not as good at recognising their own thoughts. Thus, it would seem 
that abnormal inferences are important and not just abnormal perceptions. 
Moreover, beliefs can influence perceptions. This was demonstrated by Barber 
and Calverley (1964) who played white noise to subjects who were told that they may be 
able to hear the song "White Christmas"; Despite no song being played 5% of the 
subjects reported hearing it. Mintz and Alpert (1972) used the same task on people with 
hallucinations and found that they were more likely to believe that they heard the song 
than non hallucinators. Hallucinations often occur against backgrounds of unpatterned 
stimulation such as traffic noise (Tarrier, 1987). Therefore, what appears to be 
happening is that subjects are projecting expectations (or beliefs) onto the background. 
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Unfortunately, the evidence of normal reasoning, supporting Maher's theory is 
poor. Williams (1964) used a diagnosis of schizophrenia that allows the subjects not to 
exhibit delusional symptoms. Also, the syllogistic reasoning task has been rejected as a 
model of normal human reasoning (discussed in chapter 3). 
The final problem for Maher's theory is that any demonstration of abnormal 
reasoning will negate the proposal. The next explanation cites many examples of such 
differences in reasoning. 
2.5 Differences in Reasoning Styles 
The distinction between reality and imagination is a question of judgement 
(Johnson and Raye, 1981). In support of this notion there is evidence accumulating of 
the importance of a reasoning bias in delusion formation and maintenance. The recent 
research has followed two lines of enquiry. The first, studies the reasoning of subjects 
on tasks completely unrelated to the theme of the delusion. This is in order to show that 
the reasoning differences extend beyond the material of the delusion itself. A reasoning 
bias demonstrated with material that is unrelated to the content of the delusion implies 
that there is a more generalised judgemental abnormality. The other line of enquiry has 
specifically used material that is related to the theme of the delusional belief in order to 
try and demonstrate the biased processing of this type of information. 
2.5.1 Hypothesis evaluation 
Huq, Garety and Hemsley (1988) report a study in which subjects were shown 
two jars containing different proportions of coloured beads in containers, and were 
required to determine from which of the containers the experimenter was selecting a 
series of beads. Huq et al. (1988) report a "jump to conclusion" style exhibited by 
subjects with delusions on this neutral probabilistic reasoning task. The people with 
delusions (diagnosed as schizophrenic) requested fewer items and were more confident 
in their judgements than psychiatric controls. This work was replicated and extended by 
Garety, Hemsley and Wessely (1991) who included separate groups of patients who 
meet the DSM-UIR criteria for delusional disorder (and paranoid schizophrenia) and 
schizophrenics with delusions. Patients with delusions, irrespective of diagnosis, 
requested less information than the control groups before reaching a decision and 
showed a greater inclination to reduce confidence in their estimates in the face of 
potentially contradictory evidence. 
Hemsley and Garety (1986) have suggested that delusions may result from 
deficits in the ability to weigh evidence when compared against a model of reasoning 
(Bayes's theorem). People with delusions accept conclusions at levels of probability too 
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low for normals. The Bayesian model proposes that individuals assign probabilities to 
propositions about reality. Effective reasoning is assumed to be based upon correct 
assessment of the probabilities inherent in the empirical evidence. Weighing of 
evidence requires recognition of base rates for the occurrence of classes of events. 
Garety (1991) proposes that people with delusions are excessively influenced by 
immediately available information and that they make much less use of previously 
acquired information. This wil l lead to a neglect of factors such as base rate, and hence 
lead to differences in reasoning. 
2.5.1.1 Failure to utilise previously acquired information 
Hemsley (1987) proposed that people with schizophrenia have a weakening of 
the influence of stored memories of regularities of previous input on current perceptions. 
This means that people with schizophrenia are less able to use past experience to reduce 
current cognitive demands. Instead of using top down processing the subjects with 
schizophrenia are essentially data driven and have to build up the environment around 
them (John and Hemsley, 1992). Gray, Feldon, Rawlins, Hemsley, and Smith, (1991) 
related this hypothesis to delusions in schizophrenia. It is assumed that normal people 
have a tendency to search for a causal explanation when events do not meet expectations 
(i.e. when the unusual occurs). The unusual is detected by noting the temporal order and 
relative proximity of two events and comparing this against stored regularities of the 
world, to note i f this pairing is unusual. Therefore, i f there is a broadening of attention 
and a noticing of normally neglected material (Frith, 1979) and, a reduced ability to test 
i f these events are normally associated, there is a tendency to make abnormal causal 
relationships on the basis of a single co-occurrence. 
Salzinger (1984) proposed a not dissimilar idea; the "immediacy hypothesis". 
The behaviour of people with schizophrenia is controlled by stimuli immediately 
available in the environment. Therefore, the people with schizophrenia are stimulus 
bound and respond to stimuli in isolation and, are not able to use context to give a 
meaning to the experience. 
Evidence for these similar ideas is derived from a number of studies. Brennan 
and Hemsley (1984) reported that subjects with paranoid beliefs tended to see "illusory 
correlations" between random events, indicating abnormal' causal relationships are made. 
Baruch, Hemsley and Gray (1988) used the fact that subjects with schizophrenia are less 
able to use redundancy and patterning of sensory input to produce a task on which the 
schizophrenics actually did better than the controls. The normal subjects were hampered 
by the tendency to use previous information. Baruch et al. (1988) used the latent 
inhibition (LI) paradigm which consists of two conditions. The first exposes a group of 
subjects to a stimulus that is not associated with reward and is soon ignored. A second 
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group are not exposed to the stimulus. Later this stimulus becomes salient and 
rewarding. Subjects that have been pre-exposed, take longer to learn that the stimulus is 
important than non pre-exposed subjects. The pre-exposed subjects pay less attention to 
the previously ignored stimulus and have to unlearn that it is irrelevant. A failure to 
utilise previously acquired information would lead to people with schizophrenia in the 
pre-exposed conditions to relearn faster than normal people who did have access to 
previously acquired information. Subjects with acute schizophrenia were shown to do 
this. It appears that the people with schizophrenia treated all the stimuli as novel and 
were therefore quicker to respond to the previously redundant stimulus. 
Gray et al. (1991) used the latent inhibition paradigm as well as similar tasks 
such as the Kamin blocking paradigm to argue for a model that emphasises the failure to 
utilise previously acquired information, and a role for limbic system dysfunction. The 
function of the limbic system is mediation of the emotional life and environmental 
surveillance (see section on temporal lobe accounts of delusions, page 17). It is thought 
that in some general way the septohippocampal system promotes efficiency, flexibility 
and sophistication in learned behaviour. After damage to this area, rats typically show a 
complex set of behaviour changes in the direction of perseveration and disinhibition. 
Specifically, damage to the hippocampal formation causes the loss of Latent Inhibition 
(Kaye and Pearce, 1987). In. rats latent inhibition can also be functionally reduced by 
administration of amphetamine and restored with antipsychotic drugs. Latent inhibition 
can also be abolished in man under administration of amphetamine (Gray, Pickering, 
Hemsley, Dawling and Gray, 1992). 
Gray et al. (1991) proposed that the septohippocampal system acts to compare 
actual with expected in an animal's environment. I f there was a functional excess of 
dopamine (drawing attention to events) the septohippocampal system may become 
abnormally biased towards its passive, match function. It would be expected that 
neutral stimuli would become important and thus, events in the environment will acquire 
abnormal significance. Since these events are now significant they may be associated 
with other co-occurring events and there wi l l be illusory correlations or relationships 
between non related events. Then knowledge concerning the relationship of events wil l 
be subverted and this will alter the stored regularities for future predictions. 
2.5.1.2 Criticisms of the failure to utilise previously acquired information 
account 
The results of the latent inhibition paradigm have recently been challenged. 
O'Carroll, Murray, Austin, Ebmeier, Goodwin and Dunan (1993) used the proactive 
interference (PI) paradigm and failed to support the findings of Gray et al. (1991). PI 
occurs when new learning is diminished as a consequence of previously learned 
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material. This paradigm used on people with acute schizophrenia, depression and 
normal controls produced no evidence of a difference in learning. 
The failure to utilise previously acquired information is proposed to account for 
the formation of delusions. However, disruption of L I (failing to use previous 
experience) is only seen in the first few weeks of an illness. After this the restorative 
effects of medication (Baruch et al. 1988) or the natural course of the illness (Gray, 
Pilowsky, Gray, and Kerwin, in press) means that disrupted L I is no longer 
demonstrated. However, the subjects used by Huq et al. (1988) and Garety et al. (1991) 
all had long histories of illness and were receiving medication.. Hence, the jump to 
conclusions strategy is unlikely to arise from the same process that underlies the 
disruption to L I . There is disruption to L I for only a short time period, yet delusions, 
and voices persist over a long time and are often not responsive to medication. This 
begs the question of what are the psychological processes that operate in the "chronic" 
patients. 
However, other investigations of hypothesis testing have revealed results 
consistent with those of Garety et al. (1991). John and Dodgson (1994) found that 
subjects with delusions requested less information on an inductive reasoning task. Once 
again demonstrating an apparent hastiness bias. 
The classic inductive reasoning task is the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task 
(WCST). This has been given to groups of schizophrenics with the general result that 
they perform poorly (although by no means always, see the earlier section on Frontal 
lobe accounts). The value of these results in relation to delusions seems unclear. 
However, Young and Bentall (1995) had subjects complete a series of visual 
discrimination problems which in many ways resembled the WCST. People with 
delusions, depression and normal controls had to choose between pairs of stimuli 
presented on cards. Following positive or negative feedback from the examiner, 
subjects' ability to progressively narrow down the set of possible correct solutions was 
assessed. The groups did not differ in the range or total number of hypotheses 
generated. The people with delusions were less inclined than the controls to stick to 
their hypotheses when given positive feedback and were more inclined to stick to their 
hypotheses following negative feedback. They also showed less evidence of 'focusing 
down' their hypothesis to an overall correct solution, in response to successive feedback. 
The possible 'jump to conclusions' strategy has been demonstrated.on analogous 
ambiguous perceptual stimuli tasks. McReynolds, Collins and Acker (1964) showed 
subjects incomplete pictures of common objects. People with delusions were seen to 
'jump to perceptions'. This was interpreted as an attempt to make sense of the 
environment, reducing ambiguity at the expense of reality distortion. Abroms, Taintor 
and Lhamon (1966) extended McReynolds et al. (1964) work of showing ambiguous 
images. In this case subjects were selected according to the severity of the paranoid 
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ideation. Paranoid subjects were more likely to make incorrect judgements rather than 
wait t i l l they could be sure. Increasing hastiness was associated with severity of the 
paranoia. Similarly, McCormick and Broekema (1978) studied people with paranoid 
delusions, non deluded paranoid subjects and alcoholic controls on a perceptual 
recognition task. The paranoid subjects were seen to jump to conclusions, responding 
rapidly with complete certainty on the basis of little information. Hence, there is 
evidence of hastiness in decision making from a number of studies. 
2.5.2 Social Reasoning 
Bentall and his colleagues take an opposing view to Maher and argue that 
delusions do not arise from the operation of completely normal reasoning processes. In 
a series of studies it was proposed that people with persecutory delusions have 
information processing or cognitive biases to material that is related to the theme of the 
delusional belief. It is assumed that the theme of the persecutory delusion is intrinsically 
related to how the person with the abnormal belief perceives himself and the behaviour 
of others in the social universe. Since the delusions are assumed to be specific to certain 
themes or ideas, Bentall and colleagues specifically use material relevant to the 
delusional theme. 
People with persecutory delusions have been shown to differentially attend to 
threat related items in an emotional Stroop paradigm (Bentall and Kaney, 1989). In 
addition, these subjects with delusions preferentially recall material that is related to the 
theme of the delusion (Bentall, Kaney and Bowen-Jones, 1994). In these tasks people 
with depression have been shown to exhibit similar biases to depression related material. 
This implies that people with delusions have schemata concerning material relating to 
personal threat in the same way that people with depression have been shown to have 
negative toned schema (Williams, Watts, Macleod and Mathews, 1988). 
Reasoning biases in patients with delusions have also been studied using 
theoretical models derived from attribution theory. Social Attribution Theory 
(Hewstone, 1989) is a way of examining the explanations given for social behaviour. It 
deals with how social perceivers make use of information to arrive at causal 
explanations for events. As stated earlier, many delusions concern the relative social 
position in the environment. Depressed patients given the Attributional Style 
Questionnaire (ASQ, Peterson, Semmel, Von Bayer, Abramson, Metlasky and Seligman, 
1982) provide responses for negative social events that are internal, global and stable. 
This means that people with depression tend to blame themselves for a negative 
outcome. For instance, i f asked to explain why a romantic date went badly, depressed 
subjects would say it was their fault because they were boring to be with (internal), that 
others found them boring in other situations (global) and, that they would always would 
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be boring (stable). Kaney and Bentall (1989a) used the ASQ on subjects with 
persecutory delusions and found they made global and stable attributions for negative 
events too, but that they attributed them to external causes. People with delusions 
attribute the bad date to the fact that the other person was boring. This finding was 
independently replicated by Candido and Romney (1990). To some extent this pattern 
of attributions is normal as non patients typically attribute positive outcomes to 
themselves and negative outcomes to external causes. This is called the Self Serving 
Bias, and is seen as a form of self esteem maintenance. Other examples of the presence 
of a self esteem maintaining bias have been demonstrated on a number of different 
paradigms (Kaney and Bentall 1989b, Bentall, Kaney and Dewey, 1991) 
2.5.2.1 A Paranoid Defence? 
These biases in reasoning are found in non deluded normal subjects and appear 
to protect the individual from feelings of low self esteem. Thus, depressed people 
appear not to display these biases. Ackermann and DeRubeis (1991) report a 
phenomenon called "Depressive Realism" in which depressed people perform better at 
certain tasks in comparison to normal people. This is probably owing to the normal 
group being biased by an optimistic approach that the depressed patients no longer use. 
The studies reported above seem to indicate that paranoid subjects (and possibly patients 
with other delusions) have biases operating that are opposite in effect to the depressed 
group. The biases in persecutory delusions are extreme versions of what is found 
normally, perhaps indicating their function is to defend the individual from extreme 
feelings of low self esteem. This is consistent with the reports of Mirowsky and Ross 
(1983) who state that beliefs in external control (paranoia) are associated with low social 
status (and low self esteem). 
In Melges and Freeman's (1975) Cybernetic model of paranoia they stressed the 
effects of the perceived loss of control over the self and others as a primary factor in the 
formation of delusions. This loss of control bears a striking resemblance to theories of 
depression advocated by Brown and Harris (1978) or Seligman (1975) in which the loss 
of control or mastery is seen as fundamental in the cause. The link between paranoia 
and depression is made explicit by Zigler and Glick (1988). They proposed that 
paranoid schizophrenia is really camouflaged depression. Similarly, Colby's (1975) 
shame humiliation theory argues that paranoia develops because individuals are prone to 
make inferences implying the self is inadequate and i f this is acknowledged it wi l l lead 
to humiliation. As this emotion is negatively valued the blame is transferred to others. 
This blame transfer prevents feeling shame but leads to a general suspiciousness of 
others. 
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Drawing on a model of the self outlined by Higgins (1987), Bentall, Kinderman 
and Kaney (1994) proposed that there may be discrepancies between how the person 
with delusions perceives aspects of the self. Depression has been hypothesised to arise 
from discrepancies between actual and ideal selves. Scott and O'Hara (1993) found that 
in students, depression was associated with actual-ideal discrepancies and anxiety was 
associated with actual-ought discrepancies. Bentall and his colleagues proposed that 
persecutory delusions may arise from an attempt to try and reduce the self-ideal 
discrepancy. This hypothesis implies that subjects with persecutory delusions should be 
biased towards processing of self related material in the same way that they were shown 
to be biased to threat related material. Kinderman (1994) asked subjects with 
depression, delusions and normals to endorse or reject a set of negative and positive 
adjective traits. Then in an emotional Stroop task they were required to colour name 
similar words. People with delusions endorsed a high number of positive trait words 
(more than depressed and similar to normals) and a high number of negative words 
(about the same as depressed and more than normals). The subjects with delusions 
showed interference on both sets of words whereas the depressed subjects were only 
slower on the negative words. This is interpreted as being consistent with the desire of 
the subjects with persecutory beliefs to maintain a positive self image. 
This defensive style would appear to rely on explicit processes that are activated 
by a conscious self/ideal discrepancy. I f the person was unaware that the self concept 
was being assessed then the defensive processes may not be activated. In this case it 
would be predicted that the people with delusions would be similar to the depressed 
people in attributional style. Lyon, Kaney and Bentall (1994) tested this hypothesis that 
the cognitive biases in delusions explicitly operate to defend self esteem. For this they 
used the ASQ as an obvious or 'transparent' test of attributional style, and thus self 
esteem defence. Additionally, the Pragmatic Inference Task (PIT) was used. This was 
developed by Winters and Neale (1985) as a way of eliciting defended feelings of low 
self esteem. As it is not apparent that it is assessing self esteem, it is called an 'opaque 
task'. It is presented in the form of a memory task but actually requires inferences to be 
made that reveal the attributional style. Lyon et. al., found that on the ASQ the subjects 
with delusions, as before, demonstrated an opposite style of attribution to the depressed 
subjects. The group with delusions made external attributions for negative events and 
internal for positive. On the opaque task (PIT), however, the group with delusions 
exhibited the same reasoning style as the depressed subjects and attributed negative 
events to internal causes. Thus, the explicit process of self-ideal discrepancy reduction 
is only seen on transparent tasks and not when the subject is unaware of the discrepancy. 
The nature of the externalising bias for negative events is shown to work in an 
explicit manner in a report by Kindermann, Kaney, Morley and Bentall (1992) using the 
ASQ. Independent judges rated the attributions given as either internal or external. The 
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people with delusions externally rated causes that the judges considered internal causes. 
The judges were in close agreement with the other groups' ratings. It seems that the 
people with delusions generate an internal attribution consistent with the self-ideal 
discrepancy expected with depression and then explicit processes operate to reduce this 
discrepancy and externalise the blame. 
2.5.2.2 Criticism of Social Reasoning Theory 
Kaney and Bentall (1989a) have proposed that delusions of persecution may be 
understood as the reflections of a cognitive style in social attribution. The fundamental 
premise of this hypothesis is that delusions of persecution act to maintain the self esteem 
of the person with delusions. This approach draws heavily on a role for affect in 
persecutory delusion formation which few other theories do. 
Maher (1992b) criticises the work on social reasoning on two grounds. The first 
is that in the task of attributing cause to person or stimulus the subjects with persecutory 
beliefs are seen as making more person judgements. This is a hypothetical judgement as 
there is no independent check of the falsity or truth of the inference that is made. 
The second criticism is aimed at the evidence derived from the Emotional Stroop 
task. Bentall and Kaney (1989) regard the fact that people with delusions are more 
disrupted by threatening words as evidence of an emotional disorder. Maher regards 
this evidence as relatively unimportant as it would be expected since it is consistent with 
the general proposition that specific intense motivational and emotional states render 
individuals susceptible to stimuli relevant to their particular emotion. It reveals nothing 
about the cause. However, that either of these comments by Maher can really be 
considered criticisms seems doubtful. Differences in attribution, whether checked 
against an external criterion or not are still differences. As with an attentional bias to 
threat related stimuli, the fact that there are differences between groups is important. 
Even i f not causal in nature they are almost certainly contributing to the maintenance of 
any delusional beliefs. Evidence that the attentional bias extends to self related material 
would not have been predicted i f people with delusions attended only to threat related 
material. 
2.6 Integration of theories 
The proposed theories all have shortcomings and leave questions unanswered. It 
may be possible to arrive at an integrated and coherent view incorporating a role for 
abnormal perception, abnormal hypothesis testing and abnormal social attribution. This 
is accomplished to some extent in the accounts of Delusional Misidentification 
Syndromes (DMS). These syndromes are also useful as they reveal the blurring of the 
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strictly functional or organic distinctions. Until recently these syndromes were 
considered psychodynamic in origin, but modern techniques reveal the presence of brain 
injury in many cases (Fleminger and Burns, 1993). Like the concept of schizophrenia, 
the syndrome approach in these cases has been questioned as each of the types of 
delusional misidentification is really only defined by a single symptom. 
Capgras Syndrome, or more appropriately the Capgras delusion, is where the. 
person claims that relatives have been replaced by doubles or impostors. Usually the 
delusion is associated with a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia and used to be 
accounted for by explanations proposing conflicting or ambivalent feelings of love and 
hate. The delusion resolves the conflict by allowing hatred of the double without guilt. 
However, the organic contribution is hard to overlook and it is a combination of organic 
and psychological factors that provides the most compelling explanation. 
Ellis and Young (1990) proposed that the Capgras delusion can be regarded as a 
mirror image of prosopagnosia. Prosopagnosia is a neurological impairment in which 
the patient is unable to recognise familiar faces. The subject loses the awareness of 
recognition but will maintain many covert signs of awareness. For instance, Galvanic 
Skin Responses show a greater change when a name is read that belongs to a face being 
shown to a prosopagnosic than when the name does not match the face, indicating covert 
recognition of the face. In Capgras, it is thought, the person retains the overt recognition 
abilities but loses the covert or affective component of the recognition. Bauer (1984, 
1986) offers a neuroanatomical explanation of how this may occur. He proposed that 
overt recognition depends on the ventral visual limbic system pathway involving the 
ventromedial occipitomeporal cortex whereas, a more dorsal visual limbic pathway 
through the superior temporal sulcus and inferior parietal lobule subserves processes of 
emotional arousal. Ellis and Young (1990) proposed that in Capgras it is the dorsal 
route that is more severely affected than the ventral. Thus, overt recognition may be 
relatively unimpaired but covert recognition wil l be disrupted. This failure to elicit the 
normal emotional response wi l l be most discrepant when regarding close family 
members. The loss of an affective reaction on recognition will lead to a search for an 
explanation. Here the importance of a reasoning deficit may be evident. As was 
mentioned earlier, Huq et al. (1988) report a jump to conclusions approach in people 
with delusions. It is possible that people with DMS may equally exhibit a hasty decision 
style (although this has not yet been investigated). Thus, any data gathering is likely to 
be restricted i f the Capgras patient exhibits such a bias. The role of social attribution is 
also implicated in the formation of this delusion. Any change in the recognition (or lack 
of it) of others needs to be explained. The Capgras patient is usually suspicious and this 
implies they would have an external attributional bias for negative events (Kaney and 
Bentall, 1989a, Candido and Romney, 1990). Thus, the cause of the apparent perceptual 
change is likely to be attributed to a change in other people; they have changed. 
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A role for a combination of perceptual abnormality and reasoning biases is also 
proposed for the Cotard delusion. This delusion is the belief that everything is so unreal 
that the person believes he or she has died. This delusion is also manifested as a belief 
that the body is dead and decaying or rotting. This has little apparent similarity with the 
Capgras delusion. However, both can be seen as sharing a perceived change in the 
world. Young (1994) proposed the underlying basis of both delusions may lie in a 
delusional interpretation of altered perception (especially loss of affective familiarity). 
In Capgras this change is attributed to the outside world owing to the external bias 
associated with suspiciousness. Cotard delusions commonly arise in the setting of a 
depressive illness, implying an internal attributional bias. Hence, in Cotard the 
perceived change is attributed to an internal cause. The Capgras patient perceives a 
change and externally attributes it to "they have changed, they are impostors". The 
Cotard patient perceives a change and internally attributes it to " I have changed, I have 
died". 
Therefore, it can be seen there is a role for a perceptual abnormality as a cause of 
the delusion (the failure to evoke the emotional reaction). This may be combined with a 
failure to sufficiently evaluate the evidence (jump to conclusion). Then the final 
expression of the delusion is dependent on the mood state (internal or external 
attribution). 
The actual importance of each type of factor is relative. Fleminger and Burns 
(1993) report an inverse relationship between the presence of paranoid delusions 
preceding the delusional misidentification, and the intensity of the organic cerebral 
disorder. Essentially, a very suspicious person may need little perceptual impairment to 
arrive at a delusional explanation and a person with a substantial perceptual abnormality 
(brain damage) may require very little suspiciousness as the quality of the input is 
evidence enough. 
This account starts at an organic level but links the observed brain disease to the 
disturbed psychological functions that aid in creating the delusion. It argues that 
Capgras and Cotard delusions are in part caused by an impairment of the visual system. 
However, reasoning processes are necessary to the formation of the belief. 
This demonstration of a role for a perceptual abnormality and reasoning biases is 
important as an analogous situation may exist in other delusions. Maher (1974) states 
clearly that the reasoning processes of individuals with delusions in no significant way 
differ from those of non deluded controls. However, the bizarreness of the explanations, 
the maintenance of the delusions across time and in the face of counter evidence, and the 
fact that not all people with the same perceptual abnormality arrive at the same 
explanation, implies a reasoning deficit or bias in the formation and maintenance of 
delusions. Maher (1974) is unable offer a reason as to why the delusion is bizarre except 
that it wi l l offer relief from the perceptual abnormality and wil l thus be accepted. 
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According to Maher, delusions should always arise in the context of hallucinations or 
abnormal perceptual experience. However, in many instances of delusions there is no 
apparent perceptual abnormality. Conversely, it would follow that all people with 
hallucinations would have delusions yet this is not the case either. In addition, there are 
clear instances of people with perceptual abnormalities such as hearing loss, tinnitus, and 
phantom limb experiences where there are not delusional interpretations. With these 
factors in mind the attention now turns to possible models of delusion formation that 
have been suggested. 
2.7 Models of delusion formation and maintenance 
Maher (1974, 1988) proposed that delusions arise from the operation of normal 
reasoning processes attempting to explain an abnormal perceptual experience. Maher's 
theory advocates that reasoning is entirely normal in people with delusions. This is 
clearly not the case. Maher's account is inadequate unless a role for reasoning biases is 
acknowledged. It is the rigid distinction between perception and judgement that is 
problematic for Maher's proposal. Judgement is involved in perception. In the case of a 
perceptual abnormality such as a hallucination the experiencer has a judgement as to the 
source of the experience (i.e. internal or external origin of the voice). A role for both 
perception and reasoning is considered necessary for the formation of delusions. 
Therefore, additional accounts of delusion formation need to be considered. 
Capgras and Cotard delusions were proposed to be formed by the interaction of a 
perceptual abnormality (loss of affective familiarity) and reasoning as to the cause of the 
change. The reasoning style was determined by the predominant mood state. The 
presence of a reasoning difference is essential to the formation of the delusion. The 
presence of a perceptual abnormality is not sufficient in itself. In the absence of the 
additional reasoning bias the subject would be considered to have a different type of 
psychiatric symptom. For instance, the feeling that the world has changed is called 
Derealisation. The feeling that the subject has changed is categorised as 
Depersonalisation. Therefore, in some delusions it seems that a combination of factors 
is necessary for the formation of an abnormal belief. This multifactorial nature of 
delusional beliefs can be represented with the help of a model. 
2.7.1 BentalPs model of belief formation 
The model outlined below is taken from Bentall (1990b). It represents four 
stages of belief formation. A subject receives data, this is perceived, an inference is 
made and this is passed on to be stored as a belief. This belief wil l then direct any future 
information gathering (i.e. confirmatory information search). A belief can be formed at 
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any point in the system. Maher (1974) would argue that the perceptual process is faulty 
and this abnormal experience is interpreted using normal inferential processes. Bentall 
(1990b) would argue that the perceptual experiences are irrelevant but that it is the 
reasoning processes that are biased. However, the view forwarded here is there likely to 
be a combination of abnormal perceptual and inferential processes necessary for the 
formation of delusions. 
Figure 2.1: Bentall's (1990b) model of belief formation 
Data Perception Inference Belief —ft ft 
Information 
Search 
Bentall acknowledges that this is a crude model of belief formation and it is only 
meant to be an illustration of where differences may occur. However, it seems that there 
are two large omissions from the model; namely the effect of mood state and the 
importance of beliefs about the self. 
Mood state determines the attributional style. Negative mood leads to an internal 
attributional style for negative events and a suspicious mood leads to an external style. 
Without the appropriate mood state there is less chance of a delusion being formed. The 
attributional style is determined by the mood state and this drives the inferential system. 
As was shown in the Capgras delusion in the absence of the appropriate suspicious mood 
state the abnormal perceptual experience is not delusionally interpreted but is expressed 
as a strange perceptual experience. The person is considered to have the symptom of 
derealisation as people and places seem artificial or not real. 
The mood state is to some extent determined by the individual's beliefs about 
him or herself. Depression has been hypothesised to arise from discrepancies between 
the actual and ideal selves (Scott and O'Hara, 1993). Bentall, Kindermann and Kaney 
(1994) proposed that persecutory delusions may arise from the attempt to try and reduce 
self-ideal discrepancies. Therefore, discrepancies between how the person perceives 
aspects of the self may contribute to the determining of mood state and to the 
attributional style. Hence, to the expression of the delusional belief. Therefore, the 
belief box should consist of a number of submodules that take account of the importance 
of beliefs about the self. 
Once the belief box has been revised there is a need to appreciate what a strong 
role beliefs can play on the other stages of belief formation. A pre-existing belief can 
shape what data is selected as one tends to look for evidence to support an existing belief 
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(confirmation bias, chapter 3). In addition, the beliefs can influence what is perceived as 
was shown in the White Christmas task (Barber and Calverley, 1964, and Mintz and 
Alpert, 1972). Beliefs also influence the inferential processes (i.e. Belief bias, chapter 
3). Therefore, the arrows on the model ought to be bi-directional to recognise that 
beliefs can drive perception and inference. 
2.7.2 Garety's model of belief formation 
A more complete account of delusion formation and maintenance was proposed 
by Garety (1991) and is shown below in Figure 2.2. The model outlines the process of 
belief formation in general and indicates features of information processing that may be 
implicated in delusion formation. An individual starts with pre-existing expectations 
which are dependent on mood states and personality (box 1). This influences the 
selection of information in the environment which is detected (box 2). Material that is 
expected, common and affectively neutral is disregarded (box 3) but selected salient 
information is processed further (box 4). The belief (box 5) arises from the interaction 
of the type of information and the style of information processing. According to Garety 
(1991) there will be occasions in which the type of information wi l l be the primary 
abnormality thus, a perceptual abnormality wi l l lead to a delusion. Such instances may 
be drug/alcohol induced psychoses or in neurological disorders (presumably including 
Capgras and Cotard delusions). However, in cases where the perceptual system is less 
disrupted the information processing and judgemental processes play a larger role. The 
items in bold represent factors that are especially implicated in delusion formation. The 
broken lines represent processes that are thought to be impaired in people with 
delusions. Boxes 6 and 7 are essentially concerned with belief maintenance and would 
operate for delusions as they would for any other belief. 
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Figure 2..2: Garety's (1991) model of belief formation 
II . Prior Expectations e.g.: past learning, affect and associated cognitions, personality 2. Current Information e.g.: expected- unexpected external - internal clear- ambiguous common - unusual neutral - affectively loaded 
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focus on current stimuli - use 
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Delusions are thought to occur in the non affective psychoses primarily from a 
failure to utilise previously acquired information. This inability to use past experience 
leads to errors of processing in the information selection (box 2). Material that should 
be ignored is considered as unusual, and unexpected and is passed on for further 
processing (box 4). Here the processing style of focusing on current stimuli and being 
hasty and overconfident in processing will lead to previously neutral and ignored stimuli 
having an abnormal sense of significance. This then leads to a state of high arousal (box 
4a) which itself leads to poor processing of material (see Garety, 1991 or Garety and 
Hemsley, 1994 for a ful l account of the model). 
The strength of this model is that it is multifactorial. Many psychological models 
of schizophrenia try to specify one single cognitive dysfunction. However, this model 
argues that a number of factors contribute to the formation of one symptom within the 
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mantle of the term schizophrenia. This model explicitly recognises that delusions are 
complex phenomena that are not all likely to be caused by the same factors. Delusions 
occur in a wide variety of conditions. In some cases there may be a large distortion of 
perceptual input that drives the belief. Garety emphasises neurological and drug induced 
delusions. However, as has been detailed previously an inferential bias seems necessary 
for the expression of the delusion (Capgras and Cotard beliefs). 
Another strength of the model is the significant role given to the importance of 
the belief. To an extent beliefs drive the entire system. Prior expectations (box 1) based 
on personality and past learning influence the selection of data from the natural 
environment. In addition, previous experiences determine which information is unusual 
or unexpected and requires further processing. This then overcomes one of the 
limitations of Ben tail's model where the person was very undirected in the selection of 
information from the external. 
A third strength is that the model clearly recognises the intimate entanglement of 
perception and judgement. Box 4 explicitly combines the functions of perception and 
inference. This then draws attention to the similarities between delusions and 
hallucinations and helps overcome the limitations of Maher's theory. 
A final strength is that it can be usefully applied to individual cases both to 
facilitate understanding and as an aid to any clinical intervention (Garety, 1992). A clear 
description allows the testing of the model in single cases in an application of the 
principles of neuropsychology to psychiatric symptoms (David, 1993). 
An apparent weakness with the model is the reliance on the failure to utilise 
previously acquired information to explain delusions. As was mentioned in earlier, the 
inability to use previously acquired information is usually assessed on the Latent 
Inhibition (LI) paradigm. Disruption to L I is only seen in the early stages of the 
psychotic illness and is no longer present after treatment with antipsychotic medication 
(Gray et al. 1992) or after a few months into the natural course of the illness (Baruch et 
al. 1988). The inability to utilise previously acquired information is proposed to account 
for the jump to conclusions strategy seen on the beads task (Huq et al. 1988). Since 
virtually all of the subjects used in the beads tasks had delusions for some considerable 
time presumably despite having had aggressive medical treatments it is doubtful that 
they would exhibit disruption to L I . This would indicate that these subjects who have 
delusions are able to utilise previously acquired information. Therefore, an additional 
factor is required to explain the continued maintenance of the delusional belief. Failure 
to utilise may account for the formation of the initial belief but beliefs emerging later 
and the continued existence of delusion requires a separate explanation. 
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2.8 Conclusions 
Many explanations have been put forward to account for delusions. A l l have 
relative merits and faults. The lack of clear hypotheses and empirical research precludes 
the Psychoanalytic theories from further consideration. However, the valuable 
contribution that is made is the recognition that the delusions serve a function to the 
person. At the very least the delusion acts as a belief and helps organise incoming 
information. The fact that delusions may have other self esteem serving functions does 
not require acceptance of the psychodynamic viewpoint either. Erotomania or De 
Clerembault's syndrome, where the person believes that they are loved by a person of 
importance, is clearly self esteem enhancing. In a similar way, persecutory beliefs 
require the person to be important enough to be watched and spied on in the first place. 
Roberts (1991) has found that delusions can give the believer a sense of purpose in life 
in a similar way that religion can for Anglican Ordinands. 
Organic accounts of delusions should not be dismissed too hastily. Any theory 
of delusions must ultimately account for their presence with reference to the organic 
substrate. However, this must be conducted in the manner outlined by Marr (1982) and 
should only occur after the psychological theory has been fully formulated. 
Other accounts often refer to an organic location as a source of dysfunction but 
only as an association with a psychological process. Of these theories Frith's (1992) 
theory of willed intentions is perhaps the most elegant even i f it is not able to account for 
the ful l range of delusions. 
Of the explanations offered for the formation of delusions, two seem the most 
acceptable, despite being apparently incompatible. Maher (1974) advocates that 
delusions arise from perceptual abnormalities. The reasoning processes of the patient 
with delusions are essentially normal. An alternative explanation for the formation of 
psychotic delusions (especially paranoid) is advocated by Bentall (1994) and Garety 
(1991) in which abnormal reasoning processes are thought to be the cause. The 
abnormality is not considered a deficit as such, but an extreme form of normally 
operating biases. The difference is not qualitative as there is no truly logical thought, 
only degrees of bias. It is postulated by Bentall (1994) that the biases are motivated by a 
need to defend self esteem. In actual fact, these theories may not be as different as they 
appear. Essentially, both are proposing that delusions are at least maintained, i f not 
formed, with normal cognitive processes. Maher (1992a) states that the reasoning 
processes differ in no significant way from normal. In Bentall's case the processes are 
normal but are operating at an abnormally biased level. Hemsley's (1994) proposal that 
delusions arise from a failure to utilise previously acquired information is somewhat 
both a perceptual and reasoning theory. A failure to draw on past experience wil l leave 
perception unguided and normally neglected material wi l l enter consciousness (a 
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perceptual abnormality). In addition, the same cognitive inability to draw on prior 
experience wi l l mean that the material now in consciousness wi l l gain abnormal 
significance and likely be erroneously linked with other unrelated events (reasoning 
abnormality). This failure to utilise previously acquired information is given a key role 
in Garety's model of delusion formation. 
Perceptual abnormalities almost certainly play a role in the formation of some 
neurological delusions (i.e. Capgras Delusion), but it is probable that additional factors 
are needed to account for the development of the delusional belief. This is because not 
all subjects under the same unusual experiences develop delusion like ideas to explain 
the events. Factors that may contribute to delusion formation include attributional biases 
and a "jump to conclusion" reasoning style. However, there is an apparent conflict 
present in the literature, between the reasoning and perceptual approaches. The aim of 
this thesis is to examine the nature and extent of any reasoning differences exhibited by 
people with delusions. However, before this goal is made explicit (chapter 4) attention 
is paid to what constitutes normal reasoning. Prior to embarking on an attempt to reveal 
incidences of abnormal reasoning it is worth considering what is the basis of normal 
reasoning, which is the purpose of the next chapter. 
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Reasoning, decision making and rationality 
3.1 Introduction 
The implication of the DSM-IV (1995) definition of a delusion is that the 
abnormal belief is formed and maintained using fundamentally different processes to 
those used in normal belief formation (see chapter 1). The definition states that 
delusions are based on incorrect inference, that there is a neglect of easily available 
discrepant evidence, and that the belief is resistant to counter argument. In this chapter 
it is argued that a great many beliefs held by "normal" subjects are surprisingly similar to 
this criteria. Hence, the distinction between normal and abnormal beliefs is not as 
categorical as suggested in the definition. The importance of this proposal is that in the 
previous chapter it was shown that the two most acceptable theories of delusions stated 
that either delusions were formed using reasoning processes that did not differ from 
normal (Maher, 1974) or that only differed in degree (Bentall, 1994, Garety, 1991). The 
purpose of this section is to discuss what constitutes normal reasoning. When studying 
supposedly abnormal beliefs it seems prudent to consider how normal beliefs are 
formed. 
Here it is proposed that the vast majority of normal thinking may appear faulty i f 
it is compared to an ideal prescriptive norm. This is because reasoning is proposed to 
serve the individuals' goals and not to adhere to a prescriptive model. Reasoning may 
be based to some extent on non logical biases that serve the individual very well in real 
reasoning and decision making. The purpose of these biases is considered as two fold. 
Firstly, these biases operate to reduce cognitive demands. Using a normative statistical 
model (such as Bayes Theorem, discussed later) as the basis of decision making would 
be time consuming and require a great deal of cognitive processing. Al l the relevant 
information would be have to be drawn to mind and reasoned with. Secondly, beliefs 
serve a purpose to the holder and reasoning in accordance with the laws of logic, may 
yield a conclusion that the subject does not desire. Reasoning is rarely a neutral process 
as it may affect beliefs. Beliefs are supports for cognitive activity and aid in reducing 
uncertainty. They serve to organise the world and support optimal functioning and self 
esteem. They appear to serve a purpose to the holder and are not scientific hypotheses 
that are devoid of personal significance. Shared beliefs on topics of religion or politics 
allow identification with a group or subculture. Since beliefs serve a purpose to the 
holder it is possible that beliefs may be developed to suit the individual rather than meet 
the logical norm. 
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This is only one view of the nature of reasoning and belief formation. To allow a 
ful l discussion of these ideas a brief summary of theories of reasoning wil l be outlined. 
To support the proposal that reasoning in normal beliefs is not qualitatively different 
from that seen in delusions, examples of biases in belief formation and maintenance wil l 
be detailed. The similarities to processes in delusional beliefs wil l be noted as well. The 
existence of non logical biases in reasoning is seen as evidence that delusions share 
many of the features of non delusional beliefs. Thus, delusions should be viewed as 
existing on a continuum with other beliefs and not as categorically different. The 
existence of unusual beliefs widely spread throughout the normal population wi l l be 
demonstrated as support for the continuum idea. Thus, this chapter has four main aims. 
The first is to give a brief review of some of theories of reasoning and decision making. 
Secondly, there are examples of numerous errors and biases in thinking prevalent 
amongst the normal population. This indicates that the processes proposed to be at fault 
in delusions are found in people without delusions. Thirdly, these biases are shown to 
underlie the formation of many apparently faulty beliefs widespread amongst normal 
people. Thus, it is proposed that there are many unusual beliefs in the normal 
population. These beliefs are thought to be formed using processes similar to those in 
people with delusions. Hence, the fourth aim is to outline a possible continuum of 
beliefs that would demonstrate such a relationship. 
3.2 Theories of Reasoning and Decision Making 
This chapter covers two main areas of research, namely reasoning and decision 
making. Reasoning is concerned with the ability to use rules, pursue arguments, and 
determine the consequences of assumptions and hypotheses. Typically, research has 
focused on the solving of deductive tasks such as syllogisms, prepositional reasoning 
and the Wason's selection task (all described later). Decision making is concerned with 
the use of statistical and probabilistic models of thinking. Decisions are often 
complicated and involve balancing a number of factors. For instance, the decision to 
continue at University or take a job requires determining the probability of achieving 
outcomes in each field and the reward that each outcome would bring. The distinction 
between the two types of thinking reflects the interests of the different groups of 
researchers more than any assumption that each area relies on fundamentally different 
mechanisms and processes. Consideration will first be given to theories of reasoning. 
The theories forwarded to account for reasoning essentially differ on whether 
they propose that people are able to use an internalised form of natural logic or that 
people rely on implicit heuristics such as calling to mind similar cases. (For a fuller 
account of all of the theories see Evans, Newstead and Byrne, 1993) 
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3.2.1 Mental Logics 
According to this proposal people use content free syntactic inference rules to 
reason about situations (e.g. Braine and O'Brien, 1991). People possess an abstract 
logical competence that is implemented in an equivalent way to syntactic rules of a 
standard logical system. This normative theory of formal logic dates back to Aristotle 
who proposed a system based on the syllogism. It is assumed that there is an inherent 
mental logic comprised of a set of abstract inference rules or schemas that are applied in 
a general manner for reasoning in all contexts (also the view held by Piaget, 1952). 
The general assumption is that humans are natural logicians who only perform 
poorly on reasoning tasks when affected by extraneous influences. Such factors may be 
difficulties in comprehension or limitations of cognitive abilities such as working 
memory. The problem is that this theory is mainly derived from studies of propositional 
logic (reasoning involving the use of words such as and, or, not, i f . , then). This is only 
one of many types of reasoning that people can perform. Thus, it is difficult to see if the 
mental logic approach can account for results in other areas. For instance, performance 
on the Wason selection task (chapters 7 and 8) improves the closer the content of the 
task becomes to real life scenarios. Abstract content free rules should be applicable in 
all situations and not be susceptible to content effects. 
3.2.2 Mental Models 
The Mental Models theory (Johnson-Laird, 1983) proposes that logically 
competent reasoning can be achieved without any use of syntactic rules. People are 
meant to manipulate representations of the semantic contents of an argument in order to 
test whether a conclusion must be true given that the premises are true. The premises of 
a problem are constructed into Mental Models that represent the possible states of the 
world, consistent with the information in the premises. The conclusion can be tested 
trying to construct a counter example; alternative models in which the premises are true 
but the conclusion is false. If no counter example is found, the conclusion is accepted as 
valid. Although the Mental Models theory does not presume that people have formal 
rules of inference, it does imply an implicit understanding of some logical principles. 
This theory is less heavily committed to the application of logical rules and thus, differs 
from the above approach. 
The Mental Models approach is more able to account for the biases and errors in 
reasoning and is more complete as a psychological theory of reasoning (for a recent 
review see Johnson-Laird and Byrne, 1991). However, it is to some extent still mainly 
applied to the solving of syllogisms (All A are B, All C are A, Therefore, all C are B). 
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3.2.3 Schema theories 
In this account domain sensitive rules or schemas are elicited by the context of 
the reasoning problem. This allows the application of specific rules, that have been 
previously learnt, to the solution of the problem. It is thought that we learn to reason in 
certain contexts (perhaps by example, or trial and error) and that schemas are formulated 
that abstract the knowledge. This type of approach is typified by the Pragmatic 
Reasoning Schema theory of Cheng and Holyoak (1985). It is most commonly applied 
to explain the effects of changing the content of the problem on the Wason selection task 
(see chapter 7). For instance, people may have a Permission schema that encapsulates 
knowledge of rules and obligations. I f a reasoning problem elicits this pre-existing 
schema it may provide an example from previous experience of what should occur. The 
abstract permission schema may be expressed as: 
If an action is to be taken then a precondition must be met. 
I f a subject is given the following problem of deciding i f a rule is being broken, 
elicitation of this schema is thought to provide the correct solution. 
If a person is drinking alcohol then they must be 18 or over. 
Paul is 16. 
I f the schema is elicited the concept of permission will provide the inference that 
"Paul may not drink alcohol" without requiring formal reasoning. Thus, i f Paul is 
drinking, the subject will be aware that this means that the rule is being broken. 
The strength of this theory is that it can explain the good performance of subjects 
on reasoning tasks that are realistic in content. The formal mental logic and Mental 
Models theories are less able to do this. More realistic content is not sufficient in itself. 
The content must overlap with real life experience, perhaps allowing the solution to be 
obtained from memory (Griggs and Cox, 1982). Alternatively, the content must be 
sufficiently close to elicit a suitable schema. One difficulty the schema theories face is 
the ability to solve abstract tasks that should not allow the application of a schema. 
3.2.4 Theories of decision making 
Decision making research is concerned primarily with the making of statistical 
judgements. Like the study of reasoning, models based on deviations from an optimal 
normative theory have led the research. The models have been developed by 
economists, philosophers and mathematicians. The normative theories describe how one 
should go about determining the best possible course of action, given one's knowledge 
about the world and what one wants to achieve (i.e. the probability of, and utility of 
achieving the outcome). 
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One model applied to the study of statistical judgements is that of Bayesian 
probability theory. Bayes's theorem provides a rule for changing a belief in the light of 
evidence. The rule is formerly presented as: 
P(H/E) = P(E/H) x P(H) 
P(E/H) x P(H) + P(E/Ha) x P(Ha) 
The left side of the equation represents the probability (P) that the hypothesis (H) 
is true given the evidence [P(H/E)]. The upper part of the right half of the equation 
shows the probability of evidence occurring given the hypothesis [P(E/H)], multiplied by 
the prior probability of the hypothesis being correct [P(H)]. This is all divided by the 
probability that the evidence will occur i.e. P(E). The chance that this evidence wil l 
occur is calculated from the probability of evidence given the hypothesis P(E/H) 
multiplied by P(H) plus the probability of the alternative hypothesis (Ha), being correct 
given the evidence ([P(E/Ha)]. This is multiplied by the probability of an alternative 
hypothesis [P(Ha)]. 
An example may help! Huq et al. (1988) showed subjects two containers ful l of 
beads in equal but opposite ratios. One jar contained 85 red beads and 15 blue, whilst 
the other jar contained 85 blue and 15 red. The jars were hidden from view and subjects 
were shown one bead at a time from a randomly selected jar. Assume that one red bead 
was shown. Bayes's theorem allows a calculation of how likely this bead came from the 
mainly red bead jar. 
The prior probability (P) that the bead is from the red jar is 50% since there were 
two jars. Therefore, P(H) = 0.5 as does the alternative hypothesis [P(Ha)= 0.5)]. I f one 
assumes that the red jar has been chosen then the probability that a red bead was chosen 
is 0.85. The probability of the a blue bead being chosen was 0.15. Therefore, the lower 
line of the theorem can be calculated: 
P(E) = P(E/H) x P(H) + P(E/Ha) x P(Ha) 
0.85 x0.5 + 0.15 x0.5 
0.5 
This provides the posterior probability of the jar being red. 
P(H/E)= P(E/H) x P(H) = 0.85 x 0.5 = 85 
P(E) 0.5 
Therefore, according to Bayes theorem on the basis of one piece of evidence the 
probability is 85% that it is the red jar. Two red beads, according to the theorem, 
provides a probability of 97%. Normal people are usually more conservative than this. 
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Bayesian analysis was used in three of the following studies. Fischoff and 
Beyth-Marom (1983) argued that Bayesian inference provides a general framework for 
peoples' performance to be compared against. Thus, it is possible to assess one's 
departure or consistency from the ideal standard. Hemsley and Garety (1986) have 
stated that this model can be applied to the study of delusional reasoning and have used 
it a number of studies (Huq et al. 1988, Garety et al. 1991, Garety and Hemsley, 1994). 
Decision making research is of great practical value as there are many everyday 
situations in which probabilities and utilities of future events are necessary to consider. 
However, there are some limitations with this approach. The use of a normative model 
presupposes that we know all the actions that are within our power, all the possible 
outcomes of the actions and the relative utilities associated with each. This is 
computationally enormous, and implies that we are omniscient. It is difficult to believe 
people can make decisions in real time by applying a normative theory. In addition, it 
has great difficulty in accounting for many of the systematic errors and biases revealed 
in decision making tasks that are detailed below. 
3.2.5 Dual Process Theory 
A different perspective on thinking is provided by Evans and Over (submitted). 
Rather than viewing thinking as an attempt to attain an internal statistical or logic based 
ideal, it is necessary to consider what functions the thinking serves. It is likely that 
reasoning and decision making did not evolve for their own sakes. They would have 
developed to serve a purpose that was presumably very much goal oriented. It is 
doubtful that there would be an evolutionary advantage from the development of 
syllogistic reasoning. A recent theory has taken this into account. Evans, Manktelow 
and Over (1994) argued that there may be two types of thinking. There is a distinction 
between rationality1, that is reasoning to achieve one's goals within cognitive 
constraints, and rationality2 which is reasoning by a process of logic. It seems that 
rationality2 does not provide a good basis for rationality1 and therefore, comparison of 
subjects' performance on tasks against prescriptive norms (such as prepositional logic, 
or Bayes's Theorem) does not imply that subjects are necessarily irrational even though 
they may apparently be illogical. 
Rationality1 is best determined by assessing the extent of the person's ability to 
achieve his or her goal. Rationality1 is thought to be determined by essentially 
preconscious implicit processes that are computationally powerful and operate in 
parallel, and present the end products to consciousness. Rationality2 is thought to be 
dependent on explicit and sequential processes that people are able to report to an extent. 
Someone may still be seen to be rational1 even i f their reasoning does not fu l f i l the 
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requirements for rationality2. For instance, a politician may dismiss the results of a 
report that conflicts with his views. This is apparently irrational2, but i f his goal is self 
esteem maintenance, and belief preservation then his behaviour is still rational1. 
This dual process theory of Evans and Over (submitted) is essentially a 
development of Evans's Heuristic-Analytic (H-A) theory (1989). Both of these view 
reasoning as consisting of two possible stages. The unconscious heuristic stage selects 
the information that is 'relevant' for the reasoning task. This selection is produced by 
choosing some of the current information available and retrieving additional information 
from memory. This may be sufficient in itself to produce an answer. I f necessary, the 
selected 'relevant' information is passed on to the second stage of analytical reasoning 
where the chosen information is explicitly reasoned with. It is thought that the analytic 
stage is probably a form of Mental Models. Therefore, there are separate implicit and 
explicit reasoning modules. The implicit heuristic stage is considered to be very 
powerful and allows rapid, real time processing of information whereas, the explicit 
analytic stage is essentially slow and sequential. 
The value of this approach is that reasoning is goal oriented. Rationality1 is most 
likely to be dependent upon the implicit selection heuristics that reduce cognitive effort. 
The heuristic process although not clearly described, is apparently a form of Mental 
Models or is memory based. This framework of rationality being goal oriented wil l be 
used in the subsequent discussion of the numerous biases in reasoning and decision 
making demonstrated by normal subjects on either type of task. 
3.3 Errors and Biases in Reasoning and Decision Making 
Evidence for this discrepancy between reasoning by logic and reasoning to 
achieve one's goals is derived from a number of sources. The following examples are 
all considered biases or faults in that they are departures from some optimal system. 
Previously, these errors would be accounted for by claiming the inherent natural logic 
was constrained by limitations of working memory or another cognitive factor. 
However, these biases can be seen to serving the goals of the individual and hence, are 
rational1. The first three biases can be considered examples of faulty inference, then 
there are examples of a biased data gathering style, and disregard of discrepant evidence 
resulting in the maintenance of a belief in the face of contradictory evidence. Hopefully, 
the similarity to the processes implicated in delusions (chapter 1) wil l be obvious. 
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3.3.1 Heuristics 
In real life a subject may not have all of the evidence available to base a decision 
on or may not have the cognitive capacity available to reason it through. Hence, there is 
a need for people to use cognitive shortcuts called heuristics that act as rules of thumb. 
These heuristics are biases and are not logical but they offer a satisfactory solution given 
the limited resources. 
Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky (1982) demonstrated a number of such shortcuts. 
The Availability heuristic is one such rule of thumb used in inductive reasoning. It is a 
way of estimating the frequency of certain events, by considering how many such events 
can be called to mind (are currently available to memory). I f someone is asked how 
many traffic accidents there are each day, the answer wil l be heavily dependant on 
whether any were seen in the last few days. Therefore, the judgement of probability is 
not formed in accord with a theory of statistics but by the ease of which an example is 
brought to mind. 
Therefore, reasoning is often based on a lack of all the appropriate information. 
However, given the constraints of spending time gathering evidence and reasoning with 
it, heuristics appear to provide an adequate representation of the world (rational1). It 
would seem apparent that a subject with persecutory beliefs may have a specifically 
biased or distorted availability heuristic. When asked to call to mind the likelihood of 
people wanting to harm him, the availability heuristic wi l l provide evidence that is 
relevant to that person. In this case it will be that people have recently been persecuting 
that person and that it is likely to continue. Bentall and Kaney (1989) reported that 
subjects with persecutory delusions had an attentional bias towards threat related 
material. Kaney, Wolfenden, Dewey and Bentall (1992) also found that similar subjects 
had a bias to remembering threat related material. Clearly these subjects differentially 
attend to and remember salient information that wi l l invariably bias the information 
available to reason with. Presumably this will help maintain any paranoid beliefs. 
The heuristics outlined above appear to serve the goal of reducing cognitive 
effort in decision making. However, reasoning is potentially subject to even greater 
biasing in order to achieve a desired goal, especially i f the goal is self esteem related. 
Subjects have been proposed to have 'motivated reasoning' which is driven by a wish to 
achieve a conclusion (Kunda, 1990). The motivation to be accurate enhances the use of 
those beliefs and strategies that are considered most appropriate; whereas the motivation 
to arrive at particular conclusion, enhances the use of those beliefs that are more likely to 
arrive at the desired conclusion. For instance, people who smoke tobacco wil l reject or 
disregard evidence that is harmful or will not regard themselves as subject to the laws of 
statistics. People are more likely to arrive at conclusions that they want to reach. 
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Taylor (1983) implied that motivated reasoning may be beneficial as the resulting 
'illusions' promote mental health: unrealistically positive views of the self and the world 
are often adaptive (see section on overconfidence below). 
3.3.2 Overconfidence 
One method of studying confidence in judgement is to present subjects with 
general knowledge questions with two alternative answers provided, one of them being 
correct. Subjects are asked to choose one of the answers and rate how confident they are 
in the correctness of their decision (from 0.5 to 1). I f on average a subject gave a rating 
of 0.7 and actually was correct on 70% of those items he would be considered well 
calibrated. Lichtenstein, Fischoff, and Phillips (1982) reviewed this field of research 
and reported that subjective probabilities were consistently higher than the objective 
probabilities. Subjects were generally over estimating what they knew. People are 
apparently irrational2. However, there do appear to be potential advantages to being 
overconfident and not being well calibrated. 
For instance, if one is overconfident (relative to the statistics) that one is going to 
recover from a life threatening illness it may actually aid the chance of recovery. If one 
was well calibrated and aware of the low chance of survival it may lead to a depression 
that may adversely affect the health of the subject, further reducing the chance of 
survival. Taylor (1983) studied the cognition's of patients with serious cancers and 
found many sustained illusions that may have helped them recover. Illusions serve a 
useful purpose. Thus, distortion of the facts may be a normal process when faced with a 
threatening or disturbing event. I f one was well calibrated then one may well be aware 
of what low chances one had of survival. However, this is not the only goal that people 
have when reasoning. I f one's aim was good health then the rational1 behaviour would 
be to ignore or forget the objective probability of recovery. 
Studies of people with depression have revealed that this state is associated with 
greater realism, and that mental well being is actually a state of unrealistic optimism 
(Alloy and Abramson, 1979, Ackerman and DeRubeis, 1991). It has been suggested that 
optimism (overconfidence) may act as a spur to initiate action. I f it is thought that an 
action will be completed successfully it is more likely that the action wil l be performed. 
Mild depression may occur in order to reduce overconfidence (Nesse and Lloyd, 
1990). Someone may fail to achieve a goal that had been pursued unrealistically because 
of an overconfident expectation of success. Depression that occurs after the failure, may 
help recalibrate the expectations of the subject so that s/he strives for more attainable 
goals. Hence, mild depression is seen as leading to a state of being that is "sadder but 
wiser"(Alloy and Abramson, 1979). Huq et al. (1988) reported that people with 
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delusions were more confident than control subjects on a probabilistic reasoning task. 
Therefore, they were relatively overconfident in decision making. Optimism is usually 
seen as a self esteem enhancing process. This overconfidence appears consistent with 
Bentall's (1994) view of delusions serving to protect the self from feelings of low self 
esteem, as depressed subjects are typically under confident. (Confidence in judgement 
wil l be specifically dealt with in chapters 5 and 6). 
3.3.3 Belief Bias 
A third example of apparently faulty inference is belief bias. This occurs for 
instance, in the solving of syllogisms. People are less able to solve syllogisms that 
although logically correct, contradict normal beliefs. For instance, i f the syllogism 
requires a person to endorse as correct a conclusion that cigarettes are not addictive, 
fewer people will choose this as the right answer. The person has added his real world 
knowledge to the premises. This inability to dissociate real world knowledge from the 
demands of the task is considered as another irrational2 fault. However, it would seem 
quite rational1 to bring in additional knowledge and add it to the premises. To an extent 
it seems wise to rely on what one knows and not necessarily what one is told to believe. 
In addition, the successful communication of thoughts is very dependant on the making 
of inferences, and on bringing additional information to what is said to create a 
meaningful context. 
Once a belief is established it will influence what is subsequently encountered. It 
is easier to rely on what you hold to be true rather than what you are told at that moment 
(see below for further illustrations). 
3.3.4 Hypothesis Preservation 
In addition to examples of faulty inference, there are cases where normal people 
fail to gather data efficiently or do so in a biased way. Hypothesis preservation occurs 
when someone is presented with evidence that is contrary to the existing belief. I f the 
person does not reject or alter the belief they are considered to be incorrigible (as in the 
definition of delusions). Once again this is seen as evidence of irrationality2. However, 
it is apparent that disregarding evidence that is discrepant with your existing beliefs may 
be rational1. For instance, the politician may be faced with evidence that a policy s/he 
advocated failed. Rationally2 the politician should alter the belief. However, there may 
be additional goals of maintaining self image and self esteem. Once a position has been 
publicly stated, to yield it would involve loss of face. Military decision making has 
revealed episodes where a decision was maintained despite it obviously being wrong. 
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The usual reason that this occurred appears to be as self esteem maintenance (Dixon, 
1976). The events leading to the bombing of Pearl Harbour, are with hindsight, now 
seen as clear predictors of the attack. These easily available pieces of evidence were 
readily ignored at the time. 
In many ways it is not rational1 to reject a belief that has served you well before 
hand on the basis of discrepant evidence. The Popperian model of falsification requires 
the rejection of a theory when counter evidence is provided. However, there is always a 
chance that the evidence may be incorrect. In addition, changing beliefs requires 
cognitive upheaval and effort. Before a belief is rejected it needs to be replaced with 
another acceptable belief. Therefore, rather than look for disconfirming evidence it may 
be beneficial (rational1) to seek evidence that endorses your view, as in shown next. 
3.3.5 Confirmation Bias 
Wason (1960) demonstrated an 'error' in inductive reasoning called the 
Confirmation Bias. The bias is the way a person seeks to confirm rather than disconfirm 
his views. Wason (1960) used the 2-4-6 task. Subjects had to generate 3 numbers that 
conform to a rule the experimenter was using. When generating numbers to test a 
hypothesis, subjects only generated numbers in accordance with the possible rule. They 
would not try to disconfirm their own hypothesis. This behaviour is not rational2. 
Disconfirmation is very valuable as one negative instance should refute all of the 
positives (Popper, 1959). However, it seems that people do not want to acknowledge the 
possibility of being wrong. 
Disconfirmation is not used as much as confirmation. Gilhooly (1983) notes 
people are more likely to try to confirm rather than disconfirm their ideas. It is usual 
that someone returns to a restaurant where they had a good meal as they wish to confirm 
that it was good, and repeat the experience. It is not very likely that they would return to 
a restaurant where they had a bad meal to see i f it wi l l not happen again (disconfirming 
behaviour). 
Lord, Lepper and Ross (1979) note that confirmatory evidence is accepted 
uncritically and that discrepant evidence is scrutinised. A possible reason is that any 
denial of a schema (or belief) wil l cause cognitive upheaval and require a reorganisation 
of one's ideas after they have been shown to be wrong. Thus, any discrepant evidence 
wi l l cause cognitive dissonance (is unwelcome) and concordant evidence wil l reduce 
dissonance (welcome). Hence, it would appear to be rational1 to maintain a set of beliefs 
and search for confirmatory evidence. 
These biases reflect processes that are usually adaptive in the real world. The 
conflict with the explicit measurement of them is usually revealed on laboratory 
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paradigms or when large errors are revealed in real life (e.g. a plane crash). The aim has 
been to show that many normal beliefs are based on apparently faulty inference 
(heuristics, overconfidence, belief bias), that typically only confirmatory evidence is sort 
(confirmation bias) and any discrepant evidence is often ignored (hypothesis 
preservation). Therefore, faulty inference and incorrigibility are not unique to delusional 
thinking. Sutherland (1992) reports a collection of around 100 systematic errors in 
reasoning. This is taken as evidence of the essential irrationality of humans but it seems 
that it is actually irrational2 rather than irrational1. Consideration should also be given to 
the fact that these biases occur in normal people on tasks that are usually neutral in 
content. I f a person is very stressed or emotionally upset then it is likely to reduce any 
information search, distort any facts and reduce consideration of any alternatives even 
further. 
There are a number of reasons not to expect a formal logic to underlay real life 
reasoning. Firstly, evolutionary pressure is likely to favour short term, goal oriented 
reasoning more than formal logic abilities. A decision or belief that is achieved quickly 
and works effectively wi l l be a satisfactory solution even i f it is not optimal. I f a 
predator is nearby it is desirable to climb up a tree that is high enough to achieve one's 
goal and not to worry specifically about which tree to select. Simon (1956) called this 
satisficing. This means that an option is chosen that meets the minimal standards. A 
tree is chosen that is high enough. It does not matter too much which one it is. 
Secondly, the use of logic as the inherent reasoning system for humans seems 
wrong. Logic views the world as truth and falsehood. Therefore, there are only two 
states, but the real world is based on uncertainty. It seems that a Popperian view of 
reasoning is incorrect. Given that reasoning is goal oriented then there are utilities 
placed on the achievement of different goals. Different utilities have different 
probabilities of attainment. I may place a high value on marrying a model but the 
probability of doing so are low. Therefore, reasoning and decision making is not neutral 
and is not all or nothing but based on utilities and probabilities of outcome. 
Given the large demands on the system it is likely that rational1 thought would be 
achieved using computationally powerful implicit processes. Recognising a familiar 
face is presumably easier than explicit logical thought even though the computations in 
the former are enormous. Thirdly, reasoning is bounded by a general mental efficiency. 
Thus, it is preferable to rely on mental shortcuts that generally lead to adequate 
solutions. A final and very important reason for the apparent irrationality2 of people is 
the self serving bias. Beliefs support self esteem and issues of identity. Resistance to 
material that challenges such beliefs is almost to be expected. 
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3.4 Evidence of Abnormal Thinking 
The belief that human thought is truly logical and that errors only occur as slips, 
appears to be a false assumption. There is no legitimate reason to expect logical thought 
to be the basis of reasoning. Rather, it would be expected that illogical thought (but not 
irrational1) would be considered the natural state and that the presence of logical 
reasoning (rationality2) needs to be proven. Scientists, themselves, do not appear to 
behave in a strictly rational manner. Popper (1959) proposed that science progresses 
because of the development of competing theories held by different scientists. Not by 
one scientist evaluating all the available evidence and altering his hypotheses as 
necessary. The scientist is acting rationally in wanting to devise and test a theory, or 
disprove other people's ideas. However, it is unlikely that this wi l l progress in an 
entirely unbiased way. I f scientists are not truly rational then it makes the widespread 
acceptance of the existence of apparently abnormal beliefs, such as in paranormal 
phenomena, easier to understand. 
A recent poll (Gallup and Newport, 1991) revealed over half of the Americans 
interviewed believed in paranormal phenomena (UFO's, ESP, etc.). Research has 
identified possible reasons why people believe in the paranormal. The first is that the 
pertinent evidence suggests it is justified. For example, the Theory of Evolution is based 
on scientific methods, but it is not especially attractive to many people. The other 
reason to believe in an idea is that it is attractive, e.g. religion. Research into the 
paranormal reveals that the holding of a belief is not owing to reference to the facts but 
because of the attractiveness of the belief. In addition, the belief is supported by the 
existence of numerous biases in thinking. Belief in the paranormal can be seen to fu l f i l 
many of the criteria for delusional beliefs except that even i f the person is preoccupied 
by the belief he is unlikely to be the only one sharing it. 
Like a patient with delusions, the paranormal believer regards the burden of 
proof as being with the scientists or doctors. The beliefs need to be shown to be 
incorrect. Yet, with the case of the paranormal it is impossible to prove that something 
does not exist, only that it has never been recorded. When a believer in the paranormal 
is confronted with contradictory evidence there is a reluctance to accept it (Hypothesis 
preservation). In fact there is usually an active search for confirmatory evidence 
(Confirmation bias). 
A commonly stated cause of belief in the paranormal is personal experience 
(Blackmore, 1990). This usually means an unusual event has occurred that "could not 
have happened by chance". Blackmore (1990) suggests that people constantly search for 
connections between events and thus, for explanations. Chance is not regarded as a 
possible explanation. Hence, the demonstration of poor probability judgements can be 
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seen to be relevant. Normal, non deluded people when presented with an anomalous 
experience (chance occurrence) seek an explanation without realising it may be owing to 
chance alone. The death of a loved one after a dream is often quoted. Scott (discussed 
in Blackmore, 1990) actually calculated that i f everyone in Britain had one dream of the 
death of a named relative once in their life then such an event would come true once a 
fortnight. In apparent support of this, Blackmore and Troscianko (1985) noted that 
believers (sheep) were poorer judges of probability than sceptics (goats). Brennan and 
Hemsley (1984) report a similar finding in subjects with persecutory beliefs. These 
subjects were found to see more "illusory correlations" between non related items than 
people without delusions. 
Another phenomenon experienced is psychokinetics. In an event that is purely 
random the subject may feel he has had some control. I f someone needs a six in a dice 
game and throws it he wil l regard himself as the cause. Sheep suffer more from the 
illusion of control than goats (Blackmore and Troscianko, 1985). Once again similar 
biases have been demonstrated in people with delusions (Kaney and Bentall, 1989b). 
This similarity between belief in the paranormal and the symptoms of schizophrenia has 
been noted. For instance, Thalbourne (1994) reported that people who believe in and 
claim experience of the paranormal tend to score higher on various measures relevant to 
schizophrenia. 
Existence of paranormal events would require an enormous re-evaluation of the 
laws of physics. In such case the evidence would have to be very good indeed. To date 
there is not a replicable finding in support of paranormal phenomena that cannot be 
exposed as fraud or as methodologically weak (see Marks, 1986 or Randi, 1982, for a 
f u l l discussion of this field). Therefore, belief in the paranormal is completely 
unfounded, yet despite this it is very widespread. 
The evidence indicates that normal people do not engage in much purely logical 
reasoning. Such people demonstrate a willingness to believe in ideas that are only 
distinguishable from delusions by the fact they are quite widely held (ESP, odd or 
extreme religious and political beliefs). I f rationality is defined by consensus agreement 
then it would appear that scientists are in the minority. 
Evidence presented in this chapter indicates that reasoning in the general 
population is by no means logical. A number of biases operate to reduce cognitive effort 
as well as to help maintain self esteem. Thus, the suggestion that psychotic delusions 
are not qualitatively different from normal beliefs, but exist on a continuum of thought 
does not seem that radical. 
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3.5 Continuum of beliefs 
Strauss (1969) examined data from studies on schizophrenia and proposed that 
symptoms like delusions, are best thought of as existing on a continuum of beliefs rather 
than being categorically different. Venables (1990) felt that there existed a continuum of 
belief from the cold rationality of science through the more interesting "milder madness 
of belief in horoscopes and magical intervention" (p.204) through to the delusions of 
mental illness 
The implication of this continuum approach is not that delusions are "normal". 
However, this proposal allows the use of concepts from normal belief formation to be 
applied to research on the formation of delusions. The placing of a delusion on a 
continuum with other beliefs allows recognition that the delusion may fu l f i l a function in 
the same way as a normal belief. The delusion may act as a cognitive support to 
organise incoming information and be self esteem enhancing. Therefore, delusions may 
be considered as rational1 in that they still serve goals and thus, have an "intentionality" 
that is denied them by theorists such as Berrios (1991). 
3.6 Conclusions 
From a review of the literature on normal reasoning and decision making it 
seems more likely that thinking occurs by the use of non logical biases, than by the use 
of internalised logic. This does not mean that normal subjects are necessarily illogical. 
Their behaviour is best thought of as being goal oriented (rational1) and not logic 
oriented (rational2). This has led to a shift away from explaining departures from 
optimal norms to explaining compliance with it. Rather than assuming that errors 
represent faults or limitations in an inherently logical system, errors can be viewed as 
representing the heuristic implicit processes underlying the reasoning. 
The notion of people using heuristics and biases during reasoning has not gone 
unchallenged. Gigerenzer (1991) has argued that people reason very much in accord 
with statistical models i f given tasks that deal with the long run or frequency rather than 
single cases. However, errors still frequently occur in single cases, and in many ways 
these are more representative of normal reasoning. For instance, when deciding whether 
to have an operation, or marry, it is the single case that is of interest and not the chance 
of success for other people (Kahneman and Tversky, forthcoming). Therefore, human 
reasoning is considered biased at least when dealing with material that is relevant to the 
self. 
Errors in reasoning can be accounted for as rational1 reasoning. Faulty inference 
based on heuristics has been interpreted as rational in that it reduces cognitive demands 
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or provides evidence that allows a desired conclusion to be attained. A confirmatory 
information search is also rational because i f someone has an idea or belief then that 
person wants it to be proven and not disproven. Disregarding of discrepant evidence 
allows the retention of a belief that may have been useful in a number of other situations. 
Although the belief may not be applicable in every case it wi l l probably provide a 
solution on most occasions. 
This review has been purposefully brief. The focus has been on reasoning and 
decision making processes and biases in the system. There exists an additional vast 
literature that details problem solving, as well as belief and attitude formation on social 
issues. Given the nature of the experimental studies reported later this field has not been 
considered however, for a review of these areas see and Nisbett and Ross (1980). 
The existence of non logical reasoning in normal people requires a 
reconsideration of the definition of delusion. The current definition requires that normal 
reasoning is based on correct inference and that beliefs are not held in face of discrepant 
information. The reliance on non logical but rational1 reasoning biases makes it far 
easier to understand the great many apparently abnormal beliefs in the normal 
population. Thus, rather than view delusions as categorically different it seems far more 
realistic to consider them as lying on a continuum of thought. 
The next chapter explicitly states the aims and methods of studying the possible 
reasoning biases in people with delusions. 
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Research aims and methodology 
4.1 Ainu of thesis 
Chapter 1 considered the description and definition of delusional beliefs. It 
clearly indicated that the definition of a delusion was not as useful as it appeared. There 
was an apparent overlap with other psychiatric symptoms of obsessions, overvalued 
ideas, and hallucinations. Alternative classification systems that were based on a 
continuum approach were apparently more successful in describing delusions. Chapter 3 
also emphasised the importance of a dimensional approach to understanding delusions. 
This was owing to the demonstration of the abundance of reasoning in normal subjects 
that appears to f u l f i l many, i f not all the criteria for delusions (incorrect inference, 
incorrigibility). The reason for this apparent overlap between non delusional beliefs and 
delusions arose because reasoning was seen to be goal oriented (rationality1) rather than 
logic based (rationality2). Reasoning and beliefs (and delusional beliefs) were seen to 
serve a purpose to the holder. 
Chapter 2 examined the theories of delusions, of which two appeared the most 
worthy of further consideration. Maher (1974, 1988, 1992) proposes that delusions are 
the result of normal reasoning processes operating to explain an anomalous experience, 
such as a hallucination. The alternative hypothesis is that there is actually a reasoning 
abnormality for material related to the theme of the delusion (Bentall, 1994). In 
addition, there appears to be a more general hastiness and overconfidence in decision 
making. This is even demonstrated when the material is unrelated to the delusional 
belief (Huq et al. 1988, Garety et al. 1991). Bentall and his colleagues have 
demonstrated that people with persecutory delusions preferentially attend to and recall 
threat related material. In addition, these subjects have a social reasoning style that is an 
exaggeration of that seen in normal people, where negative events are attributed to 
external causes. Essentially, the work of Bentall and his colleagues is demonstrating an 
apparent bias of processes. Whereas, the results of Garety and her co-workers implies 
that the reasoning difference is more generalised and more deficit like, as it applies to 
tasks unrelated to the content of the delusion. This is an important distinction. A deficit 
is usually a way of showing that a person cannot do something. Typically, neutral 
material is used to show that this limitation is generalised. A bias concentrates on the 
way that information is processed. Therefore, the content of the material is very 
important and a bias is best assessed with emotionally salient material. Deficits are 
thought to reflect damage or loss to the system whereas biases in the absence of 
cognitive deficits possibly reflect past learning and unusual life experiences. It has been 
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the case that deficits are usually studied, but biases can help reveal a great deal about the 
preferential processing of information. Essentially, a deficit wil l reduce the amount of 
information that is available whereas a bias wil l affect what is selected and how it is 
processed. 
The purpose of this present research was to examine the nature of the possible 
reasoning biases or deficits in people with delusions. Performance of these subjects was 
compared with control subjects on a number of reasoning tasks that differed in form and 
content. The different forms of the tasks allowed a number of different types of 
reasoning to be examined (i.e. probability judgements, confidence in reasoning, 
hypothesis testing). The tasks were also varied in content so that both the abstract 
neutral (deficit) and the socially relevant material (bias) could be explored. Garety 
(1991) proposed that people with delusions had a biased information processing style. 
Namely, they should be hasty, overconfident, and pay undue attention to current stimuli 
by failing to draw on past experience in comparison to non deluded subjects (Box 4 in 
the model). The different forms of the reasoning tasks allow a test of these features. 
The question of the existence of a reasoning bias or defect in people with 
delusions is an important one to be answered. It should not be confused with a search 
for a general intellectual deficit. Gruhle (1915) proposed that delusions are secondary to 
poor intellect. However, delusions occur in people demonstrating all levels of 
intelligence. According to Maher and Spitzer (1993) the more intelligent the person, the 
more integrated and cohesive the delusional belief wil l be, with regards to that persons 
other beliefs (systematised or encapsulated). High intelligence does not prevent 
delusions from forming, but it may affect the content and the expression of the beliefs. 
It would seem unlikely however, that there is a linear relationship between intelligence 
and systematisation of belief. 
The practical implications for the value of this work appear twofold. Firstly, 
there is a definite need for the greater understanding of reasoning differences in 
Cognitive Behavioural Treatments (CBT) of delusions (and psychotic illness more 
generally). These treatments have had some limited success with people with delusions 
(Chadwick & Lowe, 1990; Kingdon & Turkington, 1991a, 1994). Refinements of these 
techniques wil l be possible once a fuller understanding of how these subjects arrive at 
their decisions is attained. Also, the increasing responsibility placed on the patient in the 
management of his or her own treatment (informed choice of medication, care in the 
community) means the person must be in a position to make an informed decision. 
Therefore, any defect in reasoning is potentially serious. 
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4.2 Method for studying reasoning 
The demonstration of faulty or different reasoning processes in subjects with 
delusions requires more than asking the people why they think the way that they do. As 
Maher (1992a) notes the delusion cannot be the only example of faulty reasoning (see 
below). In addition, one cannot rely on introspection to demonstrate faulty reasoning. 
Nisbett and Wilson (1977) asked normal subjects to account for the way they reached a 
decision. The subjects were able to construct plausible accounts of the mental processes, 
rather than reporting on the actual processes themselves. Therefore, delusional 
reasoning processes need to be investigated experimentally. 
However, one cannot decide i f a group of subjects is competent at inference on 
the basis of responses to a single type of problem. To investigate reasoning it is 
necessary to use a number of measures that are manipulated in form and content. This 
should allow identification of the nature of the processes and the extent of the biases 
operating. 
4.3 Issues to be addressed 
Maher (1988) states that "nobody seems to have yet established that the 
processes of logical inference are basically impaired in delusional subjects". To 
demonstrate such an impairment Maher suggests "we need well controlled comparisons 
of the cognition's of deluded patients with those of non deluded psychiatric controls and 
normal controls, before we can confidently claim that delusions are due to a pathology 
of cognition"(p. 336). Therefore in this research one must aim to produce "a 
demonstration of cognitive malfunctioning independent of the delusion itself but of a 
kind that could still account for the delusion." In order to demonstrate such a difference 
Maher (1992a) states very clear methodological criteria that the research has to consider. 
Maher's criteria are detailed below. 
A) Prescriptive or Comparative approach: 
Defective reasoning may be assessed by comparing actual 
performance with a fixed ideal standard of performance. Alternatively, it is 
possible to compare the actual performance of a group of people with 
delusions against the performance of matched non deluded people. Neither 
group may perform perfectly but they may differ in the extent of their 
respective departures from the ideal. People with delusions wil l , according to 
Maher's criteria, show a greater departure from the optimal. However, the 
value of comparing subjects' performance against a normative model has 
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already been found to be lacking because reasoning is not based on logic but 
on goal achievement (chapter 3). Measuring departure from an optimal 
model implies that the subjects have an internal mental logic that is the same 
or similar to this model. Thus, poor performance by people with delusions 
may be owing to pragmatic limitations such as the availability of working 
memory (see chapter 3). This is not an undisputed assumption (Evans et al. 
1993, Evans and Over, submitted). In the literature on depressive realism a 
similar call has been made for the use of a prescriptive norm (Ackerman and 
DeRubeis, 1991). On tasks like confidence measurement there are no right or 
wrong estimates of certainty. The experimenter is unable to control the 
beliefs and expectations that the subjects bring with them. How an external 
prescriptive logic is supposed to remedy this is unclear. However, where 
possible in the following studies an external prescriptive optimal norm is 
included in order to satisfy Maher's requirements. 
B) Deductive or inductive reasoning: 
Consideration needs to be given to the type of reasoning processes 
that are expected to be different or faulty. I f one expects that the reasoning 
defect lies in the ability to deduce logical consequences from initial premises, 
then the comparison task wil l be based on the solution of syllogisms. In this 
case, one would expect to see one or more of the common fallacies associated 
with this type of reasoning. Alternatively, i f the critical process is inductive 
reasoning then the investigator should, according to Maher, find errors that 
scientists will try to guard against (effect of sample size, failure to understand 
the unreliability of small differences, failure to abandon an initially plausible 
inference when subsequent observations produce strong counter data etc.). 
Therefore, in this thesis a number of types of reasoning tasks were used to 
explore a number of areas of reasoning. 
C) Subjects with delusions must reason in ways that lead to false 
conclusions: 
The third of Maher's criteria is that the group with delusions must 
make more errors than the non deluded group. Paranoid subjects tend to 
have higher IQ scores than non paranoids. Maher states that this is 
incompatible with the hypothesis that paranoid ideas arise from a cognitive 
deficit. However, it seems that the method of reasoning, rather than the 
outcome, is what is of interest. In Huq et al.'s study people with delusions 
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were better Bayesians according to the prescriptive norm. However, they did 
not reason like the control subjects. Despite this difference in style, the 
people with delusions did not make substantially more errors, indicating that 
a different style does not necessarily produce more errors. False conclusions 
may arise when the material is specific to theme and more errors are not 
necessary on all tasks with a neutral content. A deficit may not be evident in 
all tasks> even when a difference in style is revealed. 
D) The delusion cannot generate and test the hypothesis at the 
same time: 
For a reasoning difference to have a causative status, any difference 
must be evident on tasks that are unrelated to the theme of the delusion. 
Demonstrating that the person cannot reason about the delusion is not 
evidence that the person has faulty inference. It is not possible to say that 
someone has faulty reasoning because he or she is deluded. Take the case of 
a man who believes that a he is responsible for a war that happened before 
his birth. Clearly, the false inference is that he could have caused a war 
before he was born. I f this is taken as evidence of the person having faulty 
inference processes it is akin to saying that someone has amnesia because 
there is a problem with that person's memory. The faulty process must be 
demonstrated under other additional circumstances i f it is to qualify for 
aetiological status in the alleged pathology. 
E) The defect must be non specific: 
In a development from the previous proposition, Maher states that the 
tendency to arrive at false beliefs must be evident in beliefs that go beyond 
the topic of the delusion. This must be demonstrable in the natural habitat. 
The subjects with delusions must demonstrate a global deficit. I f a person is 
shown to exhibit a generalised reasoning bias then evidence of this wil l be 
shown in other non delusional beliefs. I f an individual holds only one 
specific delusional belief and has no evidence of faulty inference in the other 
beliefs, then this seems incompatible with a generalised reasoning difference. 
According to Maher, clinical evidence indicates that delusions tend to be 
limited in range implying that there is not a generalised reasoning deficit. 
However, demonstration of biased data gathering, preferential attendance to 
salient material and so on are all biased processes that alter the information 
available to reason with and should be studied. 
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F) Correlational studies: 
Correlations do not demonstrate causes. Most studies of persons with 
delusions begin when the subjects are already diagnosed as deluded. 
Therefore, the subject is already a psychiatric patient. Delusions of 
persecution can be self fulfil l ing i f that person is admitted to hospital. The 
only satisfactory solution of the causal direction dilemma is to produce 
evidence of the premorbid attributional style and inferential styles of the 
person with delusions. It is not possible to establish that hypothesis testing 
abnormalities are implicated in the origins of delusional thinking by a group 
comparison. It is only possible to demonstrate an association between a 
particular type of reasoning deficit and a particular type of psychopathology. 
Whilst not in complete agreement with many of Maher's considerations it may 
be prudent to take on board as many of his requirements as possible, i f only to help 
convince any sceptical readers. The studies that follow incorporated prescriptive norms 
and were varied in content from abstract and neutral (generalised deficit) to socially 
relevant and theme related material. It should be borne in mind that Maher's criteria are 
derived from the fact that the definition of a delusion requires the presence of faulty 
inference, whereas his theory argues that there is normal reasoning occurring in subjects 
with delusions. However, the previous chapter demonstrated that reasoning in normal 
subjects is not based on some system of logic. Rather, reasoning is about subjective goal 
achievement. Therefore, comparisons with optimal norms or demonstration of more 
errors may not be strictly necessarily i f differences in reasoning style can be indicated. 
4.4 Other considerations 
As mentioned earlier, this thesis is an attempt to study one specific symptom, 
delusions, usually seen within a context of a diagnosis of schizophrenia. This approach 
recognises the value of studying psychological processes involved in symptoms. Whilst 
at the same time this avoids the problem of the relative heterogeneity of the 
schizophrenia diagnosis, that often leaves uncertainty in what is being studied. Not all 
schizophrenics have delusions and not all people with delusions have schizophrenia. For 
many years there have been countless experimental studies of the psychology of 
schizophrenia with very little agreement between them. Possibly, some of the lack of 
consensus is owing to the heterogeneity of people with a diagnosis of schizophrenia 
(Bentall, Jackson and Pilgrim, 1988). In addition, some of the so called problems in 
schizophrenia may simply be the consequence of being psychologically unwell and 
having a chronic illness. 
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4.4.1 Control groups 
It is essential to consider the possibility that poor performance on tasks is merely 
a consequence of having a psychiatric illness. To control for this factor there are a 
number of possible comparison groups. 
Since this thesis advocates the use of a symptom rather than a syndrome 
approach, it may be thought best to use patients with hallucinations (and no apparent 
delusions) with a diagnosis of schizophrenia. However, there are problems of using 
these people as a psychiatric control group. It is not clear whether hallucinations result 
from a failure of reality testing which is a judgmental skill (Slade and Bentall, 1988). In 
which case they may exhibit reasoning biases similar to people with delusions. In 
addition, people with voices often have secondary delusions, i.e. explanations of voices 
as telepathy or messages from God (see chapter two). I f subjects with voices are not 
suitable that only really leaves patients with essentially negative symptoms. These 
negative signs are associated with intellectual impairment (Frith, Leary, Cahill and 
Johnstone, 1991) and possibly with ventricular enlargement (Crow, 1980). Given the 
very different pattern of presentation by subjects with predominantly negative signs it 
was considered best to use a group of patients without this degree of intellectual 
impairment. 
People with anxiety tend to be treated very differently to subjects with delusions. 
Anxiety patients are usually treated as outpatients, in group sessions and are maintained 
on different types of, and generally less medication. However, Garety et al. (1991) did 
successfully compare subjects with delusions against a control group of anxiety patients, 
so their use is perhaps not always inappropriate. 
Obsessional patients are known to have an over cautiousness bias on Bayesian 
tasks (Volans, 1976) and differ from normal subjects. Thus, it is considered best to 
exclude people with this symptom. Bipolar disorder patients (manic-depressives) often 
have grandiose ideas or delusions in manic stages and delusions of depression or guilt in 
depressive stages, and are best excluded on this basis. 
On balance, people with depression were considered most appropriate to act as a 
psychiatric comparison group. There are a great number of similarities both in the 
shared symptoms and shared types of treatment. People with delusions often have 
depressive symptoms. The prevalence of depression in schizophrenia is apparently 
much overlooked. Lindenmayer, Grochowski and Kay (1991) found high levels of mild 
or moderate depression that was associated with the presence of positive symptoms 
(delusions and hallucinations) and not with negative symptoms as one might expect. 
Also, people with delusions may perform poorly on tasks because of a lack of 
motivation or poor attention spans, which are symptoms also associated with depression. 
Reich and Cutting (1982) noted that depressed subjects made good controls for 
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schizophrenics on a number of cognitive measures. Thus, there may be similarities in 
psychiatric symptoms and cognitive difficulties. Finally, unlike anxiety patients 
depressed subjects are more likely to be treated as psychiatric in-patients and wil l share 
the same ward environments as the people with delusions . 
There are a number of possible drawbacks of comparing people with depression. 
For instance, the majority of depressed people are treated as outpatients by GP. or by 
outpatient units (Goldberg and Huxley, 1980). Depressed people who become in-
patients have specific characteristics which distinguish them from the majority of 
depressed patients (Blackburn, 1989). Typically, depressed people that become 
inpatients in the NHS have one of the following characteristics: Psychotic features 
(delusions and hallucinations), a high risk of suicide or actual para-suicidal behaviour, 
severe impairment with gross retardation or agitation, anorexia, and sleep disturbance. 
They wil l probably be receiving Electroconvulsive Therapy (ECT). Therefore, care was 
taken in selection of subjects with depression so that they did not exhibit any of the 
above features. 
4.4.2 Chronicity/Length of admittance 
Until relatively recently most patients tested in psychological experiments were 
from a heterogeneous diagnostic group and were most likely to come from large 
institutions in which they had been living for many years. Institutionalisation invariably 
has effects on behaviour and performance on psychological tasks (Frith, 1992). Recent 
developments in policy have led to the closure of many of the institutions. Hence, this 
problem of institutionalisation impairing performance may be less of a factor. To 
control for any possible effect, only out-patients or patients on acute admissions wards 
were selected for participation. The out-patients all had active delusional beliefs but 
were able to function without in-patient care. Importantly, Goldstein, Zubin and Pogue-
Heile (1991) found that the association between length of hospitalisation and cognitive 
decline is no more than is seen in normal ageing. Therefore, i f a subject had had a long 
period as an inpatient this factor alone will not exclude him or her. 
4.4.3 Medication 
The vast majority of people with delusions are treated with drugs. The 
possibility that drug treatment leads to cognitive impairment needs to be acknowledged. 
One needs to consider a way to control for drug type and dosage. Theoretically it is 
possible to convert all the neuroleptics (antipsychotic drugs) to chlorpromazine 
equivalencies and equal body weights. However, this approach assumes that there is an 
equivalence between drugs, but the relationships between drugs and doses are non linear. 
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Thus, any estimates of equivalencies are unlikely to have much meaning. Different 
drugs are prescribed because they have different effects on patients. Thus, it is not really 
possible to control for these effects (Spohn and Strauss, 1989). 
Fortunately, neuroleptics are associated with normalisation on many cognitive 
and psychological measures (Spohn and Strauss, 1989). Therefore, neuroleptics are 
likely to increase the homogeneity of cognitive functioning across patients. The 
anticholinergics that are sometimes prescribed to counter the side effects of the anti 
dopaminergic drugs can cause some disruption to some aspects of memory (Frith, 1984). 
Most likely it wil l effect recall but not recognition (Spohn and Strauss, 1989). Levin, 
Ben-Artzi, Levy, and Neumann (1992) reported that antipsychotics can have an effect on 
short term verbal memory but not on immediate, long term or short term visual memory. 
This degree of impairment was directly related to the anticholinergic effects of the 
neuroleptics. Therefore, subjects receiving courses of anticholinergic drugs were not 
asked to participate in the studies reported here. 
Delusions are often resistant to pharmacological treatment and this implies that 
the processes may be fairly drug resistant anyway. Johnstone, Owens, Frith and Leavy 
(1991) in a follow up of over 500 people with a diagnosis of schizophrenia found that 
over 50% had moderate to severe delusions. In most cases the therapeutic effect of any 
medication is generally the moderation rather than abolition of any symptom. 
4.4.4 Cognitive measures 
For the research reported here, matching of groups of subjects for age was 
supplemented with an attempt at control for intelligence. Naturally, i f one is to study 
reasoning differences between different groups it is desirable to demonstrate intellectual 
comparability. Otherwise poor performance on a reasoning task by a subject or group 
wi l l be most parsimoniously explained by lower intellectual ability. Therefore, the 
groups of subjects used in the research were matched as far as possible for age, sex, and 
estimates of IQ. For an estimate of IQ. the National Adult Reading Test (NART, Nelson 
1991) was used. The NART is a relatively robust measure of premorbid IQ. It is an oral 
reading test consisting of 50 words of irregular pronunciation. Subjects with a better 
education or who are more intelligent will be more likely to have been exposed to these 
irregular words. The words become progressively harder to read and the more a person 
correctly reads the higher their IQ. estimate. The NART is a quick, reliable and 
relatively robust indicator of intelligence (Crawford, Besson, Bremner, Ebmeier, 
Cochrane and Kirk wood, 1992). The NART correlates well with other measures of 
intelligence (Crawford, Parker, Allan, Jack and Morrison, 1991). An added benefit is 
that the person does not know i f they are incorrect and this tends to reduce any anxiety 
associated with testing. 
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In addition, the Mini Mental State Examination (MMSE) was given to the 
participants. In this task the subject is asked a number of questions about his or her 
surroundings to assess current awareness. Also, the person is asked to perform a number 
of simple tasks such as comprehension of instructions or counting backwards from 100. 
The MMSE is used to confirm that the person is able to understand the instructions of 
the investigator and is a rough gauge of current cognitive functioning. Devised by 
Folstein, Folstein, and McHugh (1975) the Mini Mental State Examination is a widely 
used screening test for dementia. Like the NART, the MMSE is brief and easy to use. 
Several studies (e.g. Anthony, LeReche, Niaz, Von Korf, and Folstein 1982) have 
indicated that a score of 23/24 (out of 30) provides a sensitive and specific cut off for the 
presence of intellectual impairment. Thus, any participants scoring below this threshold 
were excluded from the main studies. 
The importance of using cognitive measures arises from the demonstration of 
apparent impairments on intelligence measures by people with schizophrenia (Payne, 
1973). However, this impairment is more marked in patients with chronic illnesses that 
are not characterised by the presence of delusions. In acute patients, intellectual decline 
is variable but usually very minor (McKenna, 1994). Most decline is seen in patients 
who are disoriented for time, place and their own age. Such subjects were screened out 
by the MMSE. Hence, intellectual impairments in the experimental group are expected 
to be minor i f present at all. 
4.5 Conclusions 
Maher states quite clearly that "a reasoning defect in deluded patients remains to 
be demonstrated" (Maher, 1992a, p. 266). Whilst disagreeing with this statement (see 
Chapter 2 for demonstrations of abnormal reasoning) it does serve as a starting point for 
the thesis. The aim of the following investigations was to examine the performance of 
people with delusions on a number of reasoning tasks that differed in form and content. 
Manipulations of form allowed a coverage of deductive and inductive reasoning tasks 
(see Maher's criterion B). Manipulations of content allowed a series of tasks to be used 
that ranged from abstract, neutral material to socially and delusional related material. 
This allows the demonstration of any possible non specific defects in reasoning 
(criterion E) and reduces the chance of tautological explanations of delusions (criterion 
D). In all but one case (Chapter 6, the Cognitive Estimates Task) a prescriptive or 
optimal norm was used as well as a comparative approach (criterion A). 
In this chapter consideration has been given to the suitability of different control 
groups. On balance, it was decided that people with a diagnosis of depression were most 
suitable. Attempts to control for medication, chronicity of the illness and cognitive 
measures were all outlined as well. The format for the following studies was the 
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comparison of the performance of groups of subjects with delusions, depression and 
normal people on a variety of reasoning tasks that differed in form and content. The 
participants were matched as closely as possible for demographic details. Screening 
procedures (NART, MMSE) meant the groups were relatively similar intellectually. 
People with a primarily negative or chronic type of illness were not asked to participate. 
The study of reasoning in people with delusions seems of crucial importance. 
Beliefs ( and delusions) are born out of the capacity to make inferences. The capacity to 
form and hold beliefs about the world and other people is vital to successful adaptation 
to the environment. A difference in reasoning that left a person susceptible to forming 
beliefs different to the rest of the population, may well lead to difficulties for that 
person. 
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5 Experiment 1: The Biased Coin Task 
5.1 Introduction 
As has been shown, relatively little is known about the formation and 
maintenance of delusional beliefs. Two main approaches have dominated the scant 
literature, these seek to account for delusions as primarily disturbances of perception 
(Maher, 1974, 1988) or as differences in reasoning (Von Domarus, 1944, Huq et al. 
1988). 
Reasoning biases cannot be overarching, since it is known that people with 
delusions do not fail all logical tasks; for example, they solve syllogisms as well (or as 
badly!) as non-deluded people (Williams, 1964, Evans, Newstead and Byrne, 1993). 
However, biases have been found in two particular areas; social information processing 
(Bentall and Kaney, 1989, Bentall, 1994) and hypothesis testing (Huq et al. 1988). 
The concern here is with biases in hypothesis testing. Previous studies have 
demonstrated biased hypothesis testing in people with delusions, even for tasks with 
neutral content. For example, John & Dodgson (1994) used a twenty questions game to 
reveal evidence of a difference in reasoning styles in which people with delusions, in 
comparison to matched depressed and normal subjects, requested less information before 
reaching a decision. In this sort of study, the fact that the materials have no social or 
personal relevance supports the idea that the reasoning bias is generalised, rather than 
confined to material with affective or personal significance. 
Maher (1992a) outlined the requirements for an adequate investigation of 
reasoning biases in people with delusions. He proposed that a prescriptive or optimal 
norm is needed to compare the subjects with delusions against. Reasoning about 
probabilities forms one such candidate, since Bayes's theorem can be used as a model 
(Fischoff and Beyth-Marom, 1983). Hemsley and Garety (1986) suggested that this 
model could usefully be applied to the study of delusional reasoning. Huq et al. (1988), 
employed this model and showed subjects two jars containing opposite proportions 
(85:15, 15:85) of coloured beads. Subjects were required to decide from which of the 
containers the experimenter was drawing a series of beads. People with delusions 
(schizophrenics) requested less information and were relatively over-confident in their 
judgements in comparison to normal controls and a psychiatric control group of mixed 
diagnoses. Garety et al. (1991) used the same paradigm with groups of patients with 
relatively pure delusional disorders (delusional disorder or paranoid schizophrenia on 
DSM-IIIR; APA, 1987) or more mixed problems (deluded schizophrenics). Irrespective 
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of their particular diagnosis, the people with delusions requested less information in 
comparison to anxious or normal subjects. 
These findings are potentially important, since it is possible that such differences 
in hypothesis testing may contribute to the maintenance of an abnormal belief once 
formed. However, it is not known whether they apply in all tasks which involve 
weighing the probabilities of events, or only in those which take a certain form. 
Specifically, in the studies reported to date, subjects were always free to determine when 
they had enough evidence for their decisions. In this study it was therefore decided to 
explore biases in the reasoning of people with delusions in tasks which involve 
probabilities, but in which all the information necessary for a decision is given in 
advance. In subsequent studies (Chapters 9 and 10), the interest is in the possibility that 
the biases of people with delusions might relate to failures to gather sufficient evidence, 
rather than an inability to reason about probability per se. 
Experiment 1 used the 'Biased Coin' task (Griffin and Tversky, 1992). In this 
task, subjects are presented with a set of results which they are told come from spinning 
a biased coin; it is their job to estimate the chance that the coin is biased to heads. 
Performance can be assessed by how closely subjects' estimates approximate the 
probability given by Bayes's theorem. Therefore, this method allows a comparison 
against an optimal model (Bayes's theorem) as well as a comparative study of reasoning 
between different groups. 
Even more interestingly, however, is that it is known that normal subjects show 
specific biases. In particular, estimations of probability in such a task might be 
influenced by one of two factors, which Griffin and Tversky (1992) call the strength and 
the weight of the evidence. Consider the case where you are told that a coin is biased so 
that on average it comes up one particular way on 3 out of 5 times. Your job is to 
estimate the likelihood of whether the bias is to heads (rather than tails), and you are told 
that when this coin was spun 7 times it came up heads on 6 of those occasions. The 
strength of the evidence is represented by the proportion of heads in the sample; in this 
case 6/7. The weight is the number of spins (7 in this example), and represents the 
predictive validity of the sample. Griffin and Tversky (1992) found that normal subjects 
are unduly influenced by the strength of the evidence (i.e., the proportion of heads in the 
given sample) and do not take account of the weight (sample size). In other words, for 
normal people, the influence of sample size is overruled by the proportion.of heads. For 
instance, when normal subjects are presented with evidence from 3 spins of a coin that 
produced 3 heads and no tails (a high strength and low weight trial) they often give a 
high probability that the coin is biased to heads (around 90%). When presented with 
evidence from 17 spins, 10 of which produced heads and 7 were tails (a high weight and 
low strength trial), subjects usually assess the probability that the coin is biased as much 
lower (around 60%). However, the actual Bayesian probability for both trials is 77%. 
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Therefore, subjects can be seen to be overconfident when the strength of evidence is 
high (high ratio of heads to tails) and the weight of evidence (number of trials) is low. 
Conversely, normal people tend to be under confident relative to the Bayesian optimum 
when weight is high and strength is low. (see Griffin and Tversky, 1992 for more 
definition of Strength, Weight, discriminability and the relation to Bayes's theory) 
I f subjects with delusions are shown to reason abnormally on this task it is 
predicted that they will be relatively overconfident, and give higher estimations that the 
coin is biased (Huq et al. 1988). Garety (1991) proposed the subjects with delusions are 
failing to draw upon previously acquired information and are relying on the immediately 
available evidence. Thus, they are presumably less able to take account of factors such 
as base rate and are reliant on the strength of the evidence. I f they are excessively 
swayed by the strength (stimulus driven as in Salzinger's Immediacy hypothesis, 1984) 
subjects are likely to give estimates that are higher than those prescribed by Bayes's 
theorem. This will be considered as overconfidence. Therefore, overconfidence may be 
more evident on those trials where strength is high and weight is low. Also, in the 
literature on normal subjects, overconfidence is viewed as a self esteem enhancing bias 
(Sutherland, 1992) that is apparently lacking in subjects with depression (Ackerman and 
DeRubeis, 1991). Given that delusions operate as an active defence against feelings of 
low self esteem, in essence the opposite of depression (Bentall, 1994), overconfidence 
may well be expected. 
An advantage of the biased coin task is therefore that it gives us a variety of ways 
of determining whether reasoning is normal. We can ask not only whether the 
probability estimates made by people with delusions are of normal size, but also whether 
they take account of (or fail to be influenced by) the same factors. 
5.2 Method 
Subjects: Three groups of subjects participated; patients with delusions, patients 
with depressive symptoms, and normal controls. A l l were given the National Adult 
Reading Test (NART: Nelson, 1991) to establish intellectual comparability across 
groups, and the Mini Mental State Examination (MMSE: Folstein et al. 1975) to 
determine mental status. Studies (e.g. Anthony et al. 1982) have indicated that an 
MMSE score of 23 or 24 (out of 30) provides a workable cut-off for the presence of 
intellectual impairment. Thus, anyone scoring below this threshold was excluded from 
the main study. 
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The experimental subjects were 12 patients with delusions. The criteria for 
inclusion were: 
1) present delusional symptoms expressed by the patient in interview or to 
staff. Specifically, delusions of persecution or grandeur. Patients met a 
number of DSM-IIIR diagnostic criteria (9 schizophrenic, 1 bipolar disorder 
with psychotic features, 1 delusional disorder, and 1 schizoaffective 
disorder). 
2) absence of formal thought disorder or negative symptoms to such a degree 
that the delusions were secondary features of the illness. 
3) no evidence of any organic cause of illness, and no history of drug or 
alcohol abuse sufficient to warrant clinical attention. 
4) have not received a course of ECT for at least the last month. 
5) aged 18-60. 
The first comparison group involved 12 psychiatric control subjects; the criteria 
were: 
1) diagnosed as suffering from unipolar depression with no psychotic 
features. 
2) no evidence of any organic cause of illness, and no history of drug or 
alcohol abuse sufficient to warrant clinical attention. 
3) have not received a course of ECT for at least the last month. 
4) aged 18-60. 
A second comparison group involved 12 normal subjects drawn from the non-
academic staff of Durham University and informal contacts. None were undergraduates 
or postgraduates. They were selected according to the following criteria: 
1) no history of psychiatric care. 
2) no training in psychology or statistics. 
3) aged 18-60. 
The diagnostic classification of patients, and presence of current symptoms was 
confirmed on the basis of inspection of case notes, recommendation by the responsible 
consultant, or by discussion with the responsible medical officer and staff. 
Subject characteristics for these three groups are shown in Table 5.1. There were 
no significant differences across groups in age, NART estimated IQ, and MMSE 
performance. 
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Table 5.1: Subject characteristics in Experiment 1. Mean age, NART estimate of IQ. and MMSE 
performance are given, and standard deviations are in brackets. 
Group N Inpatients Gender Age NART MMSE 
Outpatients M F estimated IQ 
Deluded 12 6 6 8 4 37.0 (9.9) 102.0(10.8) 28.5(1.5) 
Depressed 12 5 7 2 10 38.3 (7.5) 99.0(13.8) 28.2(1.7) 
Control 12 6 6 43.0(12.4) 109.9 (7.4) 29.3(1.5) 
Significance NS NS NS 
Procedure: Subjects were presented with the following information: 
"Imagine you are spinning a coin, and recording how often it lands on heads and how often it 
lands on tails. Unlike tossing of a coin, which (on average) produces an equal number of 
heads and tails, spinning a coin leads to a bias favouring one side or the other because of 
slight imperfections in the rim of the coin and an uneven distribution of mass. Now imagine 
that you know the bias is 3/5. It tends to land on one side 3 out of 5 times. But you do not 
know if this bias is in favour of heads or in favour of tails." 
Any further explanation required to clarify these concepts was given. The 
subject was then given a number of trials, in each of which she or he was asked to 
estimate the probability that the coin's bias favoured heads rather than tails. The subject 
was asked to state what the chance was (as a percentage) that the coin was biased to 
heads. 
Twelve trials were given in total. Given that there is an equal chance of the coin 
landing on heads or tails there are three levels of probability calculable according to 
Bayes's theorem (0.60, 0.77, 0.88). At each level of objective probability, there were 4 
trials that differed in the strength and weight of the evidence. These were chosen so that 
strength and weight were inversely related; at high weights (large numbers of spins) 
there would always be low strength (proportion of heads in the sample), and vice versa. 
In all, then, there were 12 trials; these are listed in ful l in Appendix 1. They were 
presented in a fixed pseudo-random order. 
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5.3 Results 
The measure of interest is the probability estimates of subjects in each group. 
However, data for the 0.6 level of probability according to Bayes's theorem were 
excluded from analysis owing to the pronounced skew of the data; most subjects simply 
put the probability at 50% on these trials. 
Data for the 0.77 and 0.88 levels of objective probability are shown in Table 5.2. 
A Group by Probability by Trial mixed analysis of variance was conducted. This 
analysis looked at objective Probability (0.77 vs. 0.88; repeated measure), trial Type (4 
levels, ranging from high strength to low strength of evidence; repeated measure) and 
subject Group (deluded, depressed, normal). 
Table 5.2: Estimates of likelihood that a coin is biased to heads at the 0.77 and 0.88 Bayesian levels of 
probability, from deluded, depressed and control groups. At each level of objective probability, the 4 
trials are arranged in order of increasing weight and decreasing strength of evidence. 
Bayesian probability 
0.77 
Weight of evidence (number of spins) 
Low Medium High Highest 
3 5 9 17 
Strength of evidence (ratio of heads/tails) 
Highest High Medium Low 
3:0 4:1 6:3 10:7 
0.88 
Low Medium High Highest 
5 9 17 33 
Highest High Medium Low 
5:0 7:2 11:6 19:14 
Deluded 
Mean: 
SD: 
Depressed 
Mean: 
SD: 
Control 
Mean: 
SD: 
93.3 75.4 76.3 63.7 
14.4 15.6 17.2 13.2 
82.9 77.9 64.6 70.4 
20.7 13.9 11.2 14.7 
91.7 80.4 73.1 60.9 
13.4 11.4 9.15 9.3 
84.2 82.9 77.8 62.9 
21.5 12.9 11.2 12.3 
87.9 75.8 74.6 70.2 
18.6 11 12.3 12.3 
98.6 74.5 69.2 60.9 
2.6 12.2 12.8 6.3 
The results of this analysis indicated no overall significant difference between 
the groups' estimates of the probability of the coin being biased (Group: F (2, 33) < 1). 
Also, there was no significant difference in subjects' estimated probabilities between the 
objective probability levels of 0.77 and 0.88 (Probability: F (1, 33) < 1). The average 
estimated probability levels were 76% chance at objective p=0.77 and 77% at objective 
p=0.88 respectively. There was, however, a significant difference between the different 
types of trial (Type: F ( 3,99) = 31.15, p < 0.001). Across the pooled data for 0.77 and 
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0.88 levels of objective probability, the highest strength trials produced an average 90% 
estimate that the coin was biased to heads, the estimates for the successively lower 
strengths were 78%, 73%, and 65% respectively. Therefore, high strength trials 
produced higher probability estimates than the high weight trials. In fact, since weight 
was inversely related to strength in the trials used, it is clear that subjects were much 
more influenced by strength of evidence in arriving at their estimates, as Griff in and 
Tversky (1992) had also observed. 
Turning to the interactions, there was no significant difference between 
estimated probability levels across groups (Group x Probability: F (2, 33) < 1). The 
people with delusions produced averages of 77% for the 0.77 and for the 0.88 levels of 
objective probability. The depressed subjects average estimates were 74% and 77% for 
these two levels, and the normal group produced average estimates of 77% and 76%. 
There was also no subject Group x trial Type interaction (F (6, 99) = 1.98, p = 0.08), 
although this began to approach a significant level, and no Probability x Trial type 
interaction (F (3, 99) < 1). Hence, it was apparent that all of the groups altered their 
estimates in the same way, in line with changes in strength of the evidence given. 
Figure 5.1: Graph showing the mean difference from Bayes' theorem on each trial type for the combined 
0.77 and 0.88 objective levels of probability. 
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However, there was a 3-way interaction between subject Group, Probability and 
trial Type (F (6,99) = 2.79, p < 0.05). This is shown in Figure 5.1. Post hoc Tukey tests 
(a = 0.05) showed that there were differences between the normal subjects and the 
people with depression at the objective level of probability 0.88 on trial one. Overall, it 
can be seen in Figure 5.1 that the depressed subjects are less extreme and are less 
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influenced by the effect of Strength and Weight of evidence. Normal subjects are the 
most extreme, and the subjects with delusions fall in between. 
5.4 Discussion 
The main finding of Experiment 1 is that in estimating the probability that a coin 
is biased, people with delusions reason in much the same way as non-deluded 
comparison groups. The sizes of their probability estimates are in line with those of 
normal people, and show an equal influence of strength of evidence (i.e., the ratio of 
heads to tails in the sample given) and an equivalent disregard of the weight of the 
evidence (number of trials). This demonstrates the reliability of the task as strength and 
weight have acted in the directions expected from Griffin and Tversky's (1992) study, 
producing high estimates at high strength and lower estimates as strength decreases. 
This is important evidence as it demonstrates that the psychiatric subjects were not 
responding randomly or without consideration of the problems. I f this had been the 
case, the clear relationship between strength and weight would not have been 
demonstrated. What is seen is that the people with delusions are more like normal 
subjects in their performance on this task than subjects with depression. The depressed 
subjects are more balanced in the assessment of the strength and weight of the evidence 
and produce less extreme responses. This would appear to be consistent with work on 
depressive realism (Ackermann and DeRubeis, 1991). 
At first sight, these findings are markedly discrepant with the evidence of 
abnormal biases for people with delusions in probability reasoning tasks reported by 
Huq et al. (1988) and Garety et al. (1991). It has been shown that there is a bias in 
reasoning for the group with delusions in Experiment 1, but their bias (toward strength 
of evidence) is completely normal! 
However, the discrepancy with Huq et al.'s (1988) results may be readily 
resolved by noting a subtle but potentially important difference between the tasks. This 
is that the biased coin experiment sets out all information which must be considered, 
whereas in the task favoured by Garety, Hemsley and their co-workers the subject is free 
to determine at which point sufficient evidence for a decision is available (this issue wil l 
be returned to in Chapter 9). 
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5.5 Conclusions 
The results of the Biased Coin task provide no evidence that subjects with 
delusions are unable to reason with probabilities. Subjects were not stimulus bound 
when provided with all of the information. Thus, there was no evidence of people with 
delusions being overconfident relative to the Bayesian benchmark. These subjects were 
neither more confident generally on all the trials nor on specific trials that presented a 
large ratio of heads to tails, the high strength trials. This appears to be strong evidence 
that the probabilistic reasoning of the group of subjects with delusions was entirely 
normal. People with delusions did not make abnormal probability estimates either 
generally or specifically on high strength trials in comparison to the control subjects. 
The difference between this result and previous work is possibly accounted for by the 
difference in presentation of the material. However, before moving on to examine this 
difference more ful ly , it was considered worthwhile to investigate whether 
overconfidence in decision making may be demonstrable on a different type of task. 
Thus, in the next chapter a different approach to confidence in decisions is taken. This is 
to try and distinguish between neutral, abstract probability judgements and general 
confidence in more realistic decision making. 
75 
Chapter Six 
6 Experiment 2: The Cognitive Estimates Task 
6.1 Introduction 
Huq et al. (1988) reported that people with delusions were more confident on a 
probabilistic reasoning task than control subjects without delusions. Further research has 
found no evidence of abnormal probability estimates in the form of overconfidence on the 
Biased Coin task or on a replication of the Huq et al. study (Garety et al. 1991). This 
inconclusive state of affairs prompted Experiment 2 which examined whether subjects 
with delusions were more confident on a realistic but neutral in content reasoning task. 
The paradigm chosen was the Cognitive Estimates Task (CET, Shallice and Evans, 1979). 
The CET's origins lay in the noticing of the often inappropriately bizarre 
estimations given by patients with frontal lobe lesions. Given questions such as the ones 
below, subjects with frontal lobe damage show an inability to judge accurately in these 
novel situations. 
"What is the height of the post office tower?" 
"How fast do race horses gallop?" 
"What is the age of the oldest person in Britain today? 
"What is the length of an average man's spine?" 
These questions are ones that can be answered using general knowledge available 
to almost all subjects but for which no immediately obvious strategy is available. 
Performance in such a task demonstrates that answering such questions stresses the 
abilities to select an appropriate cognitive plan and of checking any putative answer 
obtained, as much as the ability to carry out the selected plan. To obtain a reasonable 
estimate of the length of an average spine, the subject must utilise the items of common 
knowledge in a novel fashion. It is possible to derive such knowledge from a guess based 
on length of a jacket, or of the torso without head or legs. Then the subject must check the 
answers against ideas of common sense. For instance, the answer cannot be 5 feet as 
some people are not much taller than 5 feet. Answers are rated on a scale of bizarreness. 
Essentially, this task would seem to rely on executive or metacognitive skills in order to 
check the quality of the answer produced. 
In addition to providing an estimate, the subjects were asked to rate their 
confidence in their responses'. Therefore, the task provided two measures; the degree of 
bizarreness of the answer and the degree of confidence in the answer. The main aim of the 
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study was to examine confidence in judgements given by people with delusions. This is 
because overconfidence in decisions appears to be a feature of the information processing 
style in people with delusions. Huq et al. (1988) reported that such subjects were hasty 
and overconfident on the beads task. On analogous perceptual recognition tasks people 
with delusions were also shown to be hasty and overconfident (McCormick and Broekema 
(1978). 
The use of the CET with people with delusions is considered useful for a number 
of reasons. The brief review of the literature (chapter 2) concerning frontal lobe 
dysfunction in schizophrenia, and especially in people with delusions, has already stated 
the proposed role for the frontal lobes. The frontal lobes are specialised for the planning, 
execution and control of movements. Typically, they are regarded as playing an executive 
role in the deployment of other functions such as language, attention and movement, as 
such the frontal lobes are assigned a role in most functions. A proposed role for 
dysfunctional frontal lobes in schizophrenia is derived from three main sources. Firstly, 
there are the observed similarities between schizophrenic patients and subjects with lesions 
of the frontal lobes. Both sets of patients reportedly demonstrate lack of motivation, social 
withdrawal, and shallow affect. Secondly, there are similarities between the performance 
of the two groups on neuropsychological tasks that are meant to tap the processes operated 
by the frontal lobes (Benson and Stuss, 1990). Thirdly, there is evidence accumulating 
from studies of functional imaging of the brain that show hypo function in the frontal 
lobes in patients with schizophrenia (Weinberger, 1988). Thus, there may be an 
impairment in the psychological processes associated with the frontal lobes contributing to 
delusional beliefs. 
The CET would appear to rely on metacognitive abilities that, i f faulty, may be 
involved in delusion formation. Hemsley (1994) proposed that schizophrenics are less 
able to utilise previously acquired information. Therefore, performance by the people with 
delusions may be poorer on the CET. They may make more bizarre estimates. This may 
be owing to the inability to draw to mind adequate information on which to base the 
decision, or on the ability to check the answer. McKenna, Mortimer and Hodges (1994) 
have argued that there is a semantic memory dysfunction in people with delusions that 
would probably lead to poor performance on this task as the subjects are not able to access 
the information with which to make an estimate. Similarly, Cutting and Murphy (1988) 
have proposed that people with delusions have deficient real world knowledge. Such a 
deficiency would act as a disadvantage on a task like this. Benson and Stuss (1990) 
would suggest that any poor performance by people with delusions is related to an 
inability to be self critical, leading to bizarre estimates. This is more like the metacognitive 
skills apparently tested in the CET. Therefore, persons with delusions may be expected to 
perform poorly for one of two reasons; impairment of access to semantic knowledge 
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(temporal lobe) or an inability to critically utilise this information once provided (frontal 
lobe). 
Whilst speculation about possible frontal lobe involvement in delusions is 
interesting it is not central to this study. The Cognitive Estimates task was used on people 
with delusions primarily to investigate the relationship between accuracy of estimation and 
confidence in the decision. The main purpose was not to demonstrate a link between 
delusions and frontal lobe damage. As has been noted overconfidence in reasoning 
appears to be a feature of the information processing style of people with delusions. 
Overconfidence in the decision was expected for two possible reasons. Firstly, it 
may be predicted that the subjects with delusions may not draw on past experience as well 
as others and hence, may get the answers wrong. This would be revealed as higher scores 
on the bizarreness index. Then they may not realise they are wrong and be overconfident 
in their estimation of correctness. I f there is a clear relationship between bizarreness and 
high confidence then it implies that the people with delusions do not know when they are 
wrong, and that they are not able to be self critical. 
Secondly, generally high confidence ratings may be predicted as the people with 
delusions are more likely to want to think that they are doing well as a form of self esteem 
maintenance (Bentall, 1994). It may be predicted that the people with delusions will be 
more confident in their answers to the neutral content questions as it may be important for 
them to be correct, as it reflects on self image and self esteem. Therefore, it is predicted 
that they will be overconfident in comparison to the controls. 
6.2 Method 
Subjects: As before, three groups of subjects agreed to participate in this study. 
Al l subjects were administered the National Adult Reading Test (NART) as a rough gauge 
of intelligence. Subjects were also given the Mini Mental State Examination (MMSE). As 
before, any subjects scoring less than 24/30 were excluded. 
The criteria for selection were the same as in the Biased Coin task, except only 
subjects with delusions with a clear diagnosis of schizophrenia or paranoid schizophrenia 
participated. The 15 psychiatric controls and the 15 normal subjects were selected by the 
same criteria used in the Biased Coin task. Subject's characteristics are shown in table 
6,1. -There are no differences in age, sex,-MMSE or NART estimated IQ scores. 
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Table 6.1: Subject characteristics in Experiment 2. Mean age, NART estimate of IQ. and MMSE 
performance are given, and standard deviations are in brackets. 
Group N Inpatients Gender Age NART MMSE 
Outpatients M F estimated IQ 
Deluded 15 5 10 8 7 39.2 (10.5) 106.5 (10.2) 28.4 (1.4) 
Depressed 15 8 7 8 7 40.0 (11.6) 103.9 (10.6) 28.7 (0.8) 
Control 15 8 7 39.6 (13.3) 104.7 (9.8) 29.1 (0.9) 
Significance NS NS NS 
Procedure: Subjects were told that they were participating in an investigation of 
the way that people think, reason and make decisions. They were presented with the 
revised 10 item CET as described by Shoqeriat, Mayes, MacDonald, Meudell, and 
Pickering (1990). This consists of ten questions on a sheet of paper. Beneath each 
question was a 10cm long line with 0% and 100% on either end (see appendix 2 for test 
sheet). The subject was asked to write in the answer to the question and then to estimate 
how confident they were about the answer by marking the line or writing a percentage. 
This was repeated for all 10 questions. 
Subjects' responses were scored for bizarreness on a scale of 0 to 3. Zero 
indicates that the response was good and the more bizarre the estimate the higher the score. 
The rating of bizarreness was based on the norms provided by Shallice and Evans (1978). 
The performance of their control patients was used to derive a four point scale of the 
extremeness of the response (normal, quite extreme, extreme and very extreme). In this 
study subjects' responses were scored for bizarreness and confidence in that score. 
6.3 Results 
The table below indicates the mean bizarreness rating for each of the three groups 
on all of the 10 questions. Also shown is the mean confidence rating given by the groups 
on all of the questions. 
Table 6.2: Mean bizarreness rating and confidence rating for the 3 groups. Standard deviations ate 
shown in brackets. 
Group Mean bizarreness score Mean confidence score 
Deluded 6.0 (2.7) 54.7 (15.5) 
Depressed 6.0 (3.1) 57.9 (16.1) 
Normal 5.3 (3.5) 53.6 (17.5) 
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A one way Anova conducted on the mean confidence scores revealed no difference 
between the groups (F(2,42) = 0.28, p= 0.76). None of the groups differed in overall 
confidence. The depressed group produced an overall estimate of confidence (57.9) and 
the group with delusions and normal group were a little lower (54.7, and 53.6 
respectively). 
A Kruskall-Wallis test on the bizarreness ratings indicated no significant 
differences between the 3 groups (H= 0.45, p= 0.78). The group with delusions did not 
differ in bizarreness from the other groups. As a point of comparison O'Carroll, Egan and 
MacKenzie (1994) collected a large amount of normative data , from a wide variety of 
people of different ages and social classes and the average score for normal subjects was 
5.3 as well. Therefore, there was no evidence of more bizarre answers being given by the 
people with delusions or of more confidence in their estimates. Also, there was no 
correlation between the bizarreness and confidence in an answer for all of the groups 
combined (r= 0.05, p >0.05) or for the group with delusions in particular (r= 0.3, p> 
0.05). On any individual question the subjects with delusions did not differ from the other 
subjects in their estimations or in the confidence expressed in the answer. 
The lack of a difference between the groups in the bizarreness score may have 
occurred because the bands in the rating scale are so large. For the length of the average 
man's spine question, a score of 0 (normal) is given for estimations from 18 inches to four 
feet. Similarly, the speed of a race horse is scored 0 i f the estimate is between 15 and 40 
mph. The population of Britain question allows a response of between 10 and 500 
million. Therefore, it may be have been the case that the people with delusions were 
giving abnormal estimates but that the scoring system was too insensitive to detect a 
difference between the groups. Eight of the ten questions require a number as an answer. 
On these questions the raw values were compared between groups to see i f the people with 
delusions were giving more bizarre estimates than the others. There were no significant 
differences between the responses of the groups on any question. Therefore, people with 
delusions were not substantially different from the other subjects in the bizarreness of the 
estimates. 
6.4 Discussion 
This present study, like the Biased Coin (experiment 1) has indicated that the 
subjects with delusion are no more confident than the control subjects when reasoning on 
a realistic but neutral in content task. When tested on the CET they were neither more 
confident generally (p= 0.8) nor on any specific question. Therefore, there is no evidence 
to support the finding that subjects with delusions are more confident than controls on 
these tasks. In addition, the group with delusions were no different in the bizarreness of 
the estimations given. 
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Two reasons were suggested as to why subjects with delusion would be more 
confident than other subjects. Firstly, in line with Hemsley's proposals (1994) it was 
expected that subjects with delusions would fail to utilise previously acquired information 
and would therefore give an incorrect answer. They would be overconfident in 
comparison to others as they would be unaware that the answer was incorrect. Hence, a 
higher mean bizarreness score was expected in combination with a higher overall estimate 
of confidence. 
Another theory explaining overconfidence in reasoning was derived from the work 
of Bentall and colleagues (Bentall, 1994). It was proposed that people with delusions 
utilise normally existing biases to defend against feelings of low self esteem (Bentall, 
Kinderman and Kaney, 1994). In normal subjects, self deception and bias contribute to 
the maintenance of a person's sense of well being and allows a continued pursuit of goals. 
Being slightly optimistic is a normally existing bias that allows actions to be undertaken as 
there is a biased view of the chance of success (Nesse and Lloyd, 1992). Therefore, as a 
way of defending against feelings of low self esteem it was proposed that people with 
delusions would be more confident than normal subjects. People with depression were 
not more confident than the control subjects nor were they more bizarre in their 
estimations. Therefore, there is no apparent support for either hypothesis. 
People with depression are held to be lacking these biases that operate to defend 
self esteem. Depressed subjects are supposed to view the world in an unbiased way and 
are more accurate on estimation tasks as they are not biased in the way that normal subjects 
are. People with depression are supposed to exhibit what is termed "depressive realism". 
This attenuation of normally existing biases leads to an inability to defend the self against 
feelings of low self esteem and thus, to depression. I f depressed subjects lack a bias 
leading to optimism and overconfidence then they would be less likely to initiate action as 
they would see there being less chance of success. Therefore, promoting apathetic 
lethargy. 
In the current study and the Biased Coin task there was no evidence of the 
depressed subjects being less confident (i.e. better calibrated) than the other groups which 
contradicts previous findings (Alloy and Abramson, 1979). However, Ackerman and 
DeRubeis (1991) reviewed the depressive realism literature and found that though many 
studies have produced evidence consistent with the hypothesis just as many have proved 
inconsistent. These authors have argued that only studies using tasks containing an 
objective standard against which to compare subjects response can inform us about the 
validity of this depressive realism. The Biased coin used a Bayesian model and revealed 
no difference between the groups. Although, overall the depressed group could be seen to 
be less extreme in the judgement that they made. The CET had no external criterion to 
judge accuracy by and that revealed no difference either. The lack of external criteria 
means that there is no way to decide if someone should have a low or high degree of 
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confidence in the answer. It may be entirely right that someone with depression has a low 
degree of confidence in their decision. However, there were no differences between any 
of the groups. On both of these abstract and realistic tasks no differences were found. 
The other main finding of the CET study was that the subjects with delusions did 
not differ from the controls in the bizarreness of their responses. According to the Shallice 
and Evans (1979) report, normal control subjects score on average 3.6. The scores of the 
present groups places all of the groups in the left posterior and right posterior damaged 
groups. None of the groups score highly enough to be in the range scored by patients 
with left or right anterior lesions. However, the CET has been criticised for not having 
large enough normative data sets. O'Carroll et al. (1994) gathered data from 150 normal 
subjects of a wide range of ages, social and economic levels and found a mean score of 
5.3, the same as in this normal group. The patient groups did not significantly differ from 
the normal group in the estimations given. Despite these scores being higher than Shallice 
and Evans reported, the groups did not differ from each other. This indicates that it is 
unlikely that there is any impairment of frontal lobe processes. 
It may be the case that more bizarre estimates and overconfidence in the decision 
would not be revealed on a neutral in content task such as this. Producing more bizarre 
estimates would be indicative of an inability to be self critical (Benson and Stuss, 1990) 
but it is possible that the loss of self criticism will only occur on salient material. I f the 
subjects were asked to give estimates on material that is salient in content then there may 
be more bizarre estimates. For instance, a subject may grossly over estimate the number 
of policeman in the country i f he or she is being persecuted by this group. In addition, 
when the subject is required to estimate the certainty of an event that is related to the theme 
of the delusion, then overconfidence may be demonstrated. Garety (1992) reports that a 
man with delusions over estimated the occurrence of delusion related events. When this 
belief was tested it was found that the events were happening a great deal less often than 
he expected. For instance, a subject may vastly overestimate the number of policeman in 
the country and then be very confident in the correctness of the answer. 
As noted earlier there have been numerous attempts to link delusions and 
schizophrenia to frontal lobe damage. Benson and Stuss (1990) specifically explain 
delusions as reflecting deficits in frontal lobe functioning especially self 
monitoring/criticism and reality testing. 
The CET was not used specifically to demonstrate dysfunction of frontal lobe 
functioning in people with delusions. Whilst impairment was not anticipated, it is not 
possible to exclude frontal lobe involvement in delusions. Naturally, a battery of frontal 
and non frontal lobe dysfunction sensitive tests would be required to make decisions about 
possible involvement in delusional beliefs. To accept frontal lobe involvement is not 
possible with the CET alone. Firstly, there is the lack of normative data as mentioned 
above. In addition, Kopelman (1991) reports that CET scores did not correlate with any 
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other putative frontal lobe tests. CET scores were correlated with premorbid and current 
IQ. however. Kopelman (1991) suggested that the CET was either measuring an area of 
frontal lobe not tapped by any other test or it was actually tapping semantic memory. I f 
semantic memory is being accessed then there is no evidence that this is deficient in the 
people with delusions as has been suggested before (McKenna et al. 1994, Cutting and 
Murphy, 1988). 
The lack of evidence of a frontal lobe involvement from the CET study indicates 
that perhaps other sites of impairment need to be considered. As noted earlier, Liddle and 
colleagues (Friston, Liddle, Frith, Hirsch, and Frackowiak, 1992, Liddle, Friston, Frith, 
Hirsch, Jones, and Frackowiak, 1992) found that delusions were associated with temporal 
lobe abnormalities and frontal lobe impairments were associated with negative symptoms 
of schizophrenia. 
6.5 Conclusions 
The aim of the present study (CET) was to examine the proposed higher 
confidence in judgements of people with delusions. For this purpose a task realistic but 
neutral in content was used. Subjects were required to provide answers to novel questions 
and rate how confident they were in the accuracy of their decisions. People with delusions 
did not provide answers that were more bizarre than the control subjects. Nor were the 
people with delusions more confident in the answer being correct. This result and that 
from the Biased coin task provided no evidence that people with delusions were 
excessively confident when making decisions. 
A possible reason for there not being a difference between the groups in the 
confidence estimations is attributed to the neutral nature of the material. Had the tasks' 
content been salient or theme related then biased overconfident reasoning may have been 
demonstrated. 
The possibility of frontal lobe impairment was considered as a secondary issue. It 
has been proposed that delusional thinking is associated with deficits in the psychological 
processes attributed to the frontal lobe. However, for the reasons discussed above this 
question could not be addressed by the present research. In this study subjects with 
delusions were found to be no more bizarre in their estimates than the control subjects. 
The Biased Coin and Cognitive Estimates Tasks "have provided no apparent 
evidence of abnormal reasoning in judgements of probability, nor in confidence in 
correctness. The question must be raised that people with delusions do not have abnormal 
reasoning processes, as Maher (1974) advocates. However, the stated aim of this thesis is 
to examine reasoning processes on a variety of tasks that differ in form and content. 
Therefore, in the next chapter consideration is given to perhaps the single most widely 
investigated reasoning task, namely the Wason Selection task (Wason, 1968). 
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7 
# Experiment 3: Wason's Selection Tasks 
7.1 Introduction 
The two previous studies have not revealed any apparent difference in reasoning 
between people with delusions and control subjects. It may be concluded that there is no 
difference, or it may be the case that the differences in reasoning are only revealed on 
certain other types of tasks. To explore this possibility further another reasoning task 
was selected. Perhaps the most widely investigated paradigm used is the Wason 
Selection task (Wason, 1968). In the standard form it is presented in an abstract way. 
The subject is shown four cards drawn from a pack which all have a capital letter on one 
side and a number on the other. The subject is given a conditional statement usually 
presented as " I f there is an A on one side of the card there is a 3 on the other." The four 
cards presented consist of one letter and one number that are mentioned in the statement 
and one letter and one number that differ (see below). These correspond to the p and q 
cards and the not p and not q cards respectively. They are referred to as such, as the 
statement is expressed in a general form as i f p then q. 
A 
notp notq 
Subjects are asked to decide which cards to turn over to determine i f the 
statement about the cards is false. The normative model against which performance has 
been assessed is based on falsificationist views in the Philosophy of science. Popper 
(1959) argued that a scientific law cannot be shown to be true because by uncovering a 
single counter example it is always possible that the next instance of the law is false. 
Hence, one should look for false instances or the rule breaker. Logically, in the selection 
task the correct answer is the p and not q cards. The A (p) card may have a 3 (q), or not, 
on the back and needs to be checked in order to see i f it contradicts the rule. The D card 
need not be turned over as the rule has no implication for this letter or any other than A. 
The 3 card may have an A on the back, but even i f it does not this does not contradict the 
rule. The rule does not state that there must be an A on the back of the 3. I f the 7 card 
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(not q) has an A on the back this would indicate that there is a case of an A without a 3 
and would mean the rule had been broken. 
This apparently simple task has generated a great deal of research since it was 
devised, primarily because the great majority of intelligent adults fail to solve it (see 
chapter 4 in Evans et al. 1993 for a fu l l review of the research into this task). 
The original studies (Wason, 1968) indicate that people typically choose the p 
card alone or the p and q cards. Thus, they are failing to select the not q case and often 
select the unnecessary q case. Successful selection of the p, and not q cards was 
reported in less than 10% of the subjects. Typically, incorrect choices where made when 
the conditional had an arbitrary content (as above). The p,orp and q cards selection 
pattern was called the confirmation bias, as it was believed that subjects chose to 
confirm the rule rather than disconfirm it (Wason, 1968). Recently, it has been renamed 
the matching bias as it is thought that people choose the two cards mentioned in the rule 
(Evans, 1989, Evans and Lynch, 1973). 
In apparently equivalent rules in which the content of the task is more realistic, 
performance improves considerably. For instance, Griggs and Cox (1982) told subjects 
that the rule was "One must be over 18 to drink alcohol". The subjects were given cards 
with BEER, COKE, 22 years old and 16 years old on. Here correct performance 
requires finding anyone who may be breaking the rule. In this instance the subject must 
turn over the BEER and 16 years old card. Subjects showed a high number of correct 
responses, in excess of 75%. 
The fact that patterns of reasoning differ enormously as a function of the 
thematic content of the premises, even for problems that are formally equivalent, is an 
area of much debate. Accounts of performance on the task have drawn on theories of 
mental logics (see chapter 3 for details). However, an inherent mental logic system has 
difficulty explaining the poor performance on the abstract rules (most like an 
internalised logic) and the best performance on logically equivalent but more realistic 
tasks. The theory of Mental Models is similarly limited by attempts to explain the 
thematic "facilitation" effects. Basically, it is proposed that realistic content "fleshes 
out" the Mental Models and possibly reduces the number of models necessary to 
manipulate. However, neither account is particularly satisfactory (see chapter 3). 
Arbitrary rules typically produce a high percentage of erroneous p and q card 
responses whereas formally equivalent rules that may be interpreted as expressing 
deontic relations of permission or obligation produce p and not q responses far more 
frequently. Deontic thinking takes place when we consider what we may (or are allowed 
to) do, or what we ought to do, rather than what is or wi l l actually be the case. Thus, 
basic forms of deontic thought are concerned with permissions and obligations. Once an 
obligation or permission is introduced, the conditional is no longer indicative as in the 
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example of a card having a 3 on the back of an A. Rather than being tested as true or 
false, as in the indicative conditional, the rule can be broken or upheld (deontic task). 
It has only been recently recognised that there are these two distinct forms of the 
selection task. The indicative form of the conditional is more like the original abstract 
task. Indicative forms express scientific hypotheses that can be tested and be shown to 
be true or false. The other form of the selection task is the deontic form. This format is 
used to express laws, rules, regulations and moral or social agreements. This crucial 
difference affects the way in which it is thought that the selection tasks are reasoned 
with. For instance, an indicative statement such as " I f it is,a television then it has plug" 
states a factual relationship that may be true or false. A deontic conditional would be " I f 
the television is used it must have a licence". This is a rule that may or may not be 
obeyed. I f one applies the notion of goal oriented reasoning (rationality l , chapter 3) to 
these types of conditional it can be seen that the goal in the indicative version is to 
decide i f the statement is true or not. In most thematic tasks the form of the conditional 
is deontic and here the goal is to decide i f the rule has been obeyed or broken. The rules 
in the abstract tasks are falsifiable but in deontic tasks the rules are more like 
obligations. 
Since they are obligations there are different perspectives that can be taken, i.e., 
people can have different goals. Somedrie may choose to cheat the system and not meet 
the obligation. For instance, consider the rule " I f someone spends £30 or more in the 
shop they receive a free gift". In this instance, there are outcomes that have different 
utility to the relative participants in the conditional. The customer (or actor) may try and 
cheat the shop and get a gift without paying thirty pounds. The shop (enforcer) wil l 
want to make sure that it is not giving out gifts without customers paying, but it may try 
not to give out gifts when £30 is spent as this is to its advantage. Therefore, there are 
different utilities associated with performance (Manktelow and Over, 1991,1992). Once 
utilities are associated with an outcome, the nature of the selection task changes from 
being a deductive logic task to a decision theory type judgement. Subjects no longer 
reason deductively with a rule but assess the relative likelihood and utility associated 
with an outcome (this wil l be returned to in chapter 8). 
Cosmides (1989) has argued that subjects use a Darwinian Algorithm, a type of 
innate thought, that determines performance on the selection task. The subject is 
supposed to have an innate understanding of social exchange and thus, an appreciation 
of the cost-benefit relationship in social exchange. Essentially, people are meant to be 
aware that others may cheat and take a benefit without paying the cost. Therefore, 
content facilitation effects on tasks occur because the contents f i t the proposed cheater 
detection system. Manktelow and Over (1991) and Cosmides (1989) both advocate 
approaches in which the rational performance on the selection task is not determined by 
employing a falsification strategy but by assessment of the relative utility to the subject. 
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Cosmides's (1989) algorithm is said to be innate whereas the schemas utilised in the 
account of Cheng and Holyoak, 1989, (see below) are assumed to be learned. Here there 
are obvious parallels with rationality1. I f there are different utilities associated with an 
outcome then there are different goals that can be achieved. Hence performance on the 
selection task can be judged not against an optimal norm but against how well the 
subjects' goals are met. Note also the implicit assumption in Cosmides's theory that 
there is an evolutionary advantage to mild suspiciousness. This supports the 
dimensional approach to the study of delusional beliefs. 
An additional way of explaining the performance on the selection tasks is the 
theory of Pragmatic Reasoning Schemas (PRS, chapter 3). It is proposed that subjects 
use "clusters of rules that are highly generalised and abstracted but nonetheless are 
defined with respect to classes of goals and types of relationships". (Cheng, Holyoak, 
Nisbett & Oliver, 1986). 
Pragmatic reasoning schemas fall into broad categories such as causal inference 
(Cheng and Holyoak, 1985), as well as regulations such as permissions and obligations. 
The PRS theory predicts that performance on a selection task will be facilitated when the 
stated rule has a content that evokes an appropriate schema. Correspondence between 
the stated rule and the schematic rules may be such that the latter map onto the standard 
rules of logic and thus, provide p and not q card responses. Consider the example taken 
from chapter 3. I f a reasoning problem elicits a pre-existing schema it may provide an 
example from previous experience of what should occur. The abstract permission 
schema may be expressed as: 
If an action is to be taken then a precondition must be met. 
I f a subject is given the following problem of deciding i f a rule is being broken, 
elicitation of this schema is thought to provide the correct solution. 
If a person is drinking alcohol then they must be 18 or over. 
Paul is 16. 
I f the schema is elicited the concept of permission wil l provide the inference that 
"Paul may not drink alcohol" without requiring formal reasoning. Thus, i f Paul is 
drinking, the subject will be aware that this means that the rule is being broken. 
Evidence for pragmatic reasoning schemas is derived from a number of tasks. 
Cheng and Holyoak (1985) found facilitation on a selection task with an abstract 
permission conditional rule but no facilitation for a concrete conditional. This indicates 
that the schema is abstract and domain independent. Additionally, attempts to train 
subjects in the use of logic were only successful in conditions when permission schema 
were trained rather than being taught the laws of standard logic. This indicates an 
intuitive grasp of the schema and a natural ability to map the permission schema onto an 
abstract conditional i f the permission schema is evoked (Cheng et al. 1986). 
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Jackson and Griggs (1990), criticised the work of Cheng and Holyoak arguing 
that the demonstration of facilitation for the abstract permission rule was not owing to 
evocation of a permission schema but rather it resulted from a combination of two 
presentation factors. The first is providing explicit negatives in the statement of cases. 
Rather than providing cases such as A, not A, X, not X, the cases should be A, B, X, and 
Y. The second factor suggested by Jackson and Griggs was providing a violation 
checking condition. This means telling the subjects to check for violations or breaking 
of a rule rather than seeking to test or confirm a hypothesis. 
Kroger, Cheng and Holyoak (1994) compared the effects of these two factors on 
an abstract permission rule and a rule with arbitrary content. No facilitation was 
observed for the arbitrary conditional but strong facilitation was noted for the abstract 
permission rule under the same conditions. This can be viewed as strong support for the 
Pragmatic Reasoning hypothesis. 
Similarly, it has been proposed that subjects use representations of specific 
experiences and reason by calling to mind specific counter examples that they have 
encountered before (Griggs and Cox, 1982). Essentially, this is a theory of reasoning by 
memory. 
The reason for the differences in reasoning across thematic conditions, is 
naturally a disputed issue. However, the exact cause of the effect of content is not vital 
to the current study. The fact that realistic content appears to reliably improve 
performance in normal subjects allows a comparison to be made with the performance of 
people with delusions. The purpose of this study was not to explain the Wason selection 
task. The intention was to use it as an investigatory tool in the same way a phenomena 
like the Stroop task is used to investigate cognitive processing. 
Thus, the aim of this study was to employ a number of Wason selection tasks to 
compare the performance of people with delusions against that of psychiatric and normal 
control subjects. The tasks were matched as closely as possible for structure but differed 
on thematic content, and thus, the chance of correct solution. 
There are numerous reasons for using the Wason selection task with subjects 
with delusions. Firstly, the task is traditionally viewed as a test of deductive logic. Von 
Domarus (1944) reported that subjects with schizophrenia were poor at tests of 
deductive syllogistic reasoning. However, Williams (1964) found that schizophrenics 
were no worse than appropriately matched control subjects. To study any possible 
deductive reasoning differences it would seem prudent to utilise the most widely 
researched of tasks that is used on normal subjects, which the selection task appears to 
be. 
Additionally, performance on the selection task has reliably been shown to be 
affected by changes in content. The more realistic the content, the greater the chance of 
correct solution. This feature can then act as a bridge between the neutral abstract tasks 
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used by Garety and colleagues and the social reasoning tasks employed by Bentall and 
co-workers. The content-specific biases shown by subjects with persecutory beliefs 
appear to have little in common with the more deficit like problems revealed on the 
abstract tasks. Thus, the effect of different types of content may help reveal more about 
these apparent differences. One final reason for the use of the selection task is that it 
does not merely produce an error score. The subjects can also produce different patterns 
of performance that may reveal additional information. Merely showing that the people 
with delusions performed more poorly at the task is not as interesting as demonstrating 
that they differed in a consistent way. 
The first two tasks were taken from Kroger et al. (1994). The first conditional 
was an arbitrary rule incorporating explicit negatives (A, not A etc.) and a violation 
checking condition. Performance on this task even with the additional factors included 
is typically very poor (5-10% correctly chose the p and not q cards). For this task the 
format was slightly different from Wason's original task. The arbitrary rule referred to 
" A " and " X " rather than vowels and numbers as in the original studies. This was used as 
it is logically and linguistically close to the other tasks. Being arbitrary in content, this 
first conditional should not elicit any Pragmatic Reasoning schemas and wil l thus, lead 
to poor performance by all the groups. The instructions were given as "Below are four 
cards. One side of each card has written on it either " A " or "not A". The other side has 
written either " X " or "not X". Your task is to make sure the cards conform to the rule: 
" I f a card says ' A ' on one side then the other side must say ' X ' . " Participants should 
chose the p and not q cards (A and not X). 
A not A X notX 
P not p <7 not q 
For the second task, rather than being given an arbitrary conditional, subjects 
were given an equally abstract rule but one that was likely to elicit a permission schema. 
This should increase the chance of the correct selection of p and not q cards as the 
permission schema provides responses that are in accord with those of standard logic. It 
is possible to increase the chance of successful use of the negative instance (rule breaker, 
not q card) by making the task more likely to elicit the permission schema. In previous 
studies far higher numbers of correct p and not q responses were recorded (47%). 
For instance, Cheng and Holyoak (1985) used such an abstract deontic 
conditional rule. The rule was stated as " i f one is to take action A then one must first 
satisfy precondition P". In other words in order to be permitted to do A one must have 
first fulfi l led prerequisite P (i.e. completed P first). Subjects often respond correctly 
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even when much specific content is removed. In this general content, there is an 
introduction of the concept of an outside authority that is determining the rule. Cheng 
and Holyoak (1985) found that an abstract permission rule elicited better performance 
than a rule worded in terms of concrete but arbitrary terms (as in the first conditional 
above). This task was included to investigate whether subjects with delusions were able 
to utilise the domain specific abstract permission schema that normal subjects use. The 
format is the same as that used by Kroger et al. (1994) and closely matches the wording 
of the arbitrary conditional so that the only difference is that this conditional should 
increase the chance of the permission schema being used. The rule was presented as " I f 
one is to engage in activity A, then one must fu l f i l requirement X." 
Engaged Did not Fulfilled Did not 
in engage in Require- fulfill 
acitivity activity ment require-
A A X ment X 
P notp <7 not q 
The third task is taken from Cheng and Holyoak (1985). The format has been 
changed so that the conditional and the instructions now match the two earlier ones. 
Subjects were told they are immigration officers that have to check all entrants have 
cholera vaccinations (if entry, then cholera). Passengers in transit are not important. 
Four cards are presented with entry details on one side and vaccinations on the other. It 
is unlikely that a person would have had any direct experience of being an immigration 
officer. However, the subject should be able to map the permission schema rules onto 
this conditional, as he or she is likely to be familiar with the concept of permission. 
Cheng and Holyoak (1985) report 60% of the responses were the p and not q cards. 
Many subjects correctly solved the task, despite never having been immigration officers. 
Here it would seem that even though the subjects lacked personal relevant experience, 
they were able to apply the general representative framework or schemata indicating that 
memory is not the only component. Thus, higher numbers of p and not q cards were 
expected to be chosen in this conditional. The rule was " I f one is to enter the country, 
then one must have a cholera inoculation". 
Entry Transit Cholera 
Hepatitis 
Typhoid 
Hepatitis 
P not p <t not q 
What is seen in normal subjects is a progression from poor performance on the 
arbitrary task to better performance on the more realistic conditionals. This inability to 
reason with the abstract materials leads to a frequent number of matching bias responses 
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(selection of the p and q cards). People unable to utilise a permission schema or apply 
laws of logic appear to rely on a non logical or arbitrary system such as matching cases 
in the conditional and in the responses. Better performance is found on the abstract 
deontic task (the second conditional). Then greatly facilitated performance is seen when 
people are given a ful l and realistic context. The three tasks mentioned are all expected 
to be solved by the ability to map permission schema onto the content of the problem. 
The more realistic the content, the more likely that the permission schema wil l be 
elicited and the more likely that the subject will choose the p and not q cards. However, 
it has also been proposed that these selection tasks are solved by pulling to mind from 
memory specific counter examples. Therefore, a final task was included to distinguish 
between a possible memory effect or the application of a schema. 
The fourth task was taken from Griggs and Cox (1982) but has once again been 
altered in format in order to match the earlier conditionals. Subjects were asked to 
imagine they were a pub Landlord checking for underage drinkers. The person probably 
would not have been a Landlord but wi l l almost certainly be familiar with the concepts 
of being 18 years of age or older before being allowed to drink in pubs. Here high 
facilitation was expected owing to the high likelihood of being able to draw an example 
from memory of who would be breaking the rule. 
In this condition subjects were given cards with ages and types of drink on. For 
instance, 16 22 Beer Coke. The rule was "to drink alcohol you must be over 18 years of 
age." In such instances normal subjects perform much better and turn over the 16 and 
Beer cards. Griggs and Cox (1982) report that i f a person has had previous experience 
of a rule, then performance is facilitated. It is presumed that nearly all subjects wi l l have 
had experience with this rule. This task was included as it may help reveal i f people 
with delusions can reason deductively, and also the types of errors they may be prone to, 
even though they have had experience of the rule before. The rule was "to drink alcohol 
you must be over 18 years of age." 
Beer Coke 22 16 
P not p <? not q 
Thus, across the increasingly realistic tasks there should be an increased chance 
of correct solution, possibly by evocation of the permission schemas although this is 
only one possible mechanism. People with delusions have not been used in this task 
before and thus, it is difficult to predict i f their reasoning deficits extend to this type of 
paradigm. They may be less able to evoke the schemas generally owing to an inability 
to draw on previous experience. This could lead to a "jump to conclusions" reasoning 
style meaning that not all of the cards would be considered. However, it may be the case 
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that they are more likely to elicit the schemas i f they are sensitive to the concepts of 
permission from authority figures. The formats of the conditionals are as alike as 
possible to try and reveal any effect of permission and content. 
7.2 Method 
Subjects: Three groups of people participated. There were 15 people with 
delusions, 15 with depression and 15 normal subjects. The participants were selected 
according to the same criteria as before. Subject's details are in the table below. 
Table 7.1: Subject characteristics in Experiment 3. Mean age, NART estimate of IQ. and MMSE 
performance are given, and standard deviations are in brackets. 
Group N Inpatients Gender Age NART MMSE 
Outpatients M F estimated IQ 
Deluded 15 8 7 9 6 36.7 (8.8) 101.9(11.2) 28.5(1.4) 
Depressed 15 8 7 5 10 40.3(8.1) 101.5(13.4) 28.2(1.6) 
Control 15 7 8 40.2(12.5) 107.8(7.9) 29.1(0.7) 
Significance NS NS NS 
Apparatus: Each conditional was written on a separate piece of paper and 
consisted of the rule and the four representations of cards. 
Procedure: Representations of cards were presented to the subject, on the test 
sheet (see appendix 3). The presentation order of the conditionals and the position of the 
cards on the test sheet were randomised. Subjects were handed one sheet at a time and 
were not allowed to alter the answers once completed. A l l of the conditionals were of 
the same basic format. They differed only in the thematic elements and all followed the 
basic structure of the example below, which is actually the immigration officer 
conditional. 
Suppose people wish to enter the country. You know that before one can enter, one must have a 
cholera inoculation. Your task, as an immigration officer is to make sure that people foIlbw~Uie 
regulation: "If one is to enter the country, then you must have a cholera inoculation." 
There are four cards represented below, one each for four people. Each card gives information 
on a single person. One side of each card shows whether this person wishes to enter the country. The 
other side shows whether he or she has a cholera inoculation. 
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You want to see if any person violated the regulation. Which of the cards below would you have 
to turn over to check? Turn over as many cards as you think appropriate but do not turn over a card unless 
what is on the other side can potentially tell you that the person violated the regulation. 
Tick below a card to indicate the one(s) you have chosen. 
Rule: If one is to enter the country, then one must have a cholera inoculation. 
Entry Transit Cholera 
Hepatitis 
Typhoid 
Hepatitis 
P notp <7 not q) 
A l l the other conditionals followed the same basic format as the task above (on 
the test sheets, the p and q cards were not indicated. The ful l task sheets are in appendix 
3). 
Task 1: Arbitrary content conditional. The rule " i f the card says " A " on one 
side then the other side must say "X"". 
Task two: Abstract Permission conditional: The rule was " I f one is to engage 
in activity A, then one must ful f i l requirement X." 
Task Three: the Immigration officer as above. 
Task four: The Alcohol conditional. The rule was stated as "to drink alcohol 
you must be over 18 years of age or over." 
7.3 Results 
The table on the next page (table 7.2) summarises the number and types of 
responses for each conditional. The responses in the table were collapsed to produce 
three types of answer. Responses were classified as being logically correct (p, not q) or 
classed as the matching bias response of the p card or the p and q cards together or as 
any other incorrect response. 
It is readily apparent that all three groups performed poorly on the first three 
conditionals. In line with Wason's original results, the groups as a whole were poor at 
the arbitrary task with only 13% (6/45) correctly responding p and not q. In the second 
task Kroger et al. (1994) report correct solution rate of about 47%, whereas in this 
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sample as a whole there were only 16% (7/45) correct. The immigration officer 
produced a higher chance of successful response but still only about 42% (18/45) which 
is much lower than the 60% reported by Cheng and Holyoak (1985). Finally, the 
alcohol conditional produced a far higher solution rate of 67% (30/45). Thus, there does 
appear to be a facilitative effect across the conditionals. However, examination of the 
performance of the individual groups indicates that facilitation does not occur evenly in 
all three groups. For the alcohol conditional the normal group were 87% correct, the 
depressed were 80% correct and the group with delusions only 33% correct. 
In the difficult abstract tasks there is a strong indication that the groups all tended 
to respond in accord with the matching bias response. In the harder conditions there are 
a disproportionate number of p and q card responses from all the groups. 
Table 7.2: Type of response made by the groups to the Wason Conditionals. 
Group Conditional Correct Matching Other 
p and not q porpq 
Deluded Arbitrary 2 7 6 
Deluded Abstract Permission 1 9 5 
Deluded Immigration 4 4 7 
Deluded Alcohol 5 6 4 
Depressed Arbitrary 2 5 8 
Depressed Abstract Permission 3 4 8 
Depressed Immigration 7 5 3 
Depressed Alcohol 12 1 2 
Normal Arbitrary 2 7 6 
Normal Abstract Permission 3 8 4 
Normal Immigration 7 6 2 
Normal Alcohol 13 2 0 
The main analyses presented here are in terms of matching indices and logic 
indices. The logic index is calculated by scoring a p card choice as +1 and the same for 
a not q card choice. I f the subject responds with the not p or q card a negative value is 
given (-1) for each card. The matching index is calculated by scoring +1 for a p or q 
card response. Negative scores are given for not p or not q card selections. Therefore, 
each subjects' response yields a score from -2 to +2. The mean value of these indices 
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are shown in table 7.3 below (Pollard and Evans, 1987 for further explanation of 
analysis). 
A one way Anova performed on the logic indices revealed a significant 
difference between the groups on the alcohol conditional [F (2, 42) = 7.1, p = 0.002). 
Post hoc comparisons (Tukey HSD test) showed the differences to be between the group 
of subjects with delusions and the other two groups, but not between the two control 
groups. Therefore, people with delusions perform significantly worse than the control 
subjects on the easiest Wason conditional. No differences between the groups were 
revealed on any of the other conditionals. Performance by all groups was very poor on 
these other conditionals. Differences in matching response were shown on the matching 
index for the alcohol conditional. This is to be expected as the scores are not 
independent of each other. I f the subject scores 2 on matching (i.e. pq cards) then that 
person wil l score 0 on the logic index. 
Table 7.3: Mean matching and logical indices for the four conditionals. Each index varies between +2 
and -2. 
Group 
Deluded 
Deluded 
Indices Arbitrary Abstract Immigration Alcohol 
Permission Officer 
Logic 
Matching 
0.4 
0.67 
0.07 
1.13 
0.47 
0.73 
0.8 
0.8 
Depressed Logic 0.27 0.07 
Depressed Matching 0.0 0.07 
1.0 
0.6 
1.7 
-0.07 
Normal 
Normal 
Logic 
Matching 
0.2 
0.6 
0.4 
1.07 
1.07 
0.67 
1.8 
0.2 
In addition to producing an error score the Wason selection task allows an 
examination of which cards were chosen. It may be the case that people with delusions 
differed systematically in the selection of the cards. This possibility was investigated by 
recording which cards specifically were chosen. The graph on the next page (figure 7.1) 
represents how often each of the cards were chosen by each group for the alcohol 
conditional. Performance on the other conditionals was equally poor amongst all of the 
groups and comparisons of these graphs indicates that all the groups were similar in the 
cards that were chosen. The bars on the graph below represent the number of each type 
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of card that was selected. The p card represents the Beer, the not p the coke, the q card 
is the 22 year old and the not q card corresponds to the 16 year old. 
As can be seen the main differences are on the q and not q card selection. People 
with delusions chose the q card seven times whereas the other two groups chose this 
card far less frequently. This selection of the q card is a result of the matching bias 
response of the p and q cards which was chosen six times by the people with delusions. 
In addition, the group with delusions chose far fewer of the not q card than the two 
control groups. Therefore, when the people with delusions were wrong in their selection 
of cards it seems that they were not that far off the mark. The pattern of responses does 
not indicate a random selection of cards. For instance, the not p card was selected no 
more frequently than by the depressed group. When the people with delusions are 
incorrect it appears that they tend to choose the p and q card combination which is the 
most frequent error seen in non deluded normal subjects when the conditional is 
difficult. 
Figure 7.1: Type of cards selected by each group in the alcohol conditional. 
Cards selected in Alcohol Conditior 
1 6 T 
1 4 --
1 2 
a Del Ale 
i 10 • Dep Ale o 
• Norm Ale 8 
not p not q 
Card type 
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7.4 Discussion 
The performance of people with delusions was compared with that of matched 
normal and psychiatric controls on a number of Wason selection tasks. The tasks 
differed in the amount of realistic content provided, a manipulation shown to alter the 
solution rate. As the tasks become more realistic, performance in normal subjects 
typically improves. 
The people with delusions did not differ from the matched controls on their 
performance in the three harder conditionals. Essentially, all that was demonstrated is 
that everyone performs poorly on abstract, or arbitrary conditionals. Successful p, and 
not q card responses were so low in the first three conditionals that no difference could 
be demonstrated. Solution rates of 13, 16 and 42% are below those reported by other 
researchers for the tasks (except the arbitrary task). However, these results are often 
derived from College undergraduates or academic staff and are not necessarily 
representative of the responses made by members of the non academic populations that 
were tested here. In these difficult conditionals there are a high number of p and q cards 
selected. This is the typical matching response i f one is unable to obtain the answer 
using logic or Pragmatic Reasoning schemas. On these hard conditionals the people 
who experience delusions make a high number of matching bias responses. This is the 
same as the performance of the control subjects. This indicates that subjects with 
delusions are not answering totally at random or without attempting to reason at all. I f 
this were the case the answers to the task would be more erratic. 
The performance of people with depression and normal subjects on the alcohol 
conditional was very good. The majority (80%) of the depressed subjects and normal 
subjects (86%) correctly chose the BEER and 16 cards. However, only 33% of the 
subjects with delusions chose these cards, and this is a significant difference (p = 0.002). 
Therefore, on the easiest task the group with delusions performed significantly poorer 
than either of the other two groups. This then supports the hypothesis that people with 
delusions are poorer at deductive reasoning in comparison to matched normal and 
psychiatric controls. A l l the groups performance on the other tasks is so poor that 
differentiation is not possible or worthwhile. 
It should be apparent that as a group the people with delusions are not completely 
unable to reason. They, like the other groups, benefit from the increased realism of the 
immigration officer and especially the alcohol conditional. However, the people with 
delusions do not attain the same level of performance as the other groups. It should also 
be noted that on the more difficult abstract tasks the errors that the people with delusions 
made were in keeping with those of the other subjects. The typical answer was the p and 
q card response; the matching bias. Therefore, we can see that people with delusions are 
affected by the same factors as the other subjects. Namely a tendency to answer 
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incorrectly on abstract conditionals (often giving as an answer the cards named in the 
rule) and an improvement in performance when the material is more realistic. Notably, 
when the people with delusions are wrong on the alcohol conditional the tendency is to 
select the q card rather than the not q card. This indicates an inefficiency in reasoning 
rather than an absolute inability to reason. 
It may be the case that poor performance by subjects with delusions is owing to a 
failure to utilise previously acquired information (Garety, 1991). I f the subjects with 
delusions had a hasty data gathering style then perhaps less consideration would be 
given to the cards. Only one or two cards may be considered and they may be chosen. 
An account in terms of "jump to conclusions" is inadequate though as the people with 
delusions did not choose less cards than the other groups and the ones they chose tended 
to be the p, q and not q cards rather than the not p card. Therefore, even i f the selection 
was hasty it was generally focused on the most appropriate cards. 
The failure to attain the level of performance of the other two groups on the 
alcohol conditional implies a possible memory problem. Griggs and Cox's (1982) 
account of the selection tasks is essentially that people rely on memory of similar 
experiences. There may be a problem with the memory of the subjects with delusions. 
It is possible that they are unable to pull to mind specific counterexamples, meaning that 
they may not perform as well other subjects. Cutting and Murphy (1988) proposed that 
people with delusions have deficits in real world knowledge. In a similar way McKenna 
(1991) suggested that people with delusions have deficits in semantic knowledge that 
could possibly hamper performance on such a task. However, the performance on the 
Cognitive Estimates Task (chapter 6) indicated that there appeared not to be a problem 
in accessing or utilising semantic knowledge. 
An alternative possibility is that subjects with delusions are not particularly 
sensitive to concepts of permission and thus, do not evoke the relevant schema. It may 
be that they do not look for cheaters (Cosmides, 1989). However, intuitively this seems 
at odds with the nature of persecutory beliefs. I f anything, people with persecutory 
beliefs will be very sensitive to instances of being cheated. 
It may well be the case that performance on the task is not limited by an inability 
to reason but is limited by some other performance factors (Chomsky, 1959). The 
selection tasks rely on mental manipulation of the cards and mentally testing the rule 
whilst contemplating what is on the back of the cards. This may place too great a 
demand on the working memory capacity of the subjects with delusions (Fleming, 
Goldberg and Gold, 1994). 
The effects of intelligence, education and training on the Selection Task should 
not in this case have determined the performance of the groups. Every effort was made 
to match the groups as closely as possible for performance on the NART. The groups 
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did not differ in the estimated IQ. scores. Thus, it is doubtful that differences in 
intelligence accounts for the differences in performance. 
7.5 Conclusions 
People with delusions do not perform as well as control groups on even the most 
realistic Wason selection tasks. This would appear to lend weight to the argument that 
subjects with delusions have impairments in reasoning. I f the Selection Task is viewed 
as a hypothesis testing paradigm rather than a test of formal deductive logic (Oaksford 
and Chater, 1994) then this result appears consistent with the results of Huq et al. (1988) 
and Garety (1991). 
The Wason's tasks were systematically varied in the degree to which the content 
was realistic. Control subjects showed improved performance when the content of the 
task was most like real life. The subjects with delusions also improved in their 
performance on the more realistic tasks. However, they failed to achieve the same level 
of correct performance as the control groups. Therefore, people with delusions appeared 
to be susceptible to the same content effects as other subjects. In addition, the pattern of 
card selection on the alcohol conditional implies that the people with delusions were 
generally less efficient in the choice of cards. However, the overall performance of the 
group of people with delusions was not as good even on the most realistic of tasks. The 
importance of the content of the material will be further explored in the next chapter. 
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Q 
Experiment 4: Wason's Selection Task revisited 
8.1 Introduction 
In the previous experiment people with delusions were seen to have an impairment 
in the ability to reason deductively. Whilst they performed as poorly as the other groups 
on the hardest Wason selection tasks, the people with delusions did not solve the most 
realistic, and easiest, tasks, as well as the control groups. In the hardest conditionals the 
group with delusions made the same typical error as the other groups. The typical pattern 
was to select the cards mentioned in the rule; the matching bias error. Performance of all 
of the groups, did improve for the more realistic alcohol conditional. However, the 
subjects with delusions did not achieve the same level of performance as the other two 
groups. Therefore, it can be seen that people with delusions are susceptible to the same 
types of errors (matching bias) and are affected by the content of the task. Yet, they do 
not perform as well as the other two groups on the easiest of the tasks. To further explore 
this interesting finding three more conditionals were used. 
Selection task performance has been shown to affected by two factors; the 
probability that cards will yield important outcomes and the utility of possible outcomes 
(Kirby, 1993). Therefore, there are likely costs and benefits associated with performance 
on the selection task. If on the task the class of objects in the p set is small, this may 
influence the probability of finding the not q case. For instance, take the hypothesis "If it 
is a Raven then it is black" as in the cards below. It is the subject's task to find any 
instances of there being a Raven that is not black (p and not q cards) 
Raven Not a 
Raven 
Black Not 
Black 
P notp not q 
In this case, real world knowledge will indicate that you only need to see one male 
and one female raven as they tend to be similar. Therefore, you may not feel that you need 
to see many p cards. To check the hypothesis thoroughly would require an exhaustive 
search of all non black objects to determine if the statement is correct There are a large 
number of non black objects in the world. The probability of finding a not black raven out 
of all of the not black objects in the world is really very low. Therefore, a rational1 
decision may be merely to check that the ravens are black and to leave the class of non 
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black objects alone. The probability of finding a non black raven is probably not worth 
the effort (utility) of searching. 
To show the influence of probabilities on card selection consider the example taken 
from Kirby (1993). Here the drinking age problem is presented as in the last chapter, 
except that there are six cards instead of four. There are two cards for drinks and four 
cards representing ages. 
Beer Coke 22 16 12 4 
P not p <7 notq notq notq 
The ages of 16,12, and 4 all represent the not q cards and should all be logically 
selected. When given to subjects there is a decrease in the selection of cards from 86% for 
the 16 year old to 71% for the four year old. Naturally enough the chance of a four year 
old drinking alcohol seems lower. Hence, the probability of the cards producing a 
valuable outcome is important. An additional manipulation made by Kirby was to vary the 
utility of selecting the cards. In a condition where subjects would lose their job if they 
checked someone underage who was not drinking alcohol, the probability of selecting the 
12 and 4 year old cards fell to 47% and 39% respectively. Where the utility was varied the 
other way so that the selector was encouraged to check, the selection rates of the 12 and 4 
cards was 86% and 80%. As was demonstrated in the Biased Coin (and later the Beads 
tasks) subjects with delusions do not apparently have difficulties using probabilities. 
Therefore, the loss of utility in selection may be a factor in their poorer performance. 
The possibility is that performance on the selection task is dependant on the utility 
of turning over the cards. It may be the case that people with delusions do not place the 
same value on the solution of the task as the other groups. Perhaps, the subjects with 
delusions are able to reason correctly about the cards in the alcohol conditional but they 
may attach less importance to the potential outcomes. For instance, the people with 
delusions may merely regard as less important the fact that a 16 year old is drinking beer. 
Thus, they may be less concerned with the need to check that person. 
Utility may be decreased in people with delusions on tasks where the content is not 
related to the concerns of the person. However, when the material is of a nature that is 
related to the theme of the delusional belief, this may raise the utility to the person. The 
subjects with delusions may in a sense be less motivated to find the correct response when 
the material is not directly related to the theme of their delusion. Motivation would be 
expected to be low in the depressed subjects but the motivation here is more like a cost 
benefit analysis of examining the cards. A low level of utility may lead to less of an 
information search, i.e. a jump to conclusions reasoning style. Or it may be the case that 
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owing to the quite memory-intensive nature of the reasoning tasks, people with delusions 
are less able to reason with the rule. Rather than jumping to conclusions then, these 
people may impose an answer in order to "cut their losses". 
To explore the possibility of differences in utility between the groups, three more 
Wason selection tasks were used on three more groups of subjects. The first selection 
task was a direct attempt to investigate the possible relationship between utility of outcome 
and performance on the selection task. Subjects were given the Alcohol conditional as 
before. However, in addition, the participants were asked to rate on a utility rating scale 
what the relative value of each outcome was. The people in the study were asked to rate 
the importance of a 22 year old drinking beer or coke, and of a 16 year old drinking the 
same. It is possible that the people with delusions may well have lower utility ratings on 
these dimensions. This may account for the poorer performance if the subjects with 
delusions are shown to be poorer at this task again. The people with delusions are 
proposed to have a lower utility, and therefore may place less value on the outcomes of the 
rule. The reduction of utility would lead to a less efficient information search and less 
consideration of the cards. This may lead to the subject merely selecting the cards 
mentioned in the conditional rule, i.e., making the matching bias error. Therefore, lower 
utility ratings generally are expected to be associated with the pq cards response and a 
lower utility specifically associated with the not q card. 
The second conditional was designed specifically to be of high familiarity and 
utility to the subjects with delusions. The rule was concerned with an aspect of hospital 
policy on discharge. This should be relevant and available to the people with delusions 
and depression from past experience (considered an aid to correct solution, Griggs and 
Cox, 1982). The form of the rule was "If one is to be discharged, one must have 
completed the medication" Four cards were presented with Discharge (p), Not discharged 
(not p), Taken medication (q) and Not taken medication (not q). The task was to identify 
anyone who had broken the rule and been discharged without completing the medication. 
It was predicted that the people with delusions performance would be improved as the task 
is familiar in content and available from experience. It should also be salient to many of 
the people with depression. However, they have been shown to perform well on the 
alcohol conditional already so little improvement was expected. 
Once again the visual analogue utility scale was used. It was expected that a higher 
number of correct p and not q card responses provided by the people with delusions 
would be correlated with a higher utility on the relevant outcomes than in the alcohol 
conditional. The raised salience and utility on this conditional would, it was expected, 
lead to a more efficient information search by the people with delusions. 
The third task took the form of an indicative conditional in which the statement 
needs to be checked as being true or false. Unlike the alcohol and hospital conditionals 
(above) there are no deontic terms in an indicative conditional. The deontic conditionals 
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require consideration of what ought to happen, whereas indicative conditionals consider 
whether an event did or did not occur. Usually indicative conditionals are solved less well 
than the deontic conditionals. An example of an indicative conditional is "Every time I go 
to Durham I travel by train." The task is to find if the statement is true or false. Typically 
this produces the p and q card response, when the cards are: 
r 
Durham Hexham 
notp 
Train 
notq 
In the version used in this study, participants were given a task in which the theme 
of the conditional was very close in nature to the theme of the delusional belief. Bentall 
and his colleagues have shown that people with persecutory beliefs differentially process 
material that is related to the theme of the delusional belief. As the form was an indicative 
conditional it was expected that the normal and depressed subjects would turn over the 
typical p and q cards. However, a different pattern of responding was expected for the 
subjects with delusions. It was expected that they would turn over a higher frequency of 
the not q card. This was expected in combination with the p card and perhaps with pq 
cards. The content should be more available and relevant to the people with delusional 
ideas. Thus, improved performance was expected. 
The participants in this study were told that they have identified two types of 
people in the world. The first group are genuinely friendly and the second group are 
telling lies about the person and plotting against him or her. There is a simple way to 
distinguish the two types: "If someone smiles then they are friendly." The person's task 
was to determine if this statement was true or false. 
Smile Frown Friendly Plotting 
notp notq 
Therefore, it was predicted that on the alcohol conditional the people with 
delusions would perform as poorly as on the previous study. This was proposed to occur 
because these subjects would ascribe lower utilities to the statements than the other 
groups. This should account for the lower number of correct responses on the last study. 
The second conditional deliberately tried to raise the utility of a correct solution to subjects 
with delusions. The conditional was based on a discharge policy of a hospital and was 
designed to be familiar and salient to the patients groups. This manipulation was expected 
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to produce improved performance in the group with delusions and bring them in line with 
other two groups who were already performing well. The third prediction was that on an 
indicative conditional with a realistic content that was salient and relevant to the subjects 
with delusions, these subjects would produce a differential pattern of performance to the 
other groups. Specifically, more p, not q card responses. 
8.2 Method 
Subjects: Three groups of subjects agreed to participate in this study. The 
experimental subjects were 15 patients with delusions of persecution or grandeur who 
were selected by the usual criteria. Control subjects were also selected by the previous 
criteria. 
Table 8.1: Subject characteristics in Experiment 4. Mean age, NART estimate of IQ. and MMSE 
performance are given, and standard deviations are in brackets. 
Group N Inpatients Gender Age NART MMSE 
Outpatients M F estimated IQ 
Deluded 15 7 8 10 5 39.8 (11.9) 102.9(8.3) 28.4(1.2) 
Depressed 15 9 6 8 7 42.5(9.6) 104.1 (11.1) 28.3(1.3) 
Control 15 7 8 38.2(10.4) 105.6(8.5) 28.7(0.8) 
Significance NS NS NS 
Apparatus: Each of the three conditionals was written on a separate piece of 
paper and consisted of the rule, four representations of cards as well as the utility scale 
where appropriate (shown in appendix 4). 
Procedure: Subjects were shown the conditionals one at a time according to a 
randomised order. The order of the cards on each conditional was also randomised. The 
conditionals were identical in form to those reported earlier but differed in content as 
outlined above. After completing the alcohol and hospital conditional participants 
completed the utility assessment scale (appendix 5). Subjects were given four situations 
that corresponded with or broke the rule and had to assess on a scale of 1 to 7 whether it 
mattered to the person whether such a situation occurred. The utility scale for the alcohol 
conditional is represented here, only the first scale is shown as the others were identical. 
The first three situations represent situations that are in accord with the rule and the fourth 
represents the rule breaker. Low values were expected for the situations that are in accord 
with the rule. People would be expected to say that the situation should be allowed to 
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happen. However, a high score was expected for the rule breaker as this should not be 
allowed to occur. 
Please indicate how important it is to you that the following situations should or should not be allowed to 
happen. 
A) A 22 year old drinks beer 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very Definitely Should Neutral Should not Definitely Very 
definitely should be be be allowed should not definitely 
should be allowed allowed be allowed should not 
allowed be allowed 
B) A 22 year old drinks coke 
C) A 16 year old drinks coke 
D) A 16 year old drinks beer 
8.3 Results 
The table below shows the types of, and the number of responses given by each 
group of participants on the three conditionals. As in the previous study, the responses 
are divided in to correct (p and not q), matching bias (p card alone or p and q cards) and 
then a category of other incorrect responses (combinations of cards). 
Table 8.2: Type of response made by the groups to the Wason Conditionals. 
Group Conditioned Correct (pq~) Matching 
(P or pq) 
Other 
Deluded Alcohol 5 4 6 
Deluded Hospital 1 4 10 
Deluded Paranoid 0 7 8 
Depressed Alcohol 9 2 4 
Depressed Hospital 2 3 10 
Depressed Paranoid 0 5 10 
Normal Alcohol 13 1 1 
Normal Hospital 6 5 4 
Normal Paranoid 2 7 6 
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The people with delusions were poorer at selecting the p and not q cards on the 
alcohol conditional. Out of the 15 people in the group only 5 correctly chose this 
combination. Nine of the people with depression and 13 of the normal controls were 
correct The performance is very similar to that in the previous chapter. However, people 
with depression did not perform as well on the alcohol conditional as they did before (12/7 
and not q responses last time). Analysis of the results was conducted in the same way as 
reported in the previous chapter. Responses were scored in terms of matching and logic 
indices. These are shown in table 8.3. A one way Anova revealed a significant difference 
between the groups [F (2, 42) = 7.5, p = 0.002). Post Hoc analysis (Tukey HSD test) 
indicated that there was a significant difference between the people with delusions and the 
other two groups on the alcohol conditional. The control groups did not differ from each 
other. A significant difference is found because the people with depression responded 
with&p or not q card alone on five occasions. Therefore, despite giving the p and not q 
choice on 9 occasions, the index score was raised by the correct selection of the p and not 
q cards singly but not in combination. As before, when incorrect, the people with 
delusions frequently made the common matching bias error. 
Table 8.3: Mean matching and logical indices for the three conditionals. Each indices varies between 
+2 and -2. 
Group Indices Alcohol Hospital Paranoid 
Deluded Logic 0.67 -0.07 0.2 
Deluded Matching 0.13 0.33 0.87 
Depressed Logic 1.53 0.33 -0.13 
Depressed Matching -0.07 -0.6 0.13 
Normal Logic 1.8 0.9 0.13 
Normal Matching 0.07 0.33 0.27 
The hospital conditional produced poor performance in all of the groups. The 
normal subjects were able to give the correct response on 6 occasions. Whereas the other 
control group were only correct twice and the people with delusions once. A one way 
Anova on the logic index scores revealed a significant difference between the groups [ 
F(2, 42) = 4.1, p = 0.02]. Post hoc tests revealed that the difference was between the 
normal subjects and the group with delusions. No differences existed between the two 
patient groups nor between the two control groups. 
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All of the subjects performed poorly on the paranoid theme conditional. None of 
the people from the two patient groups solved it correctly and only two normal subjects 
were correct Note that when all of the groups were unable to provide the correct p and 
not q cards, there were a high number of matching bias (p and q) responses. All of the 
groups rely on selecting the cards mentioned in the rule. There were no differences 
between the groups on the logic index scores for the paranoid conditional [F (2,42) = 
0.76, p = 0.5]. 
It was hypothesised that the poor performance by people with delusions may be 
attributable to lower judgements of utility to an outcome. The average utility ratings are 
given in the table below. Subjects rated the importance of situations occurring given the 
rule. For instance in the table, the utility rating for the A) scenario on the alcohol 
conditional corresponds to a situation of a 22 year old drinking beer. On the alcohol 
conditional it was hypothesised that there may be lower utility of outcome ratings, 
especially for the D) condition or the rule breaker card. However, it is clear that there is 
no difference on the utility of outcome on this situation as all groups rate this as 6. This 
means that all groups said that a 16 year old drinking alcohol "Definitely should not be 
allowed to happen". In fact there are no significant differences between the groups on any 
of the ratings of utility. However, the difference approaches significance [H(2,3) = 5.6, p 
= 0.06) on the ratings for C) which corresponds to a 16 year old drinking coke. 
Table 8.4: Mean utility rating of each outcome made by the groups to the Wason Conditionals. A low 
value indicates that the situation should be allowed to occur, and a high score that it should not. 
Standard deviations are shown in brackets. 
Groups Conditional A) rule B) rule C) rule D) rule 
keeper keeper keeper breaker 
Deluded Alcohol 2.3 (1.5) 2 (1) 2.7 (l) 6 (l) 
Deluded Hospital 2.9 (0.9) 4 (l) 3.4 (1.2) 5 (2) 
Depressed Alcohol 2.1 (1) 2 (l) 1.9 (1) 6 (1) 
Depressed Hospital 1.9 (0.9) 4 (2) 2.1 (1.4) 6 (2) 
Normal Alcohol 1.5 (0.8) 1 (1) 1.7 (1) 6 (1) 
Normal Hospital . 1.6 (0.8) 4 (2) 2.6 (1.5) 6 (1) 
On the Hospital utility rating scale there are some 
significant differences between the groups on the ratings of utility of outcome. The 
situation of someone being discharged after having finished their medication (condition A) 
produces mean utility ratings of 2.9 for the people with delusions, 1.9 for the group with 
depression and 1.6 for the normals. There is a significant difference between the groups 
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[H(2,3) = 12.2, p = 0.002]. Post hoc tests reveal that the difference lies between the 
group with delusions and both the depressed group (U = 48.5, p = 0.008), and the normal 
group (U = 28.5, p = 0.003) but not between the two control groups (U = 94.5, p = 
0.45). 
Also, there is a significant difference between the groups on the C) scenario which 
is the situation in which someone is kept in when they have lapsed on medication. Once 
again, the people with delusions rate this as less important than the other groups [H(2,3) 
=7.5, p = 0.02]. The difference lies between the people with delusions and both the 
depressed subjects (U = 51.5, p = 0.01), and the normals (U = 63, p = 0.04). Once again 
there is no difference between the two control groups (U =101, p = 0.6). Finally the 
groups do not differ on the utility rating given to the rule breaker condition of someone 
being discharged without having completed the prescribed medication [H(2,3) = 5, p = 
0.08]. People with delusions rate this as of lower importance and on average rate it as 5 
whereas the other groups rate it as a score of 6 meaning that they think that it definitely 
should not be allowed. Overall, people with delusions seem to give less extreme utility 
ratings to the different outcomes. However, this cannot account for performance as the 
people with depression ascribe similar ratings to the normal controls but perform as poorly 
as the people with delusions. 
As in the last chapter it is possible to examine the card selection and not just the 
error rates. On the graph below (figure 8.1) the different card selections made by each 
group on the alcohol conditional are shown. As can be seen people with delusions choose 
less of the not q card (16), and more of the not p (coke) and the q card (22). This pattern 
of selection is very similar to that seen on the previous alcohol conditional (chapter 7). 
Figure 8.1: Cards selected on the alcohol conditional by each of the three groups. 
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The poorer performance of all of the groups on the hospital conditional is reflected 
in the cards chosen. This is represented on Figure 8.2. There is an increase in the 
selection of the irrelevant not p card (kept in) and a reduction in the selection of the not q 
(lapsed on medication) card. People with delusions appear to be mainly choosing the p 
(Discharged) and q (completed medication) cards. 
Figure 8.2: Cards selected on the hospital conditional by each of the three groups. 
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The performance by all of the groups was very poor on the paranoid conditional. 
The selection of cards is shown below (figure 8.3). It can be seen that once again there is 
an increased selection of the irrelevant not p card (frowning) and very little selection of the 
not q card (plotting). Surprisingly, this card was selected the least by the people with 
delusions who are held to have an attentional bias to threat related material (Bentall and 
Kaney, 1989). The people with delusions once again show a preference for selecting the 
p (smiling) and q (friendly) cards, reflecting the high number of matching bias responses 
provided by this group. 
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Figure 83: Cards selected on the paranoid conditional by each of the three groups. 
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8.4 Discussion 
People with delusions were shown to be poorer at reasoning deductively in the last 
chapter. The utility of the outcomes is thought to be one particular factor that influences 
the chance of correct performance. This study investigated whether people with delusions 
were poorer at reasoning deductively and whether lower judgements of value or utility 
played a role in this impaired performance. 
To study this, the utility of outcome was manipulated in three Wason selection 
tasks. It was expected that the more salient and relevant the material was to the person, the 
higher the utility judgements would be, and the more correct p and not q card selections 
would be produced. 
People with delusions were once again shown to be poorer than control subjects 
on the alcohol conditional. However, the utility of outcome was not predictive of the not q 
card being selected. The groups did not differ in their rating of whether a 16 year old 
should be allowed to drink beer. Al l the groups rated it as 6, or "definitely should not be 
allowed to happen". Nevertheless, they differed in the successful selection of the p and 
not q cards. 
The hospital conditional was designed to be both available and salient to the patient 
groups and to improve the performance of the people with delusions in comparison to that 
of the other groups. In fact, all groups did poorly on this conditional especially the patient 
groups. There was a significant difference in performance on the logic index between the 
normal group and the group with delusions. There were no other differences. On this 
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conditional, the groups did differ to some extent on the judgement of utility. The people 
with delusions generally rated the outcomes as having less importance, these people were 
generally less concerned with whether a rule was upheld or broken. However, this did 
not affect the chance of correct solution, as the people with delusions did not differ from 
the people with depression in their performance on this task. Possibly, the reason the 
patient groups performed differently was owing to the different perspective that they had 
to the normal controls. The rule stated that the hospital had a policy that in order to be 
discharged, one must have completed the medication. The p and not q card response 
required checking the discharged card, and the not completed medication card. However, 
the patient groups both checked the not p card frequently. This card had "Kept in" written 
on it. Therefore, the patient groups perhaps were looking more for instances where 
someone had completed the medication and not been discharged. Similarly, the people 
with delusions chose the completed medication perhaps to check if discharged was on the 
back more than any other group. Perhaps, the patient groups had a different perspective to 
the normal subjects who adopted the hospital's view more readily and looked for people 
who had been discharged without completing their medication (i.e. had cheated the 
system). The patient groups may have been more concerned with ensuring that the system 
had not cheated the patient. Checking whether the hospital had not discharged someone 
after that person had completed the medication. However, the groups did not differ on the 
value that they placed on someone having been kept in even though that person had 
completed the medication. All groups rated it as 4 indicating that they were neutral on the 
matter. 
The final conditional was designed to be very salient to the people with delusions. 
As it was an indicative conditional which usually produces a high number of pq responses 
in people, it was assumed that this is what would happen in the two control groups. The 
people with delusions were expected to have processing biases for material that is related 
to the theme of the delusion (Bentall, 1994). Hence, it was expected that these people 
would have a preference for viewing the not q card which had the word "plotting" on it. 
In actual fact, the people with delusions chose this card less often than the other two 
groups and chose it less than any other card. The group with delusions mainly chose the 
pq cards as is seen when people make the matching error. The attentional biases for threat 
related material have been demonstrated on tasks that require automatic processing of 
material. For instance, Bentall and Kaney (1989) used the emotional Stroop paradigm to 
show that people with delusions took longer to colour name threat related words. 
Therefore, the biases in processing may only be present on tasks that require automatic 
processing of material and not when effortful, non-automatic processing is used as in 
reasoning tasks. Perhaps then this failure to select the not q card with the word "plotting" 
on it reflected some sort of deliberate avoidance of threat related material. However, 
Bentall, Kaney and Bowen-Jones (1995) have reported that there is preferential recall of 
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threat related material in memory tasks that seems unlikely to rely on automatic processes. 
Therefore, the infrequent selection of the plotting card remains perplexing. 
People with delusions appear to solve the easiest conditionals less efficiently than 
control subjects. This is most notable on the alcohol conditional which the group with 
delusions were less able to solve on this, and the previous occasion (chapter 7). The 
difference between the people with delusions and the other groups appears to represent an 
inefficiency in reasoning rather than an inability. In the last chapter, the people with 
delusions' performance did improve with increases in the realisticness of the content 
However, they did not attain the same level of performance. When the people with 
delusions are wrong they make the "normal" error of selecting the cards mentioned in the 
rule. This indicates that the group with delusions are not responding at random but are at 
least attempting to reason. 
The poor performance on the alcohol conditional by the group with delusions was 
hypothesised to be owing to lower judgements of value being placed on outcomes by this 
group. However, no difference in utility was observed on the alcohol ratings. Further 
attempts to manipulate utility did not appear to aid correct selection of the p and not q 
cards. On the hospital conditional, which was designed to be salient and available to the 
patient groups, the people with delusions were significantly worse than normal subjects. 
On a conditional designed specifically to access the processing biases for theme related 
material, there was no'difference in overall performance between all of the groups. 
Surprisingly, the people with delusions chose the not q card that had the word plotting on 
it, less than the other groups. This is despite the fact that people with delusions are held to 
have attentional biases to material related in theme to the delusion (Bentall and Kaney, 
1989). 
As utility of outcome does not appear to be able to explain the inefficiency in 
reasoning by the people with delusions, alternatives need to be considered. It is possible 
that the people with delusions are performing less well owing to impaired working 
memory ability (Fleming et al. 1994). Conditional reasoning is working memory 
intensive. It requires considering the rule, mentally manipulating the cards, checking what 
is on the back with what implications the rule holds. If a limitation in working memory 
capacity meant that the person was less efficient at selecting the cards, it may lead to a "cut 
your losses" reasoning style. A person would reason as far as possible but once working 
memory capacity was exceeded the person would decide. This would lead to performance 
that was influenced by the same factors as affects normal subjects. Also, when incorrect it 
would be expected that someone with reduced working memory capacity may demonstrate 
errors that are commonly made by normal people on harder tasks, namely the matching 
bias. This possibility that reduced working memory capacity may affect the performance 
of subjects with delusions on Wason Selection tasks clearly needs to be investigated. 
Performance on conditionals needs to be correlated with working memory tasks. 
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8.5 Conclusions 
People with delusions were, once again, shown to be poorer in their performance 
than either of the two control groups on the alcohol conditional. This poor performance 
was not attributable to the group with delusions ascribing lower judgements of utility to 
the outcomes of the rule. Performance on two other conditionals, designed to raise the 
utility and availability for the people with delusions, was poor by all of the groups. On a 
conditional that was concerned with people plotting, which was expected to be salient to 
people with delusions, there was no difference in performance. Overall, it appears that 
people with delusions show an inefficiency in reasoning rather than an inability to reason. 
This inefficiency was not obviously owing to differences in utility. A possible role for 
impairments in working memory is suggested. 
Therefore, at this stage there appears to be mixed set of results. On the one hand, 
people with delusions have been shown to reason with probabilities no differently from 
other groups (Biased Coin task). Also, the people with delusions were shown to be no 
more confident in the correctness of their decision making than other groups (Cognitive 
Estimates Task). However, the results of the Wason selection tasks indicate that people 
with delusions appear to perform poorly on tasks on which other groups perform well. 
The aim of this thesis is to explore reasoning over a variety of different tasks and with a 
variety of different types of material. For instance, tasks that are abstract and neutral in 
content or tasks that are realistic and relate to social interaction. Next, the attention turns to 
apparent discrepancy between the results of Huq et al. (1988) indicating biased 
probabilistic reasoning and the results of the Biased Coin task. 
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9 
^ Experiment 5: Probabilistic reasoning (Beads task) 
9.1 Introduction 
Subjects with delusions appeared to reason accurately and were not biased in their 
reasoning in comparison to controls in the Biased Coin task used for Experiment 1. 
However, similar people have been shown to be hasty and overconfident when reasoning 
about probabilities (Huq et al. 1988). One way to account for this difference is that it may 
be the case that biased reasoning, such as hastiness is only apparent when subjects are 
allowed to determine the level of evidence. Were this so, then when given a 
predetermined level of evidence (such as in the coin task), people with delusions would be 
expected to reason very much as normal subjects. Essentially, this hypothesis proposes 
that people with delusions have a biased data gathering style and not an absolute deficit in 
reasoning ability. Experiment 5 therefore explored this possibility, utilising the beads task 
adopted by Huq et al. (1988) and Garety et al. (1991). 
In the beads task a subject is presented with two jars full of beads. The person is 
told that the jars contain equal and opposite ratios of beads (e.g., 85 green beads and 15 
pink in one jar, and 85 pink and 15 green in the other). The jars are hidden from view and 
then the experimenter draws beads from one of the jars and shows them to the subject. 
The bead is replaced in the jar after viewing. If requested by the subject another bead will 
be shown. The subject can view as many beads as she or he likes, and informs the 
experimenter when she or he is certain which jar has been selected. The number of beads 
seen can act as an index of how much evidence is required prior to a decision being made. 
People with delusions have been reported to request fewer beads Oess evidence) before 
deciding. Thus, the people with delusions are considered to be hasty and jump to 
conclusions in this type of task (Garety et al. 1991). 
This basic task lends itself to a number of investigations. Experiment 5 had four 
principal aims. The first aim was to determine whether people with delusions would only 
give biased responses in this task when allowed to determine the number of beads 
themselves, in line with the hypothesis derived from Experiment 1. Namely, that there is 
a difference in performance when all of the information is provided to when the subject is 
allowed to determine the amount of evidence to be reasoned with. Therefore, Experiment 
5 included conditions where subjects determined how much information was available 
before they made their decisions, or where the experimenter told the subject to decide at a 
fixed point. It was hypothesised that in line with Garety and Hemsley's findings, in the 
subject-determined condition people with delusions may respond earlier than the 
comparison groups. In the experimenter-determined condition, participants were not 
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allowed to respond until they had viewed a predetermined number of beads (10). From 
the discussion of Experiment 1, it was hypothesised that this should lead to equivalent 
performance across people with delusions and non deluded comparison groups. 
Essentially, the aim was to demonstrate not an absolute deficit in reasoning but a 
difference in data gathering style. 
A second aim of Experiment 5 was to determine whether any bias is a reflection of 
a genuine reasoning bias, or mere impulsiveness. A less (iiscriminable ratio (60:40) 
should increase the number of beads requested before a decision is made. If the people 
with delusions were unable to alter their judgements to take account of this different level 
of discriminability, then it would imply they are not really reasoning at all but merely being 
thoughtless or indiscriminate in their answering style. Thus, two levels of discriminability 
were used in Experiment 5; 85:15 in order to replicate the original finding and 60:40 to 
investigate if the subjects with delusions were able to take into account this obvious 
change in the base rate. It would still be expected that the people with delusions would be 
hasty relative to the comparison groups in the 60:40 condition, but they should require 
more evidence than in the 85:15 condition. 
A third aim was concerned with the maintenance of hypotheses in the face of 
contradictory evidence. Garety et al. (1991) reported that subjects with delusions more 
readily altered beliefs in the face of contradictory evidence. This is paradoxical, as the 
generally accepted definition of a delusion implies persistence of a belief despite 
incontrovertible and obvious evidence to the contrary. This unusual result is thought to 
occur because people with delusions fail to utilise previously acquired information (Baruch 
et al. 1988) and are therefore stimulus bound. To investigate this further, we studied the 
effect of presenting disconfirmatory evidence to the subjects after they had made a 
decision, to see if the people with delusions would change their minds sooner. After 
having seen ten beads in the experimenter-determined condition, the subjects were asked 
to decide from which jar the beads had been drawn. Then, disconfirmatory evidence was 
presented by making further draws of beads of predominantly the other colour. Two 
measures were taken; the number of times that the subjects changed their decision as a 
measure of willingness to alter the hypothesis, and the number of extra beads seen before 
altering the decision as an index of speed of change. 
Finally, the possible role of memory in this type of experiment was considered 
important. Recent research has emphasised the previously neglected memory deficits 
found in schizophrenia (McKenna, Tamlyn, Lund, Mortimer, Hammond, and Baddeley, 
1990; Saykin, Gur, Gur, Mozley, Resnick, Kester, and Stafiniak, 1991; Tamlyn, 
McKenna, Mortimer, Lund, Hammond, and Baddeley, 1992; Clare, McKenna, Mortimer 
and Baddeley, 1993) and delusions (McKenna, 1991). In Experiment 5, subjects were 
required to retain information regarding the number and colours of the previously seen 
beads. If people with delusions were less able to retain this information it would probably 
115 
Chapter Nine 
lead them to make a decision early, as they would not be able to incorporate any new 
information without forgetting what had already been seen. Therefore, in half the 
conditions the memory demands of the task were reduced by presenting a record or tally of 
the previously viewed beads, in order to allow the person to concentrate on making the 
decision and not on maintaining the information in mind. I f the group with delusions were 
relatively hasty on the conditions where there were no memory aids but were no different 
to comparison groups in the conditions in which there were memory aids, it would 
indicate that the subjects with delusions only have an inferential bias or jump to conclusion 
strategy when they are not able to reason with the same evidence as other subjects. 
9.2 Method 
Subjects: Three groups of subjects agreed to take part in this study The 
experimental subjects were 15 people with a diagnosis of schizophrenia and currently 
suffering from delusions. The selection criteria for the control subjects were as before. 
Subject characteristics for these three groups are shown in Table 9.1. There were no 
significant differences across groups in age, NART estimated IQ, and MMSE 
performance. 
Table 9.1: Subject characteristics in Experiment 5. Mean age, NART estimate of IQ. and MMSE 
performance are given, and standard deviations are in brackets. 
Group N Inpatients Gender Age NART MMSE 
Outpatients M F estimated IQ 
Deluded 15 6 9 8 7 40.3 (10.1) 106.1 (8.6) 28.4 (1.5) 
Depressed 15 8 7 8 7 40.0 (13.8) 103.9 (10.6) 28.7(1.7) 
Control 15 8 7 39.6 (13.2) 104.7 (9.8) 29.1 (1.5) 
Significance NS NS NS 
Apparatus: Macintosh portable computer running the experimental presentation 
package Superlab (version 1.5.5). 
Procedure: Materials were presented on a portable computer. Subjects were 
seated in front of the screen and were told that they were participating in a study looking at 
the different ways people think. Then they were presented with written instructions 
detailing the principle of the beads task and of choosing from which jar the beads come 
from. Any questions were answered at this stage. Then there was a brief practice 
session, in order to ensure subjects were familiar with what they needed to do. 
Two jars were presented on the screen showing equal and opposite ratios of beads. 
The proportions of black:white beads in each jar were 85:15 or 60:40. Here the beads 
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were separated into the relative proportions and the discrimination was obvious (see 
Figure 9.1). The subject was then instructed that the computer had mixed up the beads, 
and was shown the jars again (see Figure 9.1). Next, the subject was told that the 
computer had chosen one of the jars at random and that it was their job to determine which 
jar had been chosen on the basis of the computer drawing beads from the jar and 
presenting them on screen. The beads were presented one at a time and were returned to 
the jar after presentation and rerandomised. 
Each subject was presented with four types of trial (details given below). In 
half of the trials the subject was allowed to decide where the beads were from as soon as 
he/she felt certain that he/she knew (subject-determined evidence). In the other half of the 
trials the subject was not allowed to decide until ten beads had been seen (experimenter-
determined evidence). In the subject-determined evidence condition, the subjects were 
encouraged to decide only when certain, and the number of beads seen prior to a decision was 
recorded. The subject was asked i f he/she was completely sure. I f not, they were offered the 
chance to see more beads. To help reduce any confusion the pictures of the mixed up beads 
were placed next to the subject to remind them of the proportions in each jar. 
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Figure 9.1: Examples of the Jars shown to the subjects in Experiment 5. Jars A and B show the jars 
in the 85:15 ratio condition. Jars C and D represent the 60:40 condition. The jars arc shown to 
the subject firstly unmixed (on the left) to demonstrate the differences in the proportions, and then 
in a mixed state (on the right). 
Unmixed Mixed 
J A R A 
8 5 White 
15 Black 
J A R C 
6 0 Black 
40 White 
J A R B 
8 5 Black 
15 White 
J A R D 
6 0 White 
40 B lack 
J A R A 
8 5 White 
15 B lack 
J A R C 
60 Black 
40 White 
J A R B 
8 5 B lack 
15 White 
J A R D 
6 0 White 
40 B lack 
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At each of the two levels of discriminability (85:15 or 60:40) there were 4 trials, given 
in a fixed order with or without a memory aid. For each trial, different representations of 
jars and different shaded beads were used This is an illustration of the sequences of trials 
using the 85:15 ratio. The sequences for the 60:40 ratio were the same. 
85:15 ratio without memory aid: 
Trials 1 and 2: Draws till decision (subject-determined evidence): Beads were 
drawn from the jar and displayed one at a time on the computer screen, and the 
subject decided when they had seen enough to make a decision as to the source of 
the beads. For example, this was the order of beads in trial 1: 
A A A B A A A A A B B A A A A A A A A B 
Trials 3 and 4: Experimenter-determined evidence and reversal: The subject was 
presented with 10 draws of beads before being allowed to offer a decision. Then, 
once a decision had been made, counter-evidence was presented (i.e. beads of 
predominantly the other colour, up to a maximum of 10) and the number of beads 
required before the decision was changed was recorded. 
85:15 ratio with memory aid: 
Trials 1 and 2: Draws till decision (subject-determined evidence) with memory aid: 
As the beads were presented in the draws til l decision task, a small marker or tally 
was incremented at the bottom of the computer screen, indicating the colours of the 
previous beads. Therefore, any bias resulting from failure to remember previous 
draws was reduced. 
Trials 3 and 4: Experimenter-determined evidence and reversal with memory aid: 
The subject was presented with 10 draws of beads before being allowed to offer a 
decision. Then, once a decision had been made, counter-evidence was presented 
(i.e. beads of predominantly the other colour, up to a maximum of 10) and the 
number of beads required before the decision was changed was recorded. The 
previously drawn beads were shown along the bottom of the screen. 
No effects of ordering in similar tasks have been reported (Huq et al. 1988). 
Trials with the 60:40 and 85:15 sets were blocked together and given in counterbalanced 
order, as were the memory-aided and unaided conditions within each level of 
discriminability. Full details of the orderings are given in appendix 6. 
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9.3 Results 
The results are dealt with in two sections. First, to be considered is the number of 
beads requested before a decision was made in the 85:15 and 60:40 conditions (i.e., data 
from Trials 1 and 2 in each block). The second section considers the conditions in which 
ten beads were presented before a decision was requested (exrjerimenter-deterrnined 
evidence) and then counter-evidence was provided (i.e., data from Trials 3 and 4 in each 
block). 
Draws till decision (subject-determined evidence): 
The first analysis involved the mean number of beads viewed prior to a decision on 
the draws till decision task. Table 9.2 shows the mean number of beads requested in the 
60:40 and 85:15 conditions, and indicates whether or not a memory aid was present. 
Table 9.2: Results of Draws till Decision in Experiment 5. The mean numbers of beads requested by 
each group and standard deviations are shown at each of the two levels of discriminability (60:40 
and 85:15). The presence of a memory aid is indicated as well. 
Level of discriminability 60:40 85:15 
Presence of memory aid No Yes No Yes 
Deluded Mean: 5.2 5.1 2.4 .2.5 
SD: 2.4 2.4 0.7 0.7 
Depressed Mean: 8.4 7.9 4.1 4.5 
SD: 2.9 2.7 1.6 1.6 
Control Mean: 9.4 7.7 4.1 4.9 
SD: 3.7 2.0 1.4 1.9 
A three-factor Analysis of Variance was used to investigate the effects of subject 
Group (deluded, depressed, and control), level of Discriminability (60:40 or 85:15; 
repeated measure), and Memory load (presence or absence of memory aid; repeated 
measure). 
A significant main effect of subject Group was found (F (2, 44) = 11.8, p < 
0.001). Post hoc Tukey tests (a = 0.05) showed that the difference lay between the 
subjects with delusions and the other two groups; people with delusions requested fewer 
beads prior to a decision. Planned comparisons showed that this was true of both the 
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85:15 level (F (2, 42) = 11.1, p<0.001) and the 60:40 level (F (2, 42) = 8.3, p< 0.001) of 
discriminability. 
A significant main effect was also found for the Discriminability factor (F (1,42) = 
125.2, p < 0.001) indicating an overall difference between the 60:40 and 85:15 conditions; 
fewer beads were required to make a decision at the 85:15 level of dUscriminability, as 
would be expected. There was no Group by Disairninability interaction (F (2,42) = 1.9, 
p > 0.1) indicating that all of the groups took account of the change in base rates and 
altered the number of beads requested accordingly. The group of subjects with delusions 
changed from 2.5 beads to 5.2, and the controls from around 4.5 to about 8.5. 
There was no main effect of Memory load (F (1,42) = 1.2, p > 0.1), indicating no 
overall difference between conditions in which the previously seen beads were presented 
or not. There was however, a Discriminability by Memory interaction (F (1,42) = 6.6, p 
<0.02). When the task was more difficult (60:40) the groups benefited from seeing the 
previous beads on the screen, and this allowed a slightly earlier decision. Without the 
burden of having to remember the previously seen beads in the 60:40 condition the control 
group subjects were thus able to respond a little earlier. There was no Group by Memory 
interaction (F (2, 42) = 0.6 < 1). Finally, there was no significant 3-way interaction 
between Group, Discriminability, and Memory load (F (2, 42) = 2.3, p > 0.1). 
Errors (incorrect choice of jar) were rare, and not subjected to formal analysis. 
However, it did seem that although error rates were low, there were more errors for the 
group with delusions. At the 85:15 level of discriminability the subjects with delusions 
incorrectly chose the wrong jar on 4 of the total 60 trials. None of the comparison 
subjects made an error. At the 60:40 level of discriminability, there were a total of 12 
errors made by the group with delusions, 4 by the subjects with depression, and 3 by the 
normal control group. 
Ten beads (experimenter-determined evidence) and reversal: 
Next to be considered was the number of errors made by the subjects when 
deciding from which jar the beads were drawn after having had to wait until they had seen 
10 beads. With the 85:15 ratio, subjects were typically presented with 8 beads of one 
colour and 2 of the other. Subjects with delusions made 5 decision errors (i.e., incorrect 
choice of jar) on the 85:15 condition. This is out of a total of 60 trials, and represents an 
overall error rate of about 8%. The depressed subjects made 1 error, and the normal 
subjects made no mistakes. At the 60:40 level of probability, people with delusions made 
6 errors, the subjects with depression made 5 errors, and the normal subjects 2 errors. On 
the whole, accuracy can be considered very good. 
Once the subjects had made a decision after the tenth bead bad been shown, extra 
beads were then presented that would be discrepant with the answer given. The mean 
number of times that the groups changed their minds is shown in Table 9.3. Also shown 
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are the mean number of beads required for subjects to change their minds when they did 
change. A Kruskall-Wallis test on the number of times that the subjects switched jars 
revealed no difference between groups (H = 1.7, p = 0.3) in the number of times the 
hypothesis was changed. The subjects with delusions were no more willing to alter their 
decisions than any of the other groups. In fact, all of the subjects were quite reluctant to 
change their minds at all. Additional Kruskall-Wallis tests on the number of beads 
required to change the decision revealed ho difference at the 85:15 (H = 1.23, p = 0.5) or 
the 60:40 (H = 2.9, p= 0.2) levels of discriminability. Therefore, there were no group 
differences in the number of times that subjects changed, or in how long it took them to 
change their decisions. 
Table 9.3: Results of Reversals in Experiment 5. The mean numbers of times that 
subjects in each group were willing to reverse a decision (out of a possible 
maximum of 2) at the two levels of discriminability are indicated. The mean 
numbers of extra draws required to alter are also shown. 
Level of discriminability 60:40 85:15 
Presence of memory aid No Yes No Yes 
Mean number of reversals (max = 2): 
Deluded Mean: 0.73 1.00 1.13 0.40 
SD: 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.09 
Depressed Mean: 0.53 1.00 1.4 0.6 
SD: 0.09 0.14 0.14 0.24 
Control Mean: 0.47 0.87 0.67 0.47 
SD: 0.14 0.05 0.28 0.05 
Mean extra draws before changing: 
Deluded Mean: 3.09 7.27 5.06 6.67 
SD: 2.55 2.82 2.93 2.66 
Depressed Mean: 5.00 7.00 5.48 7.78 
SD: 2.45 2.24 2.77 2.11 
Control Mean: 4.57 8.15 7.00 6.00 
SD: 1.51 2.12 0.94 2.83 
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9.4 Discussion 
The possibility was examined that people with delusions only show differences in 
reasoning in conditions in which the amount of evidence collected is determined by the 
subject. Results were consistent with this hypothesis. In conditions where the evidence 
was predetermined by the experimenter, and all of the subjects were required to decide at 
the same point, there was no difference between the groups in the ability to reason. 
However, when subjects were free to determine the amount of evidence they required 
before making a decision, people with delusions requested fewer beads. At the 85:15 
level of discriminability, on average the group with delusions requested only 2.5 beads 
whereas the depressed and normal control groups requested 4.3 and 4.7 beads 
respectively (p < 0.001). The performance of the patients with delusions appears very 
similar to the study by Garety et al. (1991), who found that schizophrenic patients 
requested 2.4 beads (SD = 1.9) and patients with delusional disorder requested 3 beads 
(SD = 3.3). Garety et al.'s (1991) anxious control group requested 3.7 beads (SD = 1.7) 
and the normal controls requested 5.4 (SD = 3.2). 
To examine if this was a reflection of a genuine reasoning bias, or mere 
impulsiveness, a less discriminable 60:40 condition was included. In this condition, the 
subjects with delusions did take account of the change in base rate and delayed their 
decision accordingly. The mean number of beads rose from 2.5 in the 85:15 condition to 
5.2 in this 60:40 condition. The people with delusions still requested fewer beads than the 
two comparison groups however. . The depiessed subjects requested 8.1 beads on 
average. The normal controls requested 8.6. These differences are highly significant for 
both levels of discriminability (p < 0.001). The use of this 60:40 ratio, which makes the 
decision harder, indicates that the subjects in the delusions group were not ignoring base 
rate, and were able to delay their decision. Hence, their early responses do seem to reflect 
a reasoning bias, not impulsiveness. 
The addition of a memory aid indicating the previously drawn beads made no 
difference to the reasoning style of the people with delusions. Thus, it would appear that 
the subjects with delusions are not hasty because they fail to remember the previously 
shown beads. Again, their early responses seem to reflect a genuine bias. 
In the experimenter-determined evidence conditions, few mistakes were made. 
This indicates that, as in Experiment 1 (Biased Coin task), the people with delusions were 
mostly able to reason like the comparison groups when all of the information was 
available. However, the subjects with delusions did make 5 errors at the 85:15 level of 
discriminability, whereas the subjects with depression only made 1 error and the normal 
subjects made none. Note that these errors arise out of a total of 60 trials for each group, 
and hence in no way represent any absolute deficit or inability to reason. None the less, it 
is surprising that any mistakes would be made on the 85:15 condition, especially in the 
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memory aid condition where the previous beads are on display; yet this happened twice in 
people with delusions and once in the group with depression. 
The possible reason for the slightly increased error rates in the delusion group is 
that, owing to the nature of persecutory delusions, the subjects with these problems were 
by nature suspicious. Therefore, they did not always trust what they saw and were 
willing to believe that they were sometimes being tricked. One subject appeared to learn 
that after giving a response after 10 beads had been shown, further beads of 
predominandy the other colour would be drawn, and was trying to pre-empt this! In 
addition,, another patient with delusions spontaneously explained why she had chosen the 
white bead jar having seen 8 black beads and 2 white beads; she stated that the black beads 
were more magnetic and would therefore be attracted to the top and be picked out more 
often. The number of errors at the 60:40 ratio was 6 for the subjects with delusions, 5 for 
the depressed sample and 2 for the normal group. In this case, the ratios are so close it is 
perhaps surprising more errors were not made by all of the groups. 
The results of Experiment 5 therefore confirm the findings of Huq et al. (1988) 
and Garety et al. (1991) in demonstrating that people suffering with delusions request less 
information before reaching a decision on a probabilistic reasoning task; they are hasty and 
jump to conclusions in comparison to depressed and normal controls. This hastiness 
generalised to a more difficult condition in which the ratios were less discriminable. The 
hastiness was not apparently caused by the inability to retain the information long enough 
to allow a decision, as the presence of a memory aid did not affect the decision style of 
people with delusions. Nor was the reasoning bias merely owing to impulsiveness, since 
the change in discriminability from an 85:15 ratio to a 60:40 ratio affected people with 
delusions as much as it affected comparison groups. However, in this experiment there 
was no apparent evidence of subjects with delusions being more willing to change their 
minds or of being especially quick to do so, as was found in previous work (Garety et al. 
1991). This may be owing to a difference in testing methods. In previous studies the 
reversal measure was a change in confidence, rather than a complete reversal as used here. 
The results of Experiments 1 and 5 provide clear evidence that people with 
delusions do not have an inability to reason per se; they are able to reason in a similar way 
to non-deluded comparison groups when provided with all of the necessary evidence. In 
Experiment 1, subjects were given the results of spinning a supposedly biased coin and 
asked to estimate the chance that the coin was biased to heads. The people with delusions 
gave estimates that did not differ from those of the comparison groups. In fact the people 
with delusions were subject to the same biases in reasoning as the normal subjects. When 
the strength of the evidence was high (a high ratio of heads to tails) and weight was low 
(very few spins) subjects were relatively overconfident. However, when strength was 
low (heads and tails were similar) and weight was high (a large number of spins) all 
subjects were relatively underconfident in comparison to Bayes's theorem. Similarly, the 
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subjects with delusions did not differ from comparison groups in Experiment 5 (beads 
task) for conditions where the amount of evidence viewed was predetermined by the 
experimenter. 
However, people with delusions appear to limit the amount of data gathered before 
a decision is made, i f allowed to do so. In the conditions of Experiment 5 involving 
subject-determined evidence, people with delusions were found to require fewer beads 
than comparison groups. Therefore, it is apparent that these people are willing to reach a 
decision on the basis of less evidence. This data-limiting bias does not apparently arise 
from a disregard for task demands, impulsiveness, or from boredom or lack of 
motivation. Subjects with delusions did request more beads in the less discriminable 
60:40 condition than in the easier 85:15 condition, indicating that they took what they were 
doing seriously. Neither was the hastiness the result of an obvious limiting cognitive 
factor such as memory, as the addition of a memory-aided conditions had no effect on 
decision style. 
Garety (1991) proposed that the willingness of people with delusions to decide 
earlier and then alter their hypotheses is consistent with the studies of information 
processing that emphasise the greater influence accorded by schizophrenics to immediate 
environmental stimuli compared with the effects of prior learning. Similarly, Chapman 
and Chapman (1988) suggested that schizophrenics have a selection bias in which 
prominent stimuli are focused on and weaker stimuli are neglected to a greater degree than 
is seen in controls. Young and Bentall (1995) proposed that subjects with delusions may 
have an inability to attend to and make use of sequential information about outcomes. 
Difficulty in integrating information over time would presumably lead to an early response 
when presented with information bit by bit. Young and Bentall also state that this 
difficulty may lead to increased errors when the subjects are made to decide at a fixed point 
by the experimenter. This is not in keeping with what is found here. 
An alternative way of viewing such a biased reasoning style is as a functional way 
of reducing cognitive demands. An early jump to conclusions style may reduce the 
investment that a subject has to make in the decision. It may be possible that the subjects 
experiencing delusions do not especially care whether they are right or wrong, and the 
additional motivational cost of requesting additional information is not worth it to them. 
However, the same would then be expected of subjects with depression. Alternatively, 
the hasty style could be considered as an extreme version of the confirmation bias (Wason, 
1960), in which people with delusions may be less able to consider alternatives or are 
unwilling to entertain other hypotheses or tolerate ambiguity, and thus impose an answer 
on the task. Brett-Jones, Garety and Hemsley (1987) reported that patients with delusions 
did not search for disconfirmatory evidence as much as patients without delusions. 
A possible anecdotal illustration of this confirmation bias is the case of one patient 
suffering from delusions. She would explicitly state that she would see a set number of 
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beads before making a decision. Then, regardless of the actual sequence of draws, she 
would decide at the predetermined number. 
It should be borne in mind that a hasty decision style does not inevitably lead to 
incorrect decisions. There were only 4 errors made at the 85:15 ratio by the people with 
delusions, despite gathering less evidence. However, no comparison subjects made such 
errors. At the 60:40 ratio, a hasty decision style should apparently leave the subject open 
to making errors. However, even i f a hasty decision style did lead to incorrect hypotheses 
i f the material is neutral, as in the case of this beads task, a faulty idea or belief could be 
revised in the face of disconfirmatory evidence, as was shown by the willingness to alter 
beliefs in the reversals condition. Overall, then, with these neutral materials the subjects 
with delusions appear to be as rational as comparison groups and are no more or less 
willing to alter their hypothesis or quicker or slower to do so than the controls. The 
difference is simply that people with delusions choose to make up their minds when less 
evidence is available. When the subjects with delusions have made an incorrect decision 
they do not stick doggedly to the conclusion. However, this is not to deny that i f the 
belief is of a personally salient nature then the resistance to counter-argument may be 
increased and presentation of disconfirmatory evidence may be ignored. In such 
circumstances, the subjective importance of the content may serve to exaggerate the biased 
thinking (Bentall, 1994). 
A jump to conclusions reasoning style could of course be contributing to the 
maintenance and intensity of delusional beliefs. Moreover, such reasoning biases may be 
a focus for cognitive behavioural treatments. Kingdon and Turkington (1991a) described 
the course of cognitive therapy with patients with delusions and noted that people often 
made arbitrary inferences (or jumped to conclusions). The finding that when given all of 
the evidence, the people suffering from delusions were able to reach the same conclusion 
as the normal subjects indicates that when the material is of a non-salient nature the 
reasoning process is functioning normally. 
9.5 Conclusions 
Subjects who experience delusions have been shown to exhibit a hastiness bias on 
tasks unrelated to the content of the delusion. However, these subjects do not have an 
inability to reason as was shown on the Biased Coin, and Cognitive Estimates Tasks. It 
appears to be the case that subjects with delusions appear to prefer to view less evidence 
prior to a decision. Bentall and colleagues have reported that subjects with delusions 
preferentially attend to and subsequently bias the processing of material related to the 
theme of the delusional belief. This raises the intriguing possibility of manipulating the 
material used on the beads task so that it now becomes salient to the subject with 
delusions. This is the focus of the next study. 
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10 Experiment 6: Reasoning with self referent material 
10.1 Introduction 
People suffering delusions have been shown to be hasty relative to control subjects 
when making up their minds on abstract, neutral probabilistic reasoning tasks (previous 
chapter). This jump to conclusions strategy is thought to occur because people with 
delusions fail to draw on previously acquired information (Garety, 1991). However, the 
cause of the hastiness is by no means clear. 
In addition, subjects who have delusions (though more specifically with a 
persecutory theme) have also been shown to have content specific information processing 
styles. For instance, they have attentional and memorial biases for threat related material 
(Bentall and Kaney, 1989) as well as for self esteem related concepts (Kindermann, 
1994). It is suggested that normally existing biases found in non deluded subjects are 
operating to an excessive degree in order to defend the subject with persecutory beliefs 
against feelings of low self esteem. The paranoid subject is held to have a discrepancy 
between the self as it actually is and the ideal self. In depressed subjects this discrepancy 
leads to feelings of sadness and inadequacy and naturally leads to depression. Subjects 
with delusions in an attempt to stave off this depression utilise self esteem enhancing 
biases in order to bolster apparent self esteem and actively try to reduce the discrepancy 
between actual and ideal self. This leads to a biasing of any threat related or self related 
material (Bentall, Kinderman and Kaney, 1994). 
This current study was an attempt to investigate the two types of biased reasoning. 
People with delusions have been shown to have a hasty decision style on material 
unrelated to the theme of the delusion (Garety, 1991). In addition, such subjects have 
been shown to have attentional, processing and reasoning biases with material that is 
related to the theme of the delusion (Bentall, 1994) or is related to the self concept (Bentall 
et al. 1994). Thus, following a functional model of delusions acting to protect self 
esteem, it would be expected that these subjects are likely to amplify or exaggerate the 
hastiness demonstrated on the beads task i f it the material is made salient and is changed 
from abstract neutral to realistic and social in content. People with delusions will become 
even more hasty in data gathering. Possibly the subjects with delusions may want to 
impose an answer quickly to reduce the ambiguity. Given the importance of the self 
esteem defending function of delusions (Bentall, Kinderman and Kaney, 1994) any study 
that did not find saliency of self esteem related material would seriously weaken the 
hypothesis involving the self concept. 
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People with delusions are supposed to be less able to utilise previously acquired 
information on neutral tasks. Thus, it would be expected that salient material will reduce 
this ability even further, as it places a greater demand on the already biased (or inefficient) 
information processing systems. 
To explore this possibility two versions of a beads type task were used. The first 
task was realistic in that it used concrete examples but remained neutral in content. 
Subjects were presented with two schools, one that is mainly for boys (60%) and one that 
is mainly for girls (60%). On the basis of random sampling from the school the subject 
had to identify whether it is mainly boys or girls that attend the school. The first names of 
the students were presented and the participant requested as many names as necessary to 
make a decision. It was expected that the people with delusions would perform in the 
same way as they did on the previous study and respond on the basis of less evidence in 
comparison to control groups. Since the content is only different in the degree of realism 
and not in personal salience it was not expected that there would be a difference from the 
beads task in the amount of evidence viewed by each group. 
In an emotional self referent (salient) version of the above task, participants were 
presented with a short scenario that two surveys had been conducted that gathered 
comments about someone who was very similar to the subject. One survey was generally 
positive and indicated the person was generally liked by other people (60%) and in the 
other survey the person was generally disliked (60%). On the basis of showing the 
participant a series of comments it was his/her job to decide i f the survey indicated that the 
person was generally liked or disliked. The subject requested as many comments as 
necessary in order to decide if the comments originated from a mainly positive or a mainly 
negative survey. People with delusions were expected to request even less information 
than on the neutral tasks as the material is self related and this group show a biased 
processing of this type of material. 
Since an increase in hastiness was expected the 85:15 ratio was not used as in this 
instance subjects with delusions were deciding on the basis of very little evidence (2 or 3 
beads). Hence, there was very little scope for even hastier deciding. Therefore, the 
harder to discriminate 60:40 ratio was used throughout. 
The words used in the self referent (salient) task were rated for likeableness of 
personality traits (Anderson, 1968). Participants in the study decided whether there were 
generally positive traits mentioned (sincere, honest, loyal, warm etc.) or generally negative 
comments (liar, mean, cruel, dishonest etc.). It was expected that dealing with this salient 
material would cause an exaggeration of the hastiness bias and would lead to even less 
evidence being collected by the people with delusions. 
Self esteem related words were preferred to threat related material (i.e. Emotional 
Stroop task, Bentall and Kaney, 1989) because persecutory delusions are not all 
necessarily the same. They often differ in the actual detailed content of the delusion. The 
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theme is consistent in that one feels to be the victim of a plot or conspiracy. However, the 
detail may concern poisoning, stealing, watching, or any of a multitude of other methods. 
Thus, it is unlikely that different people's delusions will share common words such as 
spy, follow, watch, etc.. Therefore, using a limited number of words may not be salient 
to some of the experimental group. Self esteem related words are meant to reflect the 
concern with self image that is considered the basis of the paranoid defence (Bentall, 
1994) and should apply to all persecutory type delusions (patients with grandiose 
delusions also participated as they were expected to be preoccupied with self concepts as 
well, Neale, 1988). 
Maher criticised the work of Bentall and colleagues stating that the bias associated 
with processing threat related material may occur as the subject is very familiar with the 
materials. Thus, the person with persecutory beliefs would have an attentional bias to 
threat related material in the same way that a golfer may have an attentional bias to golf 
related material. However, in Maher's theory people with delusions would not be 
expected to be attentive to self concept material. I f they are shown to be attentive to this 
type of material it indicates that the subject is preoccupied with their self concept even if 
they do not openly discuss it. This would lend support to Bentall et al.'s (1994) proposal 
that delusions arise from a discrepancy in the self concept. 
No predictions were made a priori about whether there would be a bias between 
positive and negative outcomes. It is sufficient at this stage to demonstrate an increased 
bias with salient material. Kinderman (1994) demonstrated an increased latency on the 
Emotional S troop task for both positive and negative words implying that both types are 
difficult for the person with delusions to cope with. There is a possibility that choice of 
survey may be congruent with the subjects' moods. Thus, people with depression may be 
more likely to choose the negative survey. People with delusions may be more likely to 
choose the positive survey as a deliberate attempt to stave off feelings of low self esteem. 
This is only a speculation however. Generally, accuracy of the decision at this level of 
probability is less important because at the 60:40 ratio it is very difficult to be truly positive 
that one choice is better than the other. 
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10.2 Method 
Subjects: Once again three groups of subjects agreed to participate in this study. 
The experimental subjects were 15 people with delusions of grandeur or persecution and 
who were diagnosed as schizophrenic. The criteria for experimental and control groups 
selection were the same as in the previous study. Subject details are in table 10.1 below. 
Table 10.1: Subject characteristics in Experiment 6. Mean age. NART estimate of IQ. and MMSE 
performance are given, and standard deviations are in brackets. 
Group N Inpatients 
Outpatients 
Gender 
M F 
Age NART 
estimated IQ 
MMSE 
Deluded 15 5 10 11 4 44.4 (9.7) 102.8 (13.2) 28.4 (12) 
Depressed 16 12 4 8 8 44.6 (9.4) 106.3 (12.7) 28.3 (1.2) 
Control 15 7 8 38.5 (10.4) 105.6 (8.5) 28.7 (0.8) 
Significance NS NS NS 
Procedure: Materials were presented on a portable computer using the same 
experimental computer package (Superlab) as in the last study. Subjects were told that 
they were participating in a study looking at the different ways people think. They were 
told about the general procedure. Then they were presented with written instructions 
detailing the general principle of choosing from which school or survey the names or 
comments come from. Any questions were answered at this stage. Brief details of the 
trials are reported here. The presentation of the tasks followed a very similar format to the 
previous study. 
Realistic version: Two schools were presented on the screen in equal and opposite 
ratios of boys and girls in proportions of 60:40. They were represented by different 
coloured beads, or counters, in school buildings. Here the children (beads) were 
separated into the relative proportions and the discrimination was obvious. The subject 
was instructed that in real life the children are found around the school and so the 
computer had mixed up the beads, which were then shown. Next the subject was told that 
the computer had chosen one of the schools at random and that it was the subject's job to 
decide which school had been chosen on the basis of the computer drawing names of the 
children from the school and presenting them on screen (i.e. James, David, Jenny, Clare, 
Mark etc.). The names were presented one at a time and returned to the school after 
presentation. A reminder of the previously seen names was presented on the bottom of the 
screen. The subject was encouraged to decide only when certain that he/she knew whether 
it was mainly a boys' or girls' school. The number of names seen prior to a decision was 
130 
Chapter Ten 
recorded. The subject was asked i f he/she was completely sure. I f not, they were offered 
the chance to see more names. To help reduce any possible confusion, the pictures of the 
mixed up beads representing children in the schools was placed next to the subject to 
remind which was the mainly boys' and girls' school. 
Salient version: The procedure was identical except instead of schools the subject 
was told to imagine that two surveys of 100 people each were asked what they thought of 
a person who was very similar to the subject. In one survey most people made positive, 
or nice comments about the subject. In fact 60% said they did like subject and had given 
positive comments and 40% said that they did not like the person and had given negative 
comments. In the other survey the opposite ratio of good to bad comments was found. 
Comments were then presented on the screen one at a time and the subjects decided when 
they felt certain they knew whether the survey was generally positive or negative The 
previous comments were in a list on the bottom of the screen. 
For each of the two content types (realistic, or salient) there were 6 trials. For each 
trial different representations of schools or surveys were used. An illustration of the 
sequence of trials will be given. 
Realistic Trials 
Trial 1: Names of children were displayed one at a time on the screen. The subject 
determined when sufficient had been seen. Fo r example the order of names in trial 1 was: 
Catherine, Gregory, Heather, Pauline, Russell, Leonard, Edward, Margaret, Rosemary, Josephine, 
Elizabeth, Maureen, Dorothy, Patrick, Michelle, Charles, Veronica, Maxwell, Theresa, Winston. 
Two further realistic trials followed. Then a block of three salient trials was 
presented. 
Salient Trials 
Trial 4: Comments from the surveys were displayed as above. An example is 
given here of the comments seen. 
Offensive, Reliable, Cheerful, Pessimistic, Selfish, Kind, Amusing, Wise, Gentle, Envious, Positive, 
Unreliable, Helpful, Bright, Unfriendly, Generous, Honest, Truthful, Annoying, Witty. 
3 more neutral trials and then 3 salient trials followed. The trials were in 4 blocks 
that were presented in a fixed pseudo random order. Full details of the orderings and the 
stimuli are in appendix 7. There were no differences in word lengths of the boys, girls 
names or of the positive and negative comments. 
131 
Chapter Ten 
10.3 Results 
The analysis involved the mean number of names of children (neutral) or the 
number of comments (salient) viewed prior to a decision being made. Table 10.2 shows 
the mean number of names and comments requested. 
Table 10.2: Results of Draws till Decision in Experiment 6. The mean numbers of words requested by 
each group and standard deviations are shown at each of the two levels of content (neutral and 
salient). A memory aid was present in all trials. 
Type of material Neutral Salient 
Deluded Mean: 5.2 4.2 
SD: 2.6 1.9 
Depressed Mean: 7.5 7.1 
SD: 3.4 3.6 
Control Mean: 8.0 7.3 
SD: 3.8 3.7 
A 2 factor analysis of variance was used to investigate the effects of subject 
Group, (3 levels, deluded, depressed, normal) and the effect of the Content on reasoning 
(2 levels, neutral or salient, repeated measure). The mean scores for each subject were 
derived from the 6 trials on the realistic task and the same number of self related trials (i.e. 
3 positive and 3 negative outcomes). 
A significant main effect of Group was found (F(2, 43) = 7.3, P< 0.002). Post 
Hoc Tukey tests (a = 0.05) indicated that the difference lay between the subjects with 
delusions and the other two groups but there was no difference between the 2 control 
groups. 
A main effect was also found for the Content factor (F( l , 43) = 11.25, p<0.002). 
Fewer items of information were requested in the salient condition than in the realistic 
condition. Simple main effects tests (a = 0.05) showed that the group with delusions 
requested fewer items at both the neutral and salient versions of the task. In both content 
conditions the control subjects did not differ from each other. 
There was no Group by Content interaction (F(2, 43) = 0.5, p = 0.6). In the 
neutral condition the people with delusions viewed on average 5.2 names and only 4.2 
comments on the salient condition. Both control groups also requested fewer comments 
than names. Depressed subjects requested on average 7.5 names and 7 comments and the 
normals requested 8 names and 7.3 comments. Thus, content apparently has an effect on 
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all groups decision processes. The greatest effect apparently being for the subjects with 
delusions and least on the people with depression. 
Overall, the number of errors made was fairly small. People with delusions made 
7 errors on the schools task and 15 on the survey task. People with depression made one 
error on the schools task and 4 on the survey task. The normal control subjects made 2 
errors on each. Given the low discrimination of the two hypotheses and the early 
response strategy of the people with delusions it is surprising more errors were not made. 
The people with delusions did make more errors in deciding the source of the material 
generally, and even more when the material is of a salient nature. However, this can in no 
way represent an absolute deficit as these 22 errors occurred in 180 trials. No one subject 
made more than 3 errors out of 12 trials. 
The cause of the errors is the people with delusions responding too early. For 
instance in trial 3, the comments block starts with a negative comment, then two positive 
and then two negative. In the long run more positive than negative words would be 
shown. However, the people with delusions typically respond after 4 or 5 comments and 
thus, say it is a negative survey. Given the evidence, this is the right decision but the early 
decision has led to an error. As people with delusions view less data on the salient trials 
they make more errors. 
The people with delusions wrongly said that the comments were from a negative 
survey when the comments actually came from a positive survey 9 times. The opposite 
error was made 6 times. The people with depression made more of the first type of error 
(4 to 1). This is likely to occur as a result of a particular presentation order of one the 
comment trials rather than from any systematic bias. Al l the errors of saying the source is 
negative when it was actually positive occurred on the same trial. Therefore, it is doubtful 
that there is a systematic bias in either of the groups to pick favour one sort of survey 
above the other. 
Performance on the previous beads task at the 60:40 ratio, which is equivalent to 
this task, is virtually identical. In the previous study, people with delusions requested on 
average 5.1 beads and the depressed subjects viewed 7.9 and the normal subjects 7.7 
beads. Therefore, performance on the neutral names tasks and the neutral beads task is 
very similar. 
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10.4 Discussion 
The present study examined whether the apparent hastiness in reasoning exhibited 
by people with delusions would be evident on more realistic tasks and whether the 
hastiness would be affected by changes in the saliency of the material. Namely, would the 
decision style be affected when the material was self referent and required a self focused 
value judgement. The results of the experiment indicate that people with delusions once 
again, make decisions on the basis of less evidence than control subjects (p = 0.002). 
Therefore, the hastiness in reasoning or the "jump to conclusions" style is evident on tasks 
that use more realistic materials. 
Moreover, when the material is of a self related nature, concentrating on how 
others view the person, it seems that people with delusions actually become even more 
hasty in their decision making. This reduced data gathering is true of all the groups but the 
largest proportional difference is for the people with delusions. 
Therefore, this study supports the previous findings that people with delusions 
reliably gather less data before making decisions. In the previous study, it was 
demonstrated that this hastiness bias was not a mere artefact of being generally impulsive 
and answering without consideration of the task. This was shown by the increase in the 
amount of evidence collected in the 60:40 condition relative to the 85:15 ratio. Also, the 
hastiness bias was shown not to arise from the people with delusions being unable to 
retain the information in mind in order to reason with it. The addition of a memory aid in 
the form of showing the previously presented beads did not radically alter the decision 
style. This present study has indicated that the early decision style is evident when the 
material is more complex and realistic. The people with delusions made up their minds 
based on a similar amount of evidence as in the beads task. Finally, this hastiness appears 
to be increased when all subjects are dealing with material that is self referent and concerns 
value judgements about the self. There is a hint that this increase is especially marked in 
the people with delusions. 
The results of this and the previous study support the finding that people with 
delusions are hasty in their decision making (Garety, 1991) and that they are especially 
hasty whilst reasoning with material that is related to the self concept (Bentall, 1994). The 
reason for this increased hastiness in people with delusions when dealing with self related 
material is proposed to occur because an already biased and inefficient data gathering 
system is stretched further by the salient material. This biased processing of self related 
material places an increased demand on the reasoning system. In order to reduce this 
strain, or cognitive effort, it is proposed that the subject decides early to reduce the 
ambiguity of not having an answer. Since the material is presumably difficult for all 
subjects, as all of the groups show a decrease in the amount of evidence viewed, it may be 
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the case that the material is merely accelerating an already hasty system in the people with 
delusions. 
More errors were made by the people with delusions than the control subjects (22 
errors, versus 5 and 4 for the depressed and normals respectively). This is still not 
representative of a pervasive inability to reason by people with delusions. The number of 
errors is still small relative to the number of trials in total (180). The group with delusions 
made 7 errors on the school tasks and 15 on the comments task. Although it is tempting to 
believe that this represents an inability to reason with salient information this is probably 
not the case. The early decision style simply leads to more errors being made. There is no 
evidence that there is a deliberate conversion of answers. The people with delusions do 
not systematically claim the comments come from a negative or a positive survey, 
regardless of the data. Rather, it appears that when the subjects with delusions are hasty it 
merely leads to more errors. The people with delusions are not viewing enough evidence 
to be correct. When reasoning with salient material they become even more error prone 
owing to the increase in hastiness. 
Despite being more likely to make errors than the control subjects such a "jump to 
conclusions" bias does not mean that errors are necessarily maintained. In the previous 
study subjects with delusions were as willing as control subjects to change their decisions 
when presented with discrepant evidence. One obvious question to ask is whether people 
with delusions would as readily alter a belief when the content of the belief is self related 
and not neutral in content. 
10.5 Conclusions 
People with delusions have been shown to request less evidence than other 
subjects when making a decision. This hastiness in data gathering is present in a realistic 
reasoning task. In addition, the tendency to jump to conclusions is apparently increased 
when the material reasoned with is of personally salient nature. Specifically, i f the 
material is self related, people with delusions become even hastier in their decision 
making. However, this increase is not disproportionate to that demonstrated by other 
control groups. 
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11 
J i — S u m m a r y and conclusions 
11.1 Overview of thesis 
The aim of this present research has been to explore the possibility that people 
who suffer delusions have biases or errors in their thinking. These differences are 
thought to contribute to them forming and holding their abnormal beliefs. This chapter 
serves to recap and to review the results of the experimental studies and to discuss these 
findings in relation to models of delusion formation. 
An important consideration in this research on reasoning is what type of task 
should be used to compare the groups' performance on. The strategy taken here was to 
manipulate the reasoning tasks in both form (statistical, deductive) and in content 
(abstract or realistic and neutral or self referent). Using different forms of tasks allowed 
an examination of the information processing biases proposed to be characteristic of 
people with delusions (Garety, 1991). The use of different contents in the tasks acted to 
bridge the apparent divide between the previous research concerning social reasoning 
(Bentall, Kinderman and Kaney, 1994) and hypothesis evaluation (Garety and Hemsley, 
1994). 
11.2 Overview of results 
The results of the experimental studies showed both similarities and differences 
between reasoning in people with delusions and control subjects. These wi l l be 
examined in turn. 
11.2.1 Similarities in reasoning 
On the Cognitive Estimates task (chapter 6) the participants were required to 
utilise existing information in a novel way to provide an answer to an unusual question. 
For instance, subjects were asked "how fast do race horses gallop?". The people with 
delusions provided estimates that did not differ from those provided by the other groups. 
In addition, the subjects with delusions were no more confident in the certainty of their 
answers. Garety's (1991) model suggested that overconfidence is a feature of the 
reasoning style of people with delusions. Previous research had found examples of such 
overconfidence in decision making (Huq et al. 1988). 
In the Biased Coin task (chapter 5) subjects were presented with the results of 
spinning a supposedly biased coin. The person estimated the chance or probability that 
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the coin was biased to heads. It was expected that subjects with delusions would neglect 
base rate information and be particularly affected by the saliency or strength of the 
information (ratio of heads to tails). This would have led to estimates different to those 
of the control groups. However, the people with delusions were shown to reason in 
accord with the other normal and depressed subjects. In fact, all groups were susceptible 
to the same biases in estimates caused by differing the strength (ratio of heads to tails) 
and weight (number of trials) of the evidence. 
Similarly, in the Experimenter determined condition of the Beads task (chapter 9) 
subjects were presented with 10 pieces of evidence and were required to decide from 
which jar the beads were most likely coming. Here the subjects with delusions reasoned 
very much like the control subjects. Once a decision had been made after viewing ten 
beads, subjects were presented with evidence that would conflict with their judgement of 
the source of the beads. The people with delusions did not change their minds more 
quickly nor more frequently than the control subjects. I f these people with delusions 
were excessively influenced by stimuli currently in the environment (Garety, 1991) then 
they would have been expected to have reversed their decisions more often or faster than 
the control subjects. 
Therefore, on tasks that were unrelated to the theme of the delusional belief, 
people with delusions reasoned in the same way as control subjects. In probabilistic 
reasoning (Biased Coin, 10 beads) when the people with delusions were provided with 
all of the necessary information, the decisions made were the same as those of people 
without delusional beliefs. The evidence demonstrated that people suffering from 
delusions were able to reason normally. However, differences were revealed when 
reasoning on different forms of reasoning tasks and when dealing with material of an 
emotional nature. 
11.2.2 Differences in reasoning 
The second set of results provided clear evidence of differences in reasoning 
between the groups. For instance, the people with delusions were significantly poorer at 
solving the easiest Wason Selection task, the alcohol conditional (chapter 7). On the less 
realistic conditionals the pattern of performance was similarly poor for all of the groups. 
When unable to produce the logically correct p and not q card selection, all the groups 
tended to choose the p and q cards. They made the matching bias response and chose 
the cards mentioned in the rule. It is interesting to note that the people with delusions 
did improve in their performance across the conditionals. Like the comparison groups, 
the subjects with delusions produced more correct responses when the content was more 
realistic. Therefore, people with delusions were subject to the same biases as the other 
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groups. Namely, a tendency to make the matching error response when the task was 
abstract and difficult, and an improvement in performance with facilitatory content. 
This indicates that the group with delusions were attempting to reason and were not 
disregarding the task demands or merely responding at random. However, they did not 
achieve the same level of performance as the other groups on the easiest alcohol 
conditional. 
In a second set of conditionals the utility of outcome was assessed as it may have 
affected the performance of the groups (chapter 8). It was thought that the values placed 
on the different consequences of a rule may have been different for subjects with 
delusions. These people may have been less concerned about the rule being broken than 
the other groups. This would have led to less efficient performance on the task by this 
group as utility of outcome has been shown to affect performance (Manktelow and Over, 
1992). Once again people with delusions were significantly worse at providing the 
correct answer on the alcohol conditional. However, there was no relationship between 
the poor performance and the utility judgements made by the groups. Therefore, utility 
did not appear to be a factor influencing the poor performance of the subjects with 
delusions. 
One of the conditionals used a threat related content. This manipulation should 
have made the conditional both salient and available to the people with delusions. 
Increasing familiarity and salience are factors that usually improve performance in 
normal subjects (Griggs and Cox, 1982). Surprisingly, when the conditional was closely 
related to the theme of the delusion there was no difference in performance between the 
groups. This task did not reveal the processing biases for theme related material that 
subjects with delusions have demonstrated previously (Bentall, 1994). 
The performance of people with delusions on the Wason's selection tasks was 
worse than that of the control subjects on the easiest of the conditionals; the alcohol 
conditional. However, the difference in performance was attributed to the functioning of 
an inefficient reasoning system rather than one that was fundamentally different. This 
was owing to the demonstration of the facilitatory effect of realistic content on all 
groups' performances and the tendency by all groups to make the matching bias error on 
the more difficult, abstract conditionals. The cause of the inefficiency and the failure of 
the subjects with delusions to attain the same level of performance as the other groups is 
not known. The people with delusions are clearly finding these tasks more difficult than 
the other subjects. It was speculated that the people with delusions may be hampered by 
some limitation in a cognitive process such as working memory ability (Fleming et al. 
1994). 
The Beads task (chapter 9) demonstrated that people with delusions gathered less 
evidence before making a decision. They did not necessarily make an incorrect 
decision. In fact, the subjects with delusions reasoned very well and made few errors 
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overall. However, when allowed to view as much or as little evidence as they wished, 
this group requested less evidence than the control subjects. This hastiness was also 
evident on a less discriminable and thus, more difficult condition (60:40). The group 
with delusions requested more beads than in the easier condition. However, they still 
requested significantly fewer beads than the other groups. Therefore, the people with 
delusions took account of the task demands and altered the decision style accordingly. 
The hastiness was not the result of a disinterest in the task. Similarly, the hastiness was 
not obviously caused by an inability to retain the information in mind. The addition of a 
memory aid did not alter the decision style. In this instance a memory limitation was not 
the apparent cause of the reasoning bias. However, poorer performance on the Wason's 
selection tasks may still be explained by working memory impairments. The Wason's 
conditionals seem to be more difficult tasks that strain cognitive resources more than the 
bead tasks. Hence, any working memory limitation would have a greater impact on a 
harder task. 
The hastiness exhibited by people with delusions was also evident when the 
material used was realistic but neutral in content (names) and when the material was 
salient and self referent (comments in the Salient beads task, chapter 10). A l l of the 
groups were affected by the self referent information and decided slightly sooner in the 
salient condition. The people with delusions it seemed were disproportionately affected 
by the emotional material. In comparison to the control subjects, the people with 
delusions showed a greater percentage decrease in the amount of evidence viewed on the 
self referent comments task. Whilst, this difference was not significant it does suggest 
that there was a greater effect of the emotional material on the reasoning of people with 
delusions. 
The effect of emotional content on reasoning was also shown to be an important 
factor by Kemp, Chua, McKenna and David (1996). People with delusions and non 
deluded controls were given syllogisms that were neutral or emotionally laden in 
content. Both groups were equally affected and made more errors when reasoning with 
emotional material. David proposed that emotional content causes the person to rely on 
pre-existing beliefs rather than trying to reason with the current data. This is the 
opposite of Garety and Hemsley's (1994) proposal in which people with delusions are 
held to be stimulus bound or data driven. David is proposing that all subjects impose an 
answer from pre-existing beliefs when reasoning with this emotional material. 
People with delusions do not necessarily have fundamentally different reasoning 
processes to other subjects. Some of the studies have shown reasoning that is very much 
like that seen in non deluded subjects (Biased Coin, CET, 10 beads). However, there are 
clear instances where people with delusions do not reason as well as comparison groups 
(Wason Selection task, alcohol conditional) or reason in a different way to the other 
groups (Beads and Salient Beads tasks). 
139 
Chapter Eleven 
Maher (1992a) suggested criteria that need to be fulfilled in order to demonstrate 
a causal status for a reasoning abnormality as the basis of delusions. Criterion D 
(chapter 4) specified that reasoning biases should be present on tasks unrelated to the 
theme of the delusion. The evidence presented here provides quite ample demonstration 
of such biases (i.e. beads tasks or conditionals). In addition, criterion E required that the 
tendency to arrive at false beliefs should go beyond the topic of the delusion itself. 
Maher argued that as delusions are generally fairly limited in scope it indicated that the 
reasoning bias could not be generalised. However, this implies that a generalised 
reasoning bias naturally leads to errors in thinking and, thus faulty beliefs, on a wide 
variety of topics. 
A generalised difference in reasoning style such as hastiness, does not 
necessarily require that people with delusions are compelled to make false inferences. A 
hasty style does not automatically lead to more errors (as was shown in the beads task, 
chapter 9). Even i f a false conclusion was reached, i f the material was neutral in content 
it was readily revised in the face of disconfirmatory evidence (10 beads and reversal). 
Therefore, a false belief wil l be revised i f it is neutral in content. Thus, a generalised 
reasoning bias does not necessarily cause faulty reasoning. People with delusions do not 
have to have abnormal beliefs about a wide range of areas. I f they make a false 
conclusion owing to a hasty data gathering style then it will be readily revised owing to 
the neutral nature of the material. However, i f the material is salient in nature it appears 
to increase the hastiness in decision making seen in people with delusions. This may 
lead to an increased chance of errors (as was seen in the salient beads task). Whether a 
false belief would be as readily revised in the face of discrepant evidence remains to be 
seen. 
11.3 Implications for theories of delusion formation and maintenance 
People with delusions have been shown to have a reasoning style that is different 
under some circumstances to the reasoning of non deluded subjects. According to 
Maher's (1974, 1988) theory, delusions are normal explanations of abnormal 
perceptions. Therefore, people with delusions should have reasoning processes that are 
not different to those of other non deluded subjects. This view is incompatible with the 
reasoning differences reported here. 
Garety's (1991, Garety and Hemsley, 1994) model of delusions seems to be the 
most complete to date. The model is shown below and is discussed more fully in chapter 
2. Unlike Maher, Garety clearly recognises the intimate relationship of perception and 
inference (box 4). To briefly recap, delusions are thought to occur primarily from a 
failure to utilise previously acquired information. This can cause stimuli in the 
environment to be given abnormal significance (box 2). The failure to utilise previously 
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acquired information also affects how this abnormally significant material is processed. 
The model predicts that there are a number of biases in the processing of information 
that are characteristic of people with delusions. Specifically, such people are thought to 
be rapid and overconfident in their decision style. Also, they are supposed to display 
low IQ and focus on current stimuli (box 4). These features were tested in the reasoning 
tasks reported above. 
Figure 11.1: Garety's (1991) model of belief formation 
1. Prior 
Expectations 
e.g.: past learning, 
affect and 
associated 
cognitions, 
personality 
2. Current 
Information 
e.g.: 
expected- unexpected 
external - internal 
clear- ambiguous 
common - unusual 
neutral - affectively loaded 
voluntary - involuntary 
public - private 
irrelevant - relevant 
4. Information 
Processing Style 
(perception and inference) 
e.g.: 
focus on current stimuli - use 
past learned regularities 
rapid - cautious 
overconfident - underconfident 
cognitively simple - complex 
low IQ - high IQ 
4a. 
Fail to use 
learned 
regularities 
High 
Arousal 
3. information 
e.g.: expected 
common 
external 
neutral 
IGNORE 5. Belief 
7. Search for 
(confirmatory) 
Evidence 
6. Reinforcement 
e.g.: anxiety reduction 
defence against depressive cognitions 
The results of this research indicated that many of the features of information 
processing attributed to the people with delusions were not present. Whilst there appears 
to be ample evidence of a hasty decision style (beads tasks) the remaining features are a 
little less certain. For instance, there was no apparent evidence of subjects being 
overconfident in their decisions on the Cognitive Estimates Task. Even in a replication 
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of the beads task there was similarly no indication that people with delusions were more 
confident in their decisions than other subjects (Garety et al. 1991) 
A low IQ is considered to be a feature of delusion formation. However, all of the 
subjects in the research were matched for premorbid intelligence scores. Whilst the 
NART is not a true indicator of current IQ it does correlate well with current measures 
(Crawford et al. 1991). Therefore, there should be little i f any difference between the 
groups for intelligence. Despite the apparent intellectual comparability, reasoning 
differences did exist under certain conditions. Hence, the status of a low IQ in delusion 
formation seems unclear. 
An additional factor that is proposed to be a feature of information processing of 
people with delusions is the tendency to focus on current stimuli. This means that 
current situational information is accorded undue weight. However, the Biased Coin 
task showed that people with delusions did not focus on the strength of the evidence 
(ratio of heads to tails) more than any other group. Therefore, the group with delusions 
did not appear to be ignoring past experience (understanding of the weight) more than 
any other group. In addition, a tendency to focus on current stimuli was proposed to 
account for the tendency of people with delusions to change their minds faster than other 
subjects. Garety et al. (1991) showed subjects 10 beads and asked for a decision as to 
the source of the beads. Then beads of predominantly the other colour were shown. 
People with delusions changed their minds more rapidly than the other subjects. This 
was taken as evidence that the people with delusions were focusing on current stimuli. 
However, in the beads task reported here subjects with delusions were no quicker to 
change their decisions as to the source of the beads when presented with discrepant 
evidence. 
There is clear evidence that people with delusions are hasty and jump to 
conclusions. However, whether this is caused by a failure to utilise previously acquired 
information is less certain. The relationship between disruptions to Latent Inhibition 
(LI) and course of the illness make it unlikely that the hastiness evident on the beads task 
can be accounted for by a failure to utilise previously acquired information. The people 
with delusions who performed hastily on the beads task all had their illness for some 
considerable time and had or were receiving antipsychotic medication. Both of these 
factors have been shown to restore the L I effect (Baruch et al, 1988, Gray et al. 1992). 
This implies that the subjects in these studies would have been able to utilise previously 
acquired information. 
Therefore, an alternative explanation needs to be considered. It may well be the 
case that early in the acute stage of a psychotic illness people do fail to utilise previously 
acquired information. This may lead to the noticing of illusory correlations, feelings of 
abnormal significance and hastiness in decision making, and thus to the formation of a 
delusion. However, hastiness may be maintained even though the person is no longer 
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having difficulties using past experience. Hastiness may act as a learned heuristic. 
Decisions made hastily are not necessarily incorrect. Early decisions also lead to 
quicker less effortful reasoning. Therefore, this style may be adopted in the long term. 
Being hasty may serve the purpose of the reasoner by rapidly imposing an answer rather 
than having to endure the ambiguity of not knowing what is the correct answer. Rather 
than "jumping to conclusions" the people with delusions may be "cutting their losses". 
Hastiness in decision making was increased when reasoning with self referent 
material (chapter 10). Therefore, when dealing with emotional material perhaps it 
encourages everyone to cut their losses and decide earlier. Alternatively, David (1996) 
proposed that emotional material causes someone to rely on pre-existing beliefs to solve 
a syllogism rather than trying to reason with the material provided. Hence, hastiness 
may be increased because the person is also relying on what they expect rather than what 
is actually presented. The increased jumping to conclusions on tasks with material that 
is self referent or emotionally laden causes more errors to be made. Thus, false beliefs 
are more likely to be formed on topics that are of an emotional nature. 
Clearly the content of the material has an impact on reasoning both in the 
hypothesis testing paradigms (i.e. salient beads task, chapter 10) and in social 
information processing (Bentall, 1994). Whilst Garety's model is proposed to account 
for delusions within the non affective psychoses, it seems that there should be a greater 
role for the importance of the material that is reasoned with. When the content of the 
material is related to self esteem or affective state, reasoning is biased even further. 
Therefore, there is an apparent interaction of emotional material with a generalised 
reasoning bias. 
Throughout this thesis it has been argued that delusions are like normal beliefs 
and serve a purpose to the holder. Therefore it is important to consider the function that 
the delusional belief may serve. It is possible that the belief is abnormal because the 
function it serves is abnormal too. The paranoid defence proposal (Bentall et al. 1994) 
states that the delusion serves to reduce feelings of low self esteem by reducing the 
ideal-self discrepancy. Therefore, the beliefs about the self lead to a sense of depression 
and low self esteem. This is unacceptable and the belief that the person is being 
persecuted arises from the compensatory efforts to deny the depressive feelings. 
Work concerned with treating people with delusions using cognitive behavioural 
therapies provides support for the proposal that the delusions serves a function for the 
holder. These therapies try to tackle the errors and biases in thinking that people with 
delusions exhibit (Garety, Kuipers, Fowler, Chamberlain and Dunn, 1994, Kingdon, 
Turkington and John, 1994). Whilst in many cases reality testing techniques help the 
patient, practitioners are beginning to realise that merely correcting the errors in thinking 
does not necessarily make the person better. It is vital to recognise that some people 
with delusions have an investment in their beliefs (John, 1996, John and Turkington, in 
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press). Delusions act like other emotionally laden beliefs and serve a purpose to the 
holder (Roberts, 1991). Hence, successful therapy needs to address the function of the 
belief. Neale (1988) proposed that people with bipolar disorder use their grandiose 
delusions to keep distressing thoughts or ideas out of consciousness. Therefore, the 
delusion has a defensive function. This hypothesis goes beyond the notion that the 
delusion is reinforcing, rather it seems that the delusion may actually be preferred to the 
alternative reality. People recovering from an episode of paranoia have a high incidence 
of depression (Kingdon and Turkington, 1994). Once the reality denying delusion has 
been removed, self esteem no longer has a defence and the person is susceptible to 
feeling depressed. This defensive role for delusional beliefs was also proposed by Zigler 
and Glick (1988) who viewed paranoia as camouflaged depression. 
Any model forwarded to account for delusions must be able to account for both 
perceptual and reasoning abnormalities. In some cases a perceptual abnormality may be 
driving the inferential system. However, even in instances where there is an apparent 
perceptual abnormality (i.e. Capgras delusion) a reasoning bias still seems to be 
necessary for the ful l expression of a delusional belief (Fleminger, 1994, Young, 1994). 
Where there is no evidence of a perceptual abnormality, the possible function that the 
delusion serves may need to be addressed. Studies of reasoning in normal subjects 
(chapter 3) have demonstrated that inferential processes can be distorted to provide a 
belief that serves the purpose of the holder at the expense of a distortion of the data 
(Kunda, 1990). A similar process may be operating in people with delusions. 
11.4 Implications for future research 
The results of this and other work (e.g. Bentall, 1994, Garety and Hemsley, 
1994) provide clear evidence that there are certain specific biases and errors in the 
reasoning of people with delusions. However, there is still considerable scope for 
further research. 
Within the model proposed by Garety (1991) there is a need to consider the 
relationship between the proposed failure to utilise previously acquired information and 
the existence of delusions. As has been noted elsewhere, people with long histories of 
illness and receiving medication are not likely to exhibit this inability to utilise 
previously acquired information. Therefore, there is a need to measure the performance 
of people with delusions on tasks such as the L I paradigm and on the beads task. It may 
be the case that disruption to L I (increased failure to utilise previously acquired 
information) is associated with reduced data gathering on the beads task. This has not 
been demonstrated. Additionally, hastiness in performance on the beads task and 
disruption to L I may be measured in a longitudinal study. It may be that hastiness or 
disruption to L I is increased in the early stages of relapse. I f this were so, it would 
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provide an objective psychological predictor of a relapse and the recurrence of severe 
symptoms. 
A related issue is the need to consider the premorbid status of the reasoning 
abilities of people with delusions. A jump to conclusions reasoning style may be evident 
prior to the demonstration of psychotic symptoms. I f this is the case there is a need to 
determine what the precipitants are that cause the pre-existing hastiness to cause a 
delusion. Similarly, it would be valuable to test the performance of people who are not 
presently deluded but have been so previously on the beads task. I f the hastiness bias is 
a learned heuristic or is present premorbidly then it would be expected that it would 
persist despite the absence of the delusion. 
A crucial question in this research is whether the hastiness demonstrated by 
people with delusions is specific to this group of subjects or is common to all people 
with a psychotic illness such as schizophrenia. Clare, Eastwood and McKenna (1996) 
tested people with schizophrenia and normal subjects on the beads task using the 85:15 
ratio. The group with schizophrenia responded after seeing an average of 4.3 beads 
whilst the normal group saw an average of 4.8 beads. However, a large number of 
subjects with schizophrenia responded on the basis of seeing only one piece of evidence 
and thus exhibited the hasty decision style. When the responses of the people with 
schizophrenia were correlated with their symptoms (CASH scale), it was found that 
hastiness was not correlated with delusions but with the presence of negative symptoms. 
Naturally, this results casts doubt on the specificity of hastiness to delusions. 
However, there are a number of methodological difficulties with this study that 
need to addressed. Firstly, the correlation of hastiness with current symptoms is an 
inadequate approach. People with predominantly negative symptoms may have 
previously had delusions and the hastiness learnt may have remained. It is not known 
whether previously deluded subjects exhibit this bias. The preferred approach would be 
to test people who are diagnosed schizophrenic but have never had delusions and to 
compare them against people who have delusions. However, to a large extent delusions 
are synonymous with schizophrenia (Benson and Stuss, 1990). Given the relationship 
between auditory hallucinations and delusions, people with voices could not be 
considered suitable as the control group (see chapters 2 and 4 for a fuller discussion). 
Secondly, the participants in the Clare et al. (1996) study were only tested on one trial 
and may well have not realised the nature of the task. There is no evidence that the 
subjects were reasoning and not merely being indiscriminate or were uninterested in the 
task. This is not an unrealistic possibility given that negative symptoms are 
characterised by apathy and low motivation. The best way to end the task would be to 
respond quickly. Additionally, the subjects that participated in the research reported 
here were selected on the basis that negative symptoms were not a prominent feature of 
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their illness. Quite clearly further research remains to be conducted on the exact 
relationship between hastiness and delusions. 
Garety's (1991) model is well constructed but it has not been exhaustively tested. 
Whilst loathe to add an additional feature to the model, it seems necessary to consider 
the importance of affective state in more detail. It is possible that virtually all delusions 
wil l have a significant affective component and that this should be recognised on the 
model. To test the influence of affective state it is necessary to continue the type of 
work described in chapter 10 and use material related to the content of the delusion or 
that reflects concerns with the self image. People with delusions with different affective 
states could be compared to investigate the performance effects of affective state. For 
instance, Garety and Hemsley (1994) suggest that the performance of people with 
delusions of persecution could be compared against people with depression related 
delusions and people with depression who have no delusions. Naturally, the content of 
the material employed would need to be varied to include neutral and affectively loaded 
material relevant to the affective states of each patient group. 
To further investigate the existing model the status of overconfidence in 
reasoning could be re-examined. The standard task used to assess confidence in 
reasoning is to give a series of questions based on general knowledge (Lichtenstein et al. 
1984). Subjects are provided two answers and asked to rate on a scale of 50-100% how 
certain the subject is in the correctness of the answer. For instance, the subject may be 
asked which is further away New York or Moscow? Then the subject rates how certain 
he or she is in the answer. I f the number of correct answers is less than the average 
confidence rating it indicates that the subject is overconfident. Normal subjects tend to 
be more confident than they actually should be. The model would predict that people 
with delusions should be even more confident in the correctness of the answers 
provided. Naturally, the content of the material could be manipulated to study the effect 
of self referent material on confidence estimations. 
The importance of the content of the material could be investigated by presenting 
people with delusions and control subjects with a salient version of the 10 beads and 
reversal task. Once a decision had been made regarding the source of the comments 
conflicting evidence could be presented to see i f this encouraged a quicker reversal. 
A further investigation should consider the role of working memory on the 
Wason's Selection task. It may be that memory impairments are a cause of the 
inefficient reasoning seen most notably the alcohol conditional. Poor performance on 
the selection task should be correlated with impaired working memory ability. 
An additional area that is clearly in need of further study is the social inference 
making of people with delusions (Bentall, 1994). An aspect of social inference making 
that could be assessed is the understanding of social situations that may require the use 
of deception. Deception can serve both a positive and negative value. Surprise birthday 
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parties or proposals of marriage require considerable planning and deception yet serve a 
positive purpose. Would someone with persecutory beliefs shown a video of people 
planning a surprise party make the attribution that it was a negative deception rather than 
positive deception? 
The function of the delusion clearly needs to be more fully explored. It is 
postulated that in some cases delusions may serve to protect the person from feelings of 
low self esteem (Lyon et al. 1995). In addition, the delusion may offer a preferable 
reality at the expense of denial of the truth. John and colleagues are currently employing 
a cognitive paradigm to investigate the defensive function of a delusional belief. 
11.5 Conclusions 
Delusions occur in a wide variety of medical conditions. They vary in theme and 
content. Therefore, it is probable that they are caused by a combination of factors. 
However, differences in reasoning clearly have a strong role to play. Whilst a perceptual 
abnormality may be present, biased inferential processes are necessary for the expression 
of the belief (Capgras belief, Fleminger, 1994, Young, 1994). Subsequently, once a 
delusion is formed reasoning biases wil l contribute to its maintenance. The research 
reported here has shown that people with delusions do differ from other subjects in the 
way that they reason. Specifically, people with delusions were shown to be less able to 
reason deductively on Wason Selection tasks. Moreover, people with delusions were 
hasty and jumped to conclusions on probabilistic reasoning tasks when allowed to 
determine the amount of evidence viewed prior to a decision being made. This hastiness 
was also increased when the material was of a self referent nature indicating the 
difficulty that people have with reasoning with material that is emotionally laden. These 
findings were discussed in relation to current models of delusion formation and 
maintenance. 
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Appendix 1: Biased Coin test sheet as used in Experiment 1. 
"Imagine you are spinning a coin, and recording how often it lands on heads and how 
often it lands on tails. Unlike tossing, which (on average) produces an equal number of 
heads and tails, spinning a coin leads to a bias favouring one side or the other because of 
slight imperfections in the rim of the coin and an uneven distribution of mass. Now 
imagine that you know the bias is 3/5. It tends to land on one side 3 out of 5 times. But 
you do not know if this bias is in favour of heads or in favour of tails." 
No. of No. of Sample Chance that the coin. Bayesian 
Heads Tails Size is biased to heads Probability 
2 1 3 .60 
3 0 3 .77 
3 2 5 .60 
4 1 5 .77 
5 0 5 .88 
5 4 9 .60 
6 3 9 .77 
7 2 9 .88 
9 8 17 .60 
10 7 17 .77 
11 6 17 .88 
19 14 33 .88 
The ordering on the test sheet was different to the order above. This selection is ordered 
by sample size. The sheet presented to subjects used a fixed psuedo random order. The 
Bayesian probabilities were not included on the test sheet given to the subjects. 
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Appendix 2: The Cognitive Estimate Task given to participants in Experiment 2. 
Subjects were asked to answer the question and rate how confident they 
were in the decision. 
1) What is the height of the Post Office Tower? 
0% 
2) How fast do race horses gallop? 
0% 
3) What is the best paid job or occupation in Britain today? 
0% 
5) What is the length of an average man's spine? 
6) How tall is the average English woman? 
0% 
7) What is the population of Britain? 
U7c 
8) How heavy is a full pint bottle of milk? 
0% 
9) What is the largest object normally found in a house? 
10) How many camels are there in Holland? 
0% 
lAo% 
"l00% 
lie % 100% 
4) What is the age of the oldest person in Britain today? 
"li)% 
"iio% 
"lAo% 
TiJo% 
"li)% 
"iio% 
~ioo% 
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Appendix 3a: Wason Selection task given to subjects in experiment 3. 
Arbitrary condition with explicit negatives and violation checking context 
Subject Number: Date: 
Below are four cards. One side of each card has written on it either "A" or "not A". The 
other side has written either " X " or "not X". Your task is to make sure the cards conform 
to the rule: " I f a card says ' A ' on one side then the other side must say ' X ' . " 
You want to see i f any of the cards violates the rule. Which of the cards below would you 
have to turn over to check? Turn over as many cards as you think appropriate, but do not 
turn over a card unless what is on the other side can potentially tell you that the card 
violates the rule. 
Tick below each box to indicate the one(s) you have chosen. 
Rule: I f a card says 'A ' on one side then the other must say ' X ' . 
Cards: 
not A not X 
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Appendix 3b: Wason Selection task given to subjects in experiment 3. 
Abstract permission rule with explicit negatives and a violation checking 
context 
Subject Number: Date: 
Suppose people wish to engage in activity A. You know that before one can engage in 
this activity, one must fu l f i l l requirement X. Your task is to make sure that people follow 
the regulation: " I f one is to engage in activity A, then one must ful f i l l requirement X." 
There are four cards represented below, one each for four people. Each card gives 
information on a single person. One side of each card shows whether this person has 
engaged in activity A. The other side shows whether he or she fulfilled requirement X. 
You want to see i f any person violated the regulation. Which of the cards below would 
you have to turn over to check? Turn over as many cards as you think appropriate but do 
not turn over a card unless what is on the other side can potentially tell you that the person 
violated the regulation. 
Tick below each card to indicate the one(s) you have chosen. 
Rule: If one is to engage in activity A, then one must fulf i l l requirement X. 
Cards 
Engaged in 
activity 
A 
Did not 
Engage in 
activity 
A 
Fulfilled 
requirement 
X 
Did not fulfi l l 
requirement 
X 
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Appendix 3c: Wason Selection task given to subjects in experiment 3. 
Immigration officer conditional 
Subject Number: Date: 
Suppose people wish to enter the country. You know that before one can enter, one must 
have a cholera innoculation. Your task, as an immigration officer is to make sure that 
people follow the regulation: " I f one is to enter the country, then you must have a cholera 
innoculation." 
There are four cards represented below, one each for four people. Each card gives 
information on a single person. One side of each card shows whether this person wishes 
to enter the country. The other side shows whether he or she has a cholera inoculation. 
You want to see if any person violated the regulation. Which of the cards below would 
you have to turn over to check? Turn over as many cards as you think appropriate but do 
not turn over a card unless what is on the other side can potentially tell you that the person 
violated the regulation. 
Tick below each card to indicate the one(s) you have chosen. 
Rule: I f one is to enter the country, then one must have a cholera inoculation. 
Cards: 
Transit Cholera 
Hepatitus 
Typhoid 
Hepatitus 
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Appendix 3d: Wason Selection task given to subjects in experiment 3. 
Alcohol conditional 
Subject Number: Date: 
Suppose people wish to drink alcohol. You know that before one can drink alcohol, one 
must be 18 years of age or over. Your task, as a Landlord of a pub, is to make sure that 
people follow the regulation: " I f one is to drink alcohol then one must be 18 or over." 
There are four cards represented below, one each for four people. Each card gives 
infromation on a single person. One side of each card shows the person's drink. The 
other side shows the person's age. 
You want to see i f any person has violated the regulation. Which of the cards below 
would you have to turn over to check? Turn over as many cards as you think appropriate 
but do not urn over a card unless what is on the other side can potentially tell you that the 
person violated the regulation (law). 
Tick below each card the one(s) you have chosen. 
Rule: I f one is to drink alcohol, then one must be 18 or over. 
Cards: 
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Appendix 4: Alcohol utility rating sheet used in Experiment 4. 
Please indicate how important it is to you as a Landlord of a pub that the 
following situations should or should not be allowed to happen.(Condition 
D represents the rule breaker or not q card). 
A) A 22 year old drinks beer 
1 2 3 
Very Definitely Should 
definitely should be be 
should be allowed allowed 
allowed 
Neutral Should not 
be allowed 
Definitely 
should not 
be allowed 
Very 
definitely 
shouldnot 
be allowed 
B) A 22 year old drinks coke 
1 2 3 
Very Definitely Should 
definitely should be be 
should be allowed allowed 
allowed 
4 
Neutral Should not 
be allowed 
Definitely 
should not 
be allowed 
Very 
definitely 
shouldnot 
be allowed 
C) A 16 year old drinks coke 
1 2 3 
Very Definitely Should 
definitely should be be 
should be allowed allowed 
allowed 
4 
Neutral Should not 
be allowed 
Definitely 
should not 
be allowed 
Very 
definitely 
shouldnot 
be allowed 
D) A 16 year old drinks beer 
1 2 3 
Very Definitely Should 
definitely should be be 
should be allowed allowed 
allowed 
4 
Neutral Should not 
be allowed 
Definitely 
should not 
be allowed 
Very 
definitely 
shouldnot 
be allowed 
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Appendix S : Hospital Conditional used in Experiment 4. 
Name: Date: 
Suppose people wish to leave hospital. You know that before one can leave hospital, one 
must take all of the medication. Your task, as a Nurse on a ward, is to make sure that 
people follow the regulation: " I f one is to leave hospital then one must complete the course 
of medication." 
There are four cards represented below, one each for four people. Each card gives 
information on a single person. One side of each card shows the person's medication. 
The other side shows whether the person is leaving or not. 
You want to see i f any person has violated the regulation. Which of the cards below 
would you have to turn over to check? Turn over as many cards as you think appropriate 
but do not turn over a card unless what is on the other side can potentially tell you that the 
person violated the regulation. 
Tick below each card the one(s) you have chosen. 
Rule: I f one is to leave hospital, then one must have taken the medication. 
Cards: 
Completed 
Medication 
Kept in Discharged Lapsed 
on 
Medication 
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Appendix 6: Hospital utility rating scale 
Please indicate how important it is to you as a Nurse that the following 
situations should or should not be allowed to happen. (Condition D 
represents the rule breaker or not q card, Condition B also represents a 
condition where the rule is also broken). 
A) Someone is discharged who has completed the medication 
Very Definitely Should 
definitely should be be 
should be allowed allowed 
allowed 
Neutral Should not 
be allowed 
Definitely 
should not 
be allowed 
Very 
definitely 
shouldnot 
be allowed 
B) Someone is discharged who has lapsed on the medication 
Very Definitely Should 
definitely should be be 
should be allowed allowed 
allowed 
Neutral Should not 
be allowed 
Definitely 
should not 
be allowed 
Very 
definitely 
shouldnot 
be allowed 
C) Someone is kept in who has lapsed on the medication 
1 2 3 4 5 
Very Definitely Should 
definitely should be be 
should be allowed allowed 
allowed 
Neutral Should not 
be allowed 
Definitely 
should not 
be allowed 
Very 
definitely 
shouldnot 
be allowed 
D) Someone is kept in who has completed the medication 
1 2 3 4 5 
Very Definitely Should 
definitely should be be 
should be allowed allowed 
allowed 
Neutral Should not 
be allowed 
Definitely 
should not 
be allowed 
Very 
definitely 
shouldnot 
be allowed 
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Appendix 7: Paranoid conditional used in Experiment 4 
Subject Name: Date: 
Suppose you have noticed that there are two types of people. You know that there are 
people who are friendly, and those that are lying and plotting about you. Your task is to 
make sure that the statement is true or not " I f someone smiles then they are friendly." 
There are four cards represented below, one each for four people. Each card gives 
information on a single person. One side of each card shows whether the person is 
smiling. The other side shows whether the person is being friendly or plotting against 
you. 
You want to see if the statement has been true or false. Which of the cards below would 
you have to turn over to check? Turn over as many cards as you think appropriate but do 
not turn over a card unless what is on the other side can potentially tell you that the 
statement is false. 
Tick below each card the one(s) you have chosen. 
Rule: I f someone is smiling then they are friendly. 
Cards: 
Smiling Frowning Friendly Plotting 
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Appendix 8: Order of beads presented in the 85:15 and 60:40 conditions of the beads 
task used in Experiment 5. The correct jars are in bold 
85;15; 
1) Draws til l decisions (DTD). Jar A 85 white beads and 15 black, Jar B 85 black and 15 
white. Order of beads taken from Garety et al., (1991), beads A= black beads, B= white 
beads. 
A A A B A A A A A B B A A A A A A A A B 
JAR A JAR B 
2) DTD 2: Jar C 85 light striped, 15 dark striped, jar D 85 dark striped and 15 ligth 
striped. A= light striped and B= darks. Order derived from Huq et al., (1988). 
A A A A B A A A A A A A A A A B A A B A 
JARC JARD 
3) 10 draws and counterevidence. Jar E 85 Light beads and 15 dark beads, Jar F 85 dark 
beads and 15 light. Order taken from Garety et al., (1991). A= light beads 
A A A B A A A A B A * B B B A B B B B A B 
JAR E JAR F 
4) 10 draws and reversal 2. Jar G 85 plain or white beads, Jar H is 85 checkered beads. 
Order of beads is taken from Huq et al., (1988). Jar H = A. 
A A B A A B A A A A * B B B B B B B B B A 
JAR G JAR H 
5) Draws till decision and memory (tally): Jar K 85 black beads, Jar L 85 white beads. 
Order generated from random numbers on a BBC microcomputer. Jar K = A. 
A A A A A A A A A A A A B A A A A A A A 
JAR K JAR L 
6) Draws till decision and tally 2: Jar 1 85 light striped beads, Jar 2 85 dark striped beads 
Order generated as above. Jar 2= A 
A A A B A A A B A A A B A A B A A A A A 
JAR 1 JAR 2 
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7) 10 draws and tally: Jar M 85 light beads, Jar N 85 dark beads, order generated. Jar 
M = A 
A A A B A A A A A A * B B A B B B B B B B 
JAR M JAR N 
8) 10 draws and memory 2: Jar 3, 85 White and Jar 4 85 Checkered. Order derived from 
computer. Jar 4 = A 
A A A A A B A B A A * B B B B B A A B B B 
JAR 3 JAR 4 
vO;4Q 
1) Draws til l decisions. Jar A 60 black beads and 15 white, Jar B 85 white and 15 black. 
Order of beads taken from computer, beads A= black beads, B= white beads. 
B A B A A B A B A B A A A B A B A A B A 
JAR A JARB 
2) DTD 2: Jar C 60 light striped, 40 dark striped, jar D 60 dark striped and 40 light 
striped. A= light striped and B= darks. Order derived from computer. 
A A A B A B A A B A A B B B B A A A B A 
JARC JARD 
3) 10 draws and counterevidence. Jar E 60 light beads and 40 dark beads, Jar F 60 dark 
beads and 40 light. Order taken from computer. A= dark beads 
A B A A B B B A A A * B B B A B A B A B A 
JAR E JAR F 
4) 10 draws and reversal 2.. Jar G 60 checkered beads, Jar H is 60 white beads. Order of 
beads is taken from computer. Jar G = A. 
A A B A A A B B A A * B B A B A A B A B B 
JAR G JAR H 
5) Draws till decision and memory (tally): Jar O 60 black beads, Jar P 60 white beads. 
Order generated from random numbers on a BBC microcomputer. Jar O = A. 
A A A B A B A B A A A A B A A B B A B B 
JAR O JAR P 
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6) Draws till decision and tally 2: Jar 5 60 light striped beads, Jar 6 60 dark striped beads 
Order generated as above. Jar 6 = A 
A B A B B A A A B A A A A B A B B A A A 
JAR 5 JAR 6 
7) 10 draws and tally: Jar Q 60 light beads, Jar R 60 dark beads, order generated. Jar R 
= A 
B A B B A A A A A A * B B A B B B B B A B 
JARQ JARR 
8) 10 draws and memory 2: Jar 7, 60 White and Jar 8 60 Checkered beads. Order 
derived from computer. Jar 7 = A 
B A A B B A A A A B * B A B B A B B B A B 
JAR 7 JAR 8 
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Appendix 9: Ordering of childrens names and comments in Experiment 6. Two 
examples of the words used are given. Correct choice is in bold. 
Realistic Neutral: 
1) School A 60 boys and 40 girls, School B is 60 girls and 40 boys. Order of beads 
taken from computer, beads A= boys', B= girls' names. 
A A A B A B A A B A A B B B B A A A B A 
Martin, Thomas, Andrew, Jennifer, William, Lorraine, Douglas, Malcolm, Shirley, Lawrence, Michael, 
Melanie, Annette, Victoria, Caroline, Terrence, Kenneth, Arthur, Kimberely, Anthony. 
School A School B 
2) School C 60 Girls, 40 boys, School D 60 boys and 40 girls. A= girls and B= boys. 
Order derived from computer. 
A B A A B B B A A A A A A B A B A B A B 
School C Schoolfi 
3) School E 60 boys and 40 girls, School F 60 girls and 40 boys. Order taken from 
computer. A= girls 
B A B A A B A A A B A A A B A B B A B A 
SCHOOL jE SCHOOL F 
4) School G 60 boys, School H is 60 girls. Order of beads is taken from computer. 
School G = A. 
A A B A A A B B A A A A B A B B A B A A 
SCHOOLG SCHOOLH 
5) School 160 boys, School J 60 girls. Order generated from random numbers on a BBC 
microcomputer. School J = A. 
A A A B A B A B A A A A B A A B B A B B 
SCHOOLI SCHOOL J 
6) School K 60 girls, School L 60 boys Order generated as above. School L = A 
A B A B B A A A B A A A A B A B B A A A 
SCHOOLK SCHOOLL 
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Appendix 9: Ordering of childrens names and comments in Experiment 6. Two 
examples of the words used are given. Correct choice is in bold. 
Realistic Neutral: 
1) School A 60 boys and 40 girls, School B is 60 girls and 40 boys. Order of beads 
taken from computer, beads A= boys', B= girls' names. 
A A A B A B A A B A A B B B B A A A B A 
Martin, Thomas, Andrew, Jennifer, William, Lorraine, Douglas, Malcolm, Shirley, Lawrence, Michael, 
Melanie, Annette, Victoria, Caroline, Terrence, Kenneth, Arthur, Kimberely, Anthony. 
School A School B 
2) School C 60 Girls, 40 boys, School D 60 boys and 40 girls. A= girls and B= boys. 
Order derived from computer. 
A B A A B B B A A A A A A B A B A B A B 
School C School H 
3) School E 60 boys and 40 girls, School F 60 girls and 40 boys. Order taken from 
computer. A= girls 
B A B A A B A A A B A A A B A B B A B A 
SCHOOL£ SCHOOLF 
4) School G 60 boys, School H is 60 girls. Order of beads is taken from computer. 
School G = A. 
A A B A A A B B A A A A B A B B A B A A 
SCHOOL G SCHOOL H 
5) School 160 boys, School J 60 girls. Order generated from random numbers on a BBC 
microcomputer. School J = A. 
A A A B A B A B A A A A B A A B B A B B 
SCHOOL I SCHOOLJ 
6) School K 60 girls, School L 60 boys Order generated as above. School L = A 
A B A B B A A A B A A A A B A B B A A A 
SCHOOL K SCHOOL L 
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Salient Beads: 
Positive self esteem outcomes: 
7) Survey 1 60 negative words, Survey 2 60 positive words, order generated. Survey 1 
= A 
A A A B A B A A B A A B B B B A A A B A 
Calm, Modest, Relaxed, Deceptive, Amiable, Insincere, Happy, Forgiving, Loyal, Tolerant, Petty, Fickle, 
Mean, Unsociable, Pleasant, Intelligent, Courteous, Humourless, Trustful. 
SURVEY 1 SURVEY 2 
8) Survey 5, 60 positive and Survey 6 60 negative . Order derived from computer. 
Survey 6 = A 
B A A B B A A A A B A B A A B A A A B A 
SURVEY 5 SURVEYS 
9) Survey 11, 60 positive, survey 12 60 negative. Survey 11 = A 
A A B A A A A A B B A A B B A A B A A A 
SURVEY 11 SURVEY 12 
Negative self esteem outcomes: 
10) Survey 3 = 60 positive, Survey 4 = negative 
A A A A A B A A B B B B A A A A B A A B 
SURVEY 3 SURVEY 4_ 
11) Survey 7= negative, Survey 8= positive 
A B B A A B A A A B A A A A B B A B B A 
SURVEY 1 SURVEY 8 
12) Survey 9= positive, Survey 10= negative. 
A A A B B B B A A A A A B A B B A B A A 
SURVEY 9 SURVEYU 
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Appendix 10: Details of the subjects that participated in each experiment. 
The experimental tasks reported in this thesis were not conducted in the order that they 
were presented. In actual fact three separate sets of studies were run. In each set of 
studies, two tasks were run in parallel. No subject participated in more than the two tasks 
that comprised a set. However, the subjects that were tested for each set of studies did not 
necessarily complete both tasks within the set. Hence, there were differences between 
members of the the groups reported on each task. This appendix serves to illustrate the 
order in which the tasks were run. In addition, the number of subjects that participated on 
both of the tasks within a set are detailed. 
Set 1 
Biased Coin (chapter 5) and the 4 Wason's Selections Tasks (chapter 7) 
In the Biased Coin task there were 12 subjects per group. In the Wason's tasks there were 
15 subjects per group. All the subjects who completed the Biased coin task also 
completed the Wason's tasks. Thus, 12 subjects completed both tasks. However, an 
additional three subjects per group were tested in the Selection tasks. A table is presented 
to illustrate. 
Table 1: Numbers of subjects completing both or only one task in Set 1. 
Group Both Tasks Biased Coin only Wason's task only 
Deluded 12 0 3 
Depressed 12 0 3 
Normal 12 0 3 
Set 2 
Beads task (chapter 9) and the Cognitive Estimates Task (chapter 6) 
In both the Beads task and the Cognitive Estimates task there were 15 subjects per group. 
The same 15 psychiatric and normal control subjects participated in both of the tasks. 
However, only 13 people with delusions completed both tasks. There were two people 
with delusions who only participated in the beads task and a different two who participated 
in the Wason's tasks. 
Table 2: Numbers of subjects completing both or only one task in Set 2. 
Group Both Tasks Beads task only Cog Est task only 
Deluded 13 2 2 
Depressed 15 0 0 
Normal 15 0 0 
Set 3 
Salient beads task (chapter 10) and the second set of Wason's Selection tasks (chapter 8) 
There were 15 people per group in the Wason's selection tasks. In the Salient beads tasks 
there were 15 per group for the deluded and normal group and 16 for the depressed group. 
11 people with delusions completed both tasks. Similarly, 13 people with depression 
completed both tasks. 14 of the normal subjects completed both tasks. 
Table 3: Numbers of subjects completing both or only one task in Set 3. 
Group Both Tasks Salient beads only Wason's task only 
Deluded 11 4 4 
Depressed 13 3 3 
Normal 14 1 1 
